













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 















PhD in Philosophy 












I hereby declare that the present thesis has been composed by me, that the work it 














In this work I reconstruct the physical and mental descriptions of perception in 
Aristotle.  
I propose to consider the thesis that αἴσθησις is a μεσότης (DA II 11)  as a description 
of the physiological aspect of perception, meaning that perceiving is a physical act by 
which the sensory apparatus homeostatically counterbalances, and thence measures, 
the incoming affection produced by external perceptible objects. The proposal is 
based on a revision of the semantics of the word mesotês in Plato, Aristotle and later 
Greek mathematicians (mostly Nicomachus of Gerasa). I show how this interpretation 
fits the text, and how it solves problems that afflict the rival interpretations. 
I further develop a ‘non-dephysiologizing’ spiritualist reading of the additional 
description of perception as reception of forms without the matter (DA II 12). I show 
that Aristotle uses the expression ‘forms without matter’ to describe actually 
abstracted items in one’s mind rather than the way in which the form are received. In 
opposition to forms-in-matter, such items are causally powerless and metaphysically 
sterile: an F-without-matter somewhat determines the subject it is in (one’s mind 
content F) without qualifying or identifying it as an F-subject. Thus, we have a second 
‘mental’ description of perception. 
Further parts of the thesis are devoted to settle interpretive questions raised by 
controversial statements about perception found in De Anima II 5 and III 2, and to 
discuss the question of how the mental and physiological descriptions of perception 
Aristotle offers are related. 
My conclusion is that Aristotle’s views combines a form of quasi-dualist vitalism about 
powers (the faculty of perception, and more generally the soul, are not just irreducible 
to matter, but also primitive and non-supervenient) which is nonetheless compatible 
with hylomorphism, and a form of epiphenomenalism (and thence the ‘bottom-up’ 
determination typical of modern supervenience) with regard to perceptual events 
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The theme of perception is a nexus of fundamental philosophical questions that 
metaphysics, epistemology and cognitive sciences are still addressing. One may thence 
be led to expect Aristotle, in his capacities as one of the greatest philosophers of all 
times, to shed some light on such questions, and look with hope at central texts in De 
Anima and De Sensu devoted to the subject. The obscurity and ambiguity of Aristotle’s 
descriptions of perception in those writings, however, are perplexing even for the 
most confident and capable of his commentators, and their content risks to disappoint 
the philosophical interest of modern readers.  
Despite the number of excellent studies on Aristotle’s account of perception, and a 
lively exegetical debate involving the best scholars in ancient philosophy for the last 
decades, it is not certain whether and to what extent his views on perception are even 
comparable with modern ones. To be sure, Aristotle believes that in perceiving we 
receive information about subjects our sense-organs are interacting with. He would 
certainly grant that there is some kind of causal interaction going on between your 
eyes and the black ink printed on the white paper you are looking at, or between our 
ears and the sound of the solid and smooth keys we touch as we frantically type to 
meet our deadlines. The presence of physical constraints, and thence the attribution of 
some role to the material properties our sense-organs possess, is a further established 
fact in Aristotle’s theory of perception that no scholar would deny. Beyond this very 
limited theses, though, there is very little we can take for granted as we attempt to 
reconstruct Aristotle’s views on perception. 
It is safe to say that the requirement of physically specialized organs is always coupled 
in modern views with the belief that the physical structure, composition and state of 
the organism makes it able to undergo, in its interaction with perceptible stimulations, 
some special physical processes that are co-occurring with, and importantly related to 
the perceptual experience of those objects. In comparison to this expectation, the role 
of the assumption concerning organs’ specialisation in Aristotle’s theory of perception 
appears puzzling. If one runs through the authoritative exegetical tradition developed 
by ancient commentators, the ‘processes’ occurring in Aristotle’s sense organs of 
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perception appear peculiar, and some of their outlandish features suggest that they 
may not actually be ‘physical’ by the current understanding of the word.  
A first influential step towards the ‘de-physiologization’ of Aristotle’s theory of 
perception is represented by Alexander of Aphrodisias’ own De Anima, that theorised 
a special status in which colours and sounds are present in media and sense organs.1 
In his paraphrasis of Aristotle’s De Anima, Themistius similarly proposed a distinction 
between senses based on their different degree of immateriality: while organs of 
hearing and sight are not affected in an ordinarily material way, the organs and media 
of taste and touch are.2 Philoponus added some specifications of his own, arguing that 
the presence of colours and smells in their respective media is fully ‘immaterial’, and 
that this status is aptly described, in Aristotle’s words, as a ‘reception of forms without 
the matter’.3 Such theses were presumably transmitted to Arabic and Latin philosophy 
by annotation complementing translations of Aristotle’s works from the Greek.4 We 
then find Averroes theorizing a ‘special’ status of perceptible forms in media and 
sense organs, which is somewhat ‘in between’ the fully material one found in source 
objects, and the spiritual one characterizing perceiving subjects.5 Such a doctrine was 
connected to the notion of ‘intentio’ by Avicenna, and later reprised in Latin Scholastic 
philosophy by Albertus Magnus and Aquinas.6 
It is nowadays controversial whether the traditional attribution to Aristotle of a de-
physiologized account of perception is the result of a distortion or an accurate 
depiction of his views, and it is accordingly uncertain whether there is any space in his 
account for genuinely physiological processes.7 The first question to be answered, 
                                                             
1 Sight does not become coloured, and the medium is not changed in the way of an 
affection (παθητικῶς,) so that neither works as matter for received colours (Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, De anima, p. 62. 1-13 Bruns). Sorabji (1991: 230) further quotes the 
‘immateriality’ of the transmission of sounds in media (ibid., p. 48. 7-21 Bruns). 
2 In libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis 75. 10-19, 79. 29-37. 
3 In de anima, pp. 334. 38-336. 3; 391. 11-29; 392. 3-19; 413. 4; 413. 9-12; 416. 30-34; 432. 
32- 433. 11 438. 6-15. 
4 Sorabji, 1991:245-247. 
5 Epitome of Parva Naturalia, pp. 29. 15- 30.28; 31. 45-32. 49 Shields-Blumberg (quoted in 
Sorabji, 1991: 254-255) . 
6 Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Anima, vol. I, p. 2, cap. 2, pp. 115.73-116.81; 116.84-7; 118.6-
10; (quoted in English translation in Sorabji, 1991:254). 
7 According to Sorabji 1991, on which the brief account sketched above is based, the de-
physiologizing tradition did indeed distort Aristotle’s views, as the commentators’ goal 
was to offer to the founder of their school a solid and defendable position, rather than to 
respect the letter of his texts. On the contrary, Burnyeat (1995: 421, note 1) claims that 
the de-physiologizing accounts they proposed were in fact respondent to Aristotle’s 
original position.  
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then, is the following: what happens in Aristotle’s sense organs as a consequence of 
the causal interaction between actually perceptible objects and sense organs? The 
question is important, and not merely for the purpose of tracing back the history of 
physiology. A reason that contributes to make the question philosophically compelling 
is that a ‘de-physiologized’ account of perception would prevent the position of the 
mind body question in a way that is interesting, or even credible, from the standpoint 
of modern philosophy.  
That Aristotle does in fact propose an incredibly ‘de-physiologized’ account of 
perception is the contention of the so-called ‘Spiritualist’ interpretation. Spiritualists 
reprise the traditional interpretation to claim that for Aristotle there is no real and 
genuinely material process going on in sense-organs. According to this view, 
perceivers are made of organs and matter primitively endowed with the ability to 
perceive, and perception consists in the simple, non-further explainable, ‘becoming 
aware’ of perceptible aspects. Perception is a change, in this account, only as far as the 
‘change’ we are talking about is the phenomenal ‘appearing’ of something to a 
perceiver. In Aristotle’s theory, then, no physiological process would be taking place 
as your eyes run through the sheet you see in front of you (Burnyeat 1992, 1995; 
Johansen 1998).  
Two interpretations rejecting the ‘de-physiologized’ account of Aristotle’s theory or 
perception have been proposed. A first one, known as ‘literalism’, contends that 
Aristotle is committed to the thesis that sense-organs become literally F when 
perceiving F by causally interacting with an F-object (Sorabji, 1971, 1992, 2001; 
Everson 1997). A second reconstruction does instead claim that a sense organ 
undergoes a non-literal assimilation, by which it receives a quantitatively describable 
‘structural’ aspect belonging to the perceived property. On this view, the organ 
becomes G as it perceives F, and its ‘becoming G’ has the function of ‘codifying’ or 
‘transducing’ the quality being perceived (Caston 2004). 
It is hard to say which of the three interpretations sketched above is more plausible, 
for the astonishing divergence between them is not the outcome of capricious 
dispositions of modern commentators, but rather the result of the unfortunate 
ambiguity that vexes Aristotle’s word on the subject. Some features of his theory often 
appear to favour one reconstruction over the competing ones, but as soon as some 
other aspect is taken into account, the initial appearance is suddenly reversed. The 
explanation Aristotle gives for the existence of a tactile blind spot (in DA II 11), for 
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instance, appear to make sense only in the frame of a literalist interpretation. This 
interpretation, however, can only deliver a very unlikely, if not patently absurd 
explanation of the lack of perception in plants Aristotle proposes in DA II 12, since the 
latter are literally affected by hot and cold while unable to perceive them. In an 
attempt to address the difficulties encountered by literalism, one may feel tempted to 
endorse the idea of a physiology based on non-literal ‘codifying’ changes, proposed by 
‘structuralist’ interpreters. After all, Aristotle himself repeatedly refers to perception 
as a ‘special’ type of affection or alteration. With this regard, the thesis that perception 
is a ‘reception of forms without the matter’ has been taken as evidence of a physiology 
of perception based on ‘transductions’. What is lost by embracing this reading, 
however, is the literalist’s ability to make sense of the phenomenon of tactile blind 
spots. Furthermore, Aristotle’s sensoria are made of simple elements (or a simple 
homogeneous blend of them in the case of touch), and they are thus compositionally 
identical to bodies that work as mere intermediaries of perceptible qualities. This 
means that no ‘micro-structures’ able to perform the required transduction should be 
conjectured, and that the only effect perceptibles can have on organ through 
intermediary bodies is the same the latter may produce on a further, materially 
equivalent intermediary. Shrinking from the difficulties implied by both literalism and 
structuralism, one may finally give up the hope to find in Aristotle a credible account 
of perception, and resign to the ‘de-physiologizing’ tradition of ancient commentators 
by embracing the sophisticated spiritualist interpretation elaborated by their modern 
heirs. Such a decision would come at a cost, however. Once again, no acceptable 
explanation for the phenomenon of tactile blind spots would be available. 
Furthermore, we would be committed to a view that clashes against Aristotle’s thesis 
concerning the loss of perception by excessively intense stimulation, which requires 
that perceptibles have some genuinely physical effect on organs during causal 
interactions that lead to perception (cf. Sisko, 1996).  
As long as one is limited to the texts on which the debate between scholars has been 
conduced so far, no decisive argument is likely going to loom in the foreseeable future, 
and until this happens it would appear advisable not to commit to any of the three 
readings currently proposed. Faced with such an impasse, one may even feel tempted 
to re-consider the idea that Aristotle did not in fact provide anything better than a 
confused account, already proposed by some commentators before the ongoing 
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controversy reached the current level of sophistication (cf. Hamlyn, 1959:8-11; 
Slakey, 1961:480-481). 
What I intend to do in this work is more ambitious: I shall contend that Aristotle 
describes perception as a homeostatic reaction by which sense organs 
‘counterbalance’ (and thus ‘measure’) the incoming affection of perceptible objects. As 
I am going to argue, this is the meaning of Aristotle’s thesis that ‘αἴσθησις is a certain 
μεσότης’ (introduced in DA II 11), which cannot describe – as it is commonly assumed 
– the state of ‘intermediacy’ characterizing senses or sense-organs.  
In chapter 1, I shall lay the foundations for my proposal by arguing in favour of a 
revision of the received understanding of the meaning of the Greek word μεσότης, 
assessing a number of revealing occurrences of the word in Plato, Aristotle and the 
ancient mathematician Nicomachus of Gerasa. I shall then corroborate (in chapter 2) 
the attribution of the proposed physiology to Aristotle by tracking textual clues 
directly or indirectly supporting it. To this end, I shall first of all demonstrate that the 
rejected standard ‘state reading’ of the thesis that αἴσθησις is a μεσότης clashes 
against important difficulties, which are either solved or altogether avoided by the 
interpretation I offer. This reading will prove to be preferable with regard to the 
remaining occurrences of μεσότης in conjunction to perception, and perfectly fitting 
with the idea that perception is a ‘special’ alteration and affection of a certain kind. 
Further confirmation of my proposal will be provided by Aristotle’s attention to the 
‘preservative’ aspect of perception, which is observable throughout DA II 5-11 and in 
the comparison between the ‘impassivity’ of senses and thought in III 4. With this 
regard, my analysis of DA II 5 (in chapter 5) will show that the admission of the 
special ‘preservative’ character of perception, which Aristotle puts forth in analogy 
with the exercise of knowledge, entails no introduction of ‘quasi-physical’ changes and 
affections. My account of the chapter will be rather centred on the assumption that the 
initial aporia about self-perception and self-activation of the sense-organs cannot in 
fact be solved as easily as commentators commonly believe. In order to give a more 
complete and fully satisfactory answer to the question, Aristotle distinguishes two 
possible ways in which the powers of perceiving and knowing can be brought to 
exercise, thus explaining why sense-organs are in fact able to perceive themselves 
under certain circumstances, but not as a consequence of ordinary perceiving.  
On the grounds of a survey of the occurrences of the clause ‘without matter’ in 
Aristotle, I shall then argue that the description of perception as a reception of forms 
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without the matter refers to its being a ‘cognitive’ and ‘mental’ activity, i.e., a 
‘reception’ of metaphysically sterile and causally powerless abstract items (ch. 3). 
While I believe that Aristotle’s formula entails the idea of receiving F without standing 
to F as matter, and thus without becoming F (a claim diversely endorsed by 
transductionist and spiritualist interpreters), I shall argue that this is not the most 
accurate reading of the phrase. Aristotle is committed to something more robust than 
a denial of literal or genuinely physical changes, and his words suggest that being 
receptive of perceptible forms without matter is sufficient for being a sense organ. In 
chapter 3, I shall accordingly address the apparent contradiction between the latter 
claim and the famous simile of the signet ring sealing a wax block contained in the 
passage. I shall propose that the comparison Aristotle puts forth is a ‘signature simile’, 
rather than as a ‘wax simile’, as he could have never intended to attribute to wax 
blocks the power to receive forms without the matter . 
A final interpretive question I shall try to settle concerns Aristotle’s treatment of the 
activity of perceiving that we see and hear (ch. 4), which has been hailed by some 
scholars as introducing a certain type of awareness, supposedly intrinsic to every act 
of perception. This interpretation has the considerable merit of providing a working 
explanation of the controversial regress argument Aristotle offers with that regard in 
DA III 2, but as I shall argue an alternative reading is possible, according to which the 
argument works without requiring any notion of ‘intrinsic’ perceptual awareness. In 
my view, the passage is rather introducing a perceptual power responsible for the 
cognition of a perceptible F without a causal interaction with an F-subject, which 
secures the possibility to manipulate and combine first-order perceptual contents.  
At the end of the planned investigation, Aristotle’s treatment of perception will 
emerge as a fully credible account satisfyingly attentive to both its ‘mental’ and 
‘physical’ aspects. On the other hand, an accurate analysis of his views will lead to 
some disappointing results with regard to the relation he establishes between 
perceptual powers and sense organs, which appears to suggest be some sort of quasi-
dualist vitalism. Under the latter respect, Aristotle’s account will indeed sound less 
than exciting, if not altogether incredible by modern standards. 
 
Chapter 1 - The blind spot phenomenon and the 
thesis that Αἴσθησις is a Μεσότης (DA II 11) 
In the course of the discussion of touch of DA II 11(424a1-10), Aristotle intertwines 
the idea that αἴσθησις is a μεσότης and a claim about a ‘blind spot’ of touch 
(respectively AisthMesot and BlindSpot from now on). The first thesis is usually read 
as a statement about the physical ‘intermediacy’ of the sensory organ (to which the 
term αἴσθησις is supposed to refer) which is valid for touch, and somewhat extended 
to the other senses by reference to a physical condition of ‘neutrality’ that allows their 
sense-organs to be affected by opposite perceptible qualities in a certain range (such 
as sweet and bitter, or black and white). According to this view, the fundamental claim 
in AisthMesot is that the sensory organ of touch is a ‘mean’ between tangible 
properties, in so far as it is lukewarm rather than hot or cold, and of ‘medium’ 
consistency rather than soft or hard.8 The connection established between AisthMesot 
and BlindSpot is unclear, but it is at any rate undisputed that Aristotle does in fact 
think that given a certain tangible quality F, it is impossible to perceive F by a F -
sense-organ. In other words, we cannot perceive what is as hot (or cold) as the sense-
organ by which we perceive temperature.  
In this chapter I shall raise two problems for the standard reading of AisthMesot, and 
propose an alternative interpretation that attempts to solve them. The first of the two 
problems the standard reading of the passage has to face is an apparently irresolvable 
interpretive dilemma. As widely recognized, BlindSpot does not make sense in 
Spiritualism, since it implies that liability to be ordinarily affected by a certain 
perceptible F is required in order to perceive F. As I am going to argue, however, the 
rationale Aristotle offers for BlindSpot also entails a difficulty for the two alternative 
physicalist readings (the so called ‘Literalist’ and ‘Structuralist’ interpretations), in so 
far as it implies a problem of ‘acquired’ blind spots.  
                                                             
8 Despite the important differences among scholars in the interpretation of the 
implications of the passage, the endorsement of this basic claim is widespread (cf. Hicks, p. 
414; Hamlyn 112; Burnyeat 1992:20; Sorabji 1992: 214-215; Freeland 1992:231-232; 
Scaltsas 1996:33-34; Everson 1997:81-82; Caston 2005:285-286; Polanski 2007:333-336) 
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The second problem the standard reading has to face is the endorsement of the 
received understanding of the meaning of the Greek word μεσότης, which as I am 
going to show is seriously flawed and in need of reconsideration. According to the 
revised meaning of μεσότης I shall propose, the word indicates a ‘mediating balance’ 
between extremes that abides by a precisely defined logos. My proposal will thus pave 
the way for the further exegetical possibility that what is being described as a certain 
μεσότης is the perceptual activity (the sensation), rather than the state of the sense-
organ or sense.  
My thesis is that by AisthMesot Aristotle describes perception as a physiological 
homeostatic process of ‘counterbalancing’ – and thus measuring – the affection 
perceptible objects exercise on sense-organs. The introduction of the thesis in 
connection with the blind-spot phenomenon is not at all casual, and rather hints at an 
advantage of the physiology Aristotle proposes: postulating a homeostatic process 
that secures the preservation of the physical condition making sense-organs receptive 
of certain affections and able to perceive accurately, thus avoiding the ‘Acquired Blind 
Spot problem’ 
1. The interpretive impasse about the blind spot phenomenon 
The way Aristotle introduces BlindSpot shows that he is confident that the 
phenomenon is in accordance with his theory of perception. He says: 
The differences of the body qua body are tangible (I mean, the differences that 
define the elements: hot, cold, dry and moist; we have spoken of them earlier, in 
the lectures on the elements). What is capable of touch is the sense-organ of 
them (namely that in which the sense called touch primarily resides), the part 
which is potentially such. For perception is a certain being affected. Accordingly, 
the agent makes that one such as itself is in actuality, as <that one> is in 
potentiality. That is why we do not perceive what is equally hot and cold or 
hard and soft, but only excesses (423b27-424a4, my translation) 
The use of the particle διὸ (‘that is why’) in the last sentence indicates that some 
rationale for BlindSpot is being provided. Three characteristic theses of Aristotle’s 
natural philosophy and psychology being recalled here are in fact able to do the job. 
The first is that perception is an affection (DA II 11, 424a 1, cf. DA II 5); the second is 
the idea that being liable to an affection by F requires one to be actually different from 
and potentially similar to F on a specific level, while actually similar on a more generic 
one (DA II 11, 424a1-2, cf. GC I 7); the third is the thesis that no body deprived of any 
actual tangible quality (hot or cold, and moist or dry) can exist (DA II 11, 423b27-29, 
cf. GC II 2-3). In application to perception, the second principle establishes that in 
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order for a causal interaction and an affection to take place on the sense organ, the 
latter (qua patient) must be dissimilar from the perceptible object (the agent) but 
potentially like it with regard to properties of a certain type, pretty much in the same 
way as the content of a pot over a fire must have generic thermal properties, and be 
actually non-hot while potentially hot, in order to be liable to a ‘heating’ affection. 
Since, on the basis of the third principle, the sense-organ of touch must be 
characterized by a certain tangible F property (e.g., a certain degree of hot or cold), it 
will be impossible for such an F-organ to satisfy the ‘liability to affection’ requirement 
with regard to a certain perceptible F-object, and this will a fortiori prevent the actual 
taking place of any affection by F, including the one in which the perception of F 
consists according to the first principle. It is then clear that for Aristotle the blind spot 
phenomenon, i.e. the fact that we do not perceive objects that are as hot (or hard, or 
dry) as our own sense-organs, descends from the fact that an F-sense-organ is not 
liable to an ordinary affection by an F-perceptible object explains.  
BlindSpot has been often invoked by scholars involved in the debate about Aristotle’s 
theory of perception as evidence against the ‘Spiritualist’ interpretation proposed by 
authors like Burnyeat and Johansen. According to Spiritualism, Aristotle believes that 
no ordinary affection and change takes place in sense-organs as we perceive, and the 
latter view seems fit rather badly with BlindSpot. The reason is that if no literal 
‘becoming F’ were required to perceive F, it would hardly make any sense to claim 
that the lack of liability to ordinary affection by F, and even further the necessity to be 
potentially F, prevents the possibility to perceive F.9 
The subtlety of modern Spiritualist interpretations may seem to allow for some 
justification for BlindSpot, though. Spiritualist interpreters do recognize that ‘special’ 
quasi-physical alterations and affections take place in sense-organ as we perceive. 
What is special in such alterations is the fact that their existence and definition 
essentially depends on their being perceived by some subject. According to the 
modern Spiritualist view, what takes place in the eye and in the surrounding 
transparent medium, for instance, is the ‘appearing (to a perceiving subject)’ of a 
colour (e.g., red), which is due to the ‘non-ordinary’ affection those subjects 
                                                             
9 Sorabji 1992:214-215: ‘No barrier would have been presented to our perceiving medium 
temperatures, if the organ merely had to receive a coded message, for example a vibration, 
or if we were merely being told that the organ becomes aware of temperature’. Cf. Cohen 
1992:66 and Everson 1997:84-85, Scaltsas 1996:34.  
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underwent because of the coloured source object (e.g., a red tomato).10 Spiritualists 
claim that Aristotle has good reasons to account for such ‘alterations’ by the same 
theories exposed in GC and Physics.11 Such quasi-physical alteration requires certain 
physical conditions.12 It seems accordingly safe to move from this admission to the 
claim that the lack of the appropriate receptive conditions determines the 
impossibility to perceive. In the case of touch, then, the necessity to have a tangible F 
property, and the lack of liability to affection by an F-subject this entails, may appear 
to be enough to justify the necessary existence of a blind spot.13 The spiritualist’s 
reasoning may still appear awkward, though. Why should the requirements and 
restrictions generally valid for ordinary affections be also endorsed in perception, if 
what is needed in the latter case is only the mere ‘appearing (to the perceiving 
subject)’ of the perceived qualities? Is it not rather the case that the invocation of the 
general theory of physical affections suggests that some ordinary physical interaction 
between sense-organs and perceptible objects is necessary to perceive? 
A peculiar attempt at a spiritualist explanation of BlindSpot is offered by Johansen 
(1998:216-217), who argues that the reason why the sense faculty cannot come to 
perceive F by an F-sense-organ is that it is already perceiving it. He assumes that 
‘[e]ven when we are not particularly cold or warm we are generally aware of the 
temperature of our bodies’ and that since the sense is already aware of the 
temperature it cannot become aware of it as the temperature of another object. 
Johansen’s reading is rightly criticized by Caston (Caston 2005:287-288), who notes 
that in Johansen’s view it becomes in fact false that an F-sense-organ cannot perceive 
F, since such an organ does (must?) instead perceive F. In fact, the neutrality of the 
sense-organ, and its being non-F, would thus be required only to avoid concurrent 
perception of the organ itself, and not for the sake of securing the ability of perceiving 
the full range of qualities. This makes the reading implausible, since Aristotle 
explicitly excludes sense-organs’ self-perception in ordinary cases of perception in DA 
II 5. The proposal goes against the direct explanation of BlindSpot Aristotle’s words 
imply (cf. again διό, 424a2), based on the assumption that ‘[t]he organ’s material 
                                                             
10 Burnyeat, 1995:428-431; 2002:74-76. Johansen, 1998:124-147.  
11 Cf. Burnyeat 2002: 58-59. This can also explain the reference to the treatise on the 
elements in DA II 11, justly posed as a requirement for the interpretation of the passage by 
Sorabji (1992:214). 
12 Burnyeat, 1995:423-426. Johansen 1998:10-20.  
13 Cf. Sisko’s (1998:340-341) criticism of Everson’s arguments against Spiritualism.  
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constitution has direct bearing on the sorts of physiological changes it can undergo 
and, as a result, what it can perceive’ (Caston, ibid.). 
That Blind Spot entails the necessity of some ordinarily physical affection on sense-
organs accompanying perception is claimed, in controversy with Spiritualism, by the 
different ‘physicalist’ reconstructions of Aristotle’s theory. According to both Literalist 
and ‘Structuralist’ (or ‘Transductionist’) interpretations, Aristotle invokes an F-
organ’s lack of liability to an ordinarily physical affection from an F-object as the 
reason for the blind spot phenomenon, since such ordinarily physical affections must 
in fact take place in order to perceive corresponding perceptible objects. In the 
‘Structuralist’ interpretation, Aristotle does indeed theorize ordinarily physical 
affections that are ‘codifying’ the relevant information, thanks to the preservation of a 
quantitatively definable ‘Structure’ that is relevantly related to a the perceived 
quality.14 In this view, then, the F-organ is unable to perceive G, in so far as it cannot 
‘receive’ F, which is the quantitatively definable ‘Structure’ relevantly related to G (it is 
by becoming F that the sense-organs perceives G). In Literalism, on the other hand, 
the necessary ‘physiological’ process is a literally replicatory affection, and the 
perceptible property an F-organ is unable to perceive is F itself.15  
There is a problem for both Literalism and Structuralism, however. The same reasons 
grounding BlindSpot must also entail that as soon as the sense-organs becomes F, the 
receptive condition with regard to F is lost, and the ability to perceive the 
corresponding perceptible quality (F, in the case of literalism; G, in the ‘structuralist’ 
hypothesis) is as vanished with it. This is what I call the Acquired Blind Spot (ABS, 
from now on) problem.16 Literalism is clearly unable to deal with the ABS problem, 
                                                             
14 Cf. Caston (2005:299-316). Supporters of reconstructions attributing to Aristotle a non-
literalist physiology describable – with varying imprecision – in those terms include 
Ackrill (1981:66-67); Modrak (1987:58-60); Ward (1988: 221-228); Lear (1988: 110-16); 
Silverman (1989:273-280); Price (1996:294-300); Bradshaw (1997: 151-156); Scaltsas 
(1996:28-29); Miller (1999:191); Polanski (2007:349); Shields (2007:293-298). 
15 The view is supported by Slakey (1961:473-474), Sorabji (1974:71-72; 1992:209-210) 
Everson (1997:10-11). 
16 Cf. Magee (2000:318), who notes (by indicating as alteration1 the acquisition of a 
property implying the loss of a preceding contrary one) that ‘[w]hat is altered1 is in 
potency to what it will become, but in so altering1, it thereby loses that potency to be 
altered1. That is, once it is altered1, it cannot then be altered1 again with respect to the 
same quality. This is the definition of alteration1. If, however, sense organs were to be 
altered1 in perception, they would then lose their capacity to be altered again’). Cf. also 
Freeland, 1992:232 (‘each body part and organ, of any type of creature, exists as the 
combination in a certain ratio of various of the four elements (…) It would be impossible 
for these crucial ratios to be maintained if the body were literally altered when the 
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but Structuralism fares no better, since no actual advantage is gained with this regard 
if there is a ‘transducing’ affection that changes the organ’s initial receptive condition.  
A first way in which Structuralism can try to dodge the ABS problem is by arguing that 
the blind spot phenomenon Aristotle is referring to is the lack of perception of F qua 
different (e.g., hotter/colder than us), rather than perception of F simpliciter. The 
argument is supposedly grounded by the evident ability to perceive our hands 
touching each other, while obviously failing to perceive them as ‘hot’ or ‘cold’, or ‘hard’ 
or ‘soft’.17 Whatever the way Aristotle would account to perceive our own hands (it 
may well be by a pattern of ephemeral changes in temperature and consistency of 
superficial flesh and skin, reciprocally induced by each hand on the other), this 
reconsideration of BlindSpot would offer no solution to the ABS problem. According to 
Structuralism, as soon as I perceive an ice cube in my hand, the becoming F by which I 
perceive coldness takes place. Clearly, this change does not affect the way in which I 
will perceive the ice cube I keep in my hand from that moment onwards. For I keep 
perceiving the ice cube ‘as colder’ than me, and I certainly do not perceive it in the 
same way as I detect my hands touching each other. The latter change in the way I 
perceive ice, however, should follow in the reconsidered account of BlindSpot 
mentioned above, if the ‘becoming F’ is a change in the sense-organ’s receptive 
condition. 
It is certainly possible for Structuralism to theorize a ‘codifying’ change and a 
‘becoming F’ that modifies the physical state of the organ without affecting the 
condition that is relevant for its receptivity, and it may be thought that this idea offers 
an alternative way to reply to the ABS problem. Against this view, however, it must be 
stressed that were this the type of physiology has in mind, no blind spot should follow 
in the first place. Consider for instance a model drawn on the grounds of Aristotle’s 
own lyre analogy.18 In the lyre, the ‘reception’ of the vibration does not preclude the 
possibility to keep being affected by it. The change underwent by the string becoming 
F is not such to prevent the ability to play any note, and the receptive condition is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
organism perceived tangible objects’). Tracy (1969:207) seems to be sensible to the ABS 
problem as he hypothesizes that the first affection is followed by a second one by which 
the organ recovers its original receptive condition (cf. note 41 below). 
17 A similar account of BlindSpot is offered by Bradshaw (1997:146-147).  
18 The lyre analogy is proposed by Scaltsas (1996: 28-29), who recognizes that the passage 
on the blind spot supports literalism while generating a contradiction with the idea that 
perception only happens through interaction with media transmitting perceptible 
qualities without being literally affected by them (a problem I shall deal with in the next 
chapter).  
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accordingly not affected. In the same way, one may think that the organ’s becoming F 
does not prevent the relevant receptive condition characterizing it, and then causes no 
acquired blind spot with regard to any perceptible quality. Were this the case, 
however, the reasoning at the basis of BlindSpot would cease to be available with 
regard to the initial receptive condition as well. If the sense-organ’s receptive 
condition were determined by the possibility to be affected by the ‘codifying’ affection, 
then why should the receptive condition prevent the perception of any object in the 
first place? The actual tension of the strings in the lyre prevents them from actually 
having a different tension, without having any effect on the ‘receivable’ vibrations, and 
the organ should be similar to the lyre also under this respect. If the system is 
avoiding acquired blind spot in virtue of ‘transducing’ or ‘codifying’ alterations, then, 
the initial blind spot should not be there in the first place.19 
The partial conclusion to be drawn, then, is that in all the proposed interpretations of 
our passage (DA II 11, 423b27-424a4) Aristotle appears to give a blatantly flawed 
explanation of the blind spot phenomenon, which is either not providing any real 
explanation at all (in the Spiritualist interpretation no blind Spot should follow), or 
paying the explanation of the blind spot of touch with the costly introduction, by the 
same set of theses employed in such explanation, of a mechanism regularly generating 
acquired blind spots for each and every act of perception.  
2. On the meaning of the word μεσότης 
2.1. The need for a revision of the standard lexicography: μεσότης does not mean 
‘central position’ 
In this section, I shall argue that the standard understanding of the word μεσότης is 
seriously flawed and in need of a revision. The common belief that AisthMesot cannot 
indicate anything but the idea of a ‘mean’ state of the αἴσθησις, shared by all 
commentators and founded on the received lexicography for the word μεσότης, is 
accordingly mistaken. 
                                                             
19 It is worth noting that the ABS problem may be affecting the Burnyeat’s and Johansen’s 
spiritualist views as well, in so far as they admit that ‘quasi-physical’ alterations are 
affecting sense-organs as we perceive. The difficulties raised for the Structuralism seems 
to be avoidable only by a fairly ad hoc conjecture, according to which being ordinarily F 
prevents being liable to a ‘special’ non-ordinary affection from F, while being (and 
becoming) F in a special non-ordinary way does not prevent such liability. The objections 
to Spiritualism outlined above would still be in place, though. 
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The impression we may get by looking at the earliest occurrences of μεσότης in Greek 
writings is that the word might be of Platonic and Academic origin. While, according 
to reliable ancient testimonies, the term μεσότης was the first word denoting a 
mathematical proportion of any kind (the word ἀναλογία being initially restricted to 
the geometric one only), and the subject has been systematically studied already by 
‘Pythagoreans’ thinkers like Hippasus, Philolaus and Archytas, there seems to be no 
solid textual proof that any of them, nor anyone else before Plato, did use the actual 
term μεσότης.20  
It comes as no surprise that occurrences of the word in Plato and Aristotle abound in 
LSJ’s entry for the word. The lexicon gives ‘central position’ as the first meaning of 
μεσότης, quoting Plato’s Laws (746a) and two similar passages from works 
transmitted in Corpus Aristotelicum (Mirabilium auscultationes, 846a18, and De 
Mundo, 399b34)21. The mathematical meaning of ‘mean’ follows, quoting Plato’s 
Timaeus 32a, 43d and Aristotle Fragment 47. The famous Aristotelian 
characterizations of virtues as μεσότητες are then listed under the heading ‘mean, 
state between two extremes’. Quotations of Aristotle’s usage in relation to αἴσθησις and 
touch in DA 424a4 (cf. 431a11) are therefore classified as attesting ‘medium, 
communicating between two opposites’ and Meteor. 382a 19, which is deemed to 
mean ‘standard’. There are finally the grammatical acceptation of middle mode of a 
verb (between the passive and active ones), and the one denoting a literary style 
intermediate between poetry and prose.  
                                                             
20 Cf. Tracy (1969:344-346) about the information transmitted by ancient mathematicians 
Pappus and Nicomachus and its endorsement by modern historians of the discipline. 
Information about pythagoreans’ systematization is contained in the report about 
Philolaus by Nicomachus (1926, II 62, 2, = Test. A 24 in [Huffman, 1993]) and in a 
fragment from Archytas preserved by Porphyry (Fr. 2 in Huffman, 2005:162). 
Interestingly enough, Archytas already uses the word ἀναλογία in a broad sense to denote 
three terms related by a mathematical formula (and not just in the narrow sense of 
‘geometrical proportion’, in which the same ratio bind the medium term and each of the 
extremes), and the same usage is found later in Aristotle (cf. Huffman, 2005:179-181). It is 
therefore not impossible, albeit purely conjectural, to think that the practice of using the 
word μεσότης (which, as we shall see, denotes both the whole ἀναλογία and the medium 
term alone) originated in the Academy to speak about ‘mathematical’ ἀναλογίαι alone, 
possibly under the influence of Eudoxus’ further investigations on the subject mentioned 
by Iamblicus in his Commentary on Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic (cf. 100.19-
101.11 [= Text A in Huffman, 2005:164], a passage probably based on the lost history of 
geometry by Aristotle’s pupil Eudemus [cf. Huffman, 2005:170]). 
21 LSJ suggests that the idea of ‘central position’ is used about time as well. Passages 
quoted in this sense are Aristotle’s claim that the ‘now’ is a certain μεσότης (Phys. VIII 
251b20, on which we shall return later), and an inscription in Eleusis of the age of 
Augustus. I shall return to both passages later. 
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Doubts about the details of LSJ’s entry begins to creep in as soon as we pay closer 
attention to the first proposed meaning of μεσότης as ‘central position’. This proposal 
does not appear to be founded on solid grounds. Quoted passages from Mirabilium 
auscultationes and De Mundo are hardly of any use, as the reading μεσότης is dubious 
in itself (ἐν μεσότητι in 846a18 is at odds with ἐν μέσῃ τῇ at 399b 34).22 Furthermore, 
the only left occurrence of the word μεσότης in Plato, which appears in the fifth book 
of the Laws, provides evidence against the definition of the μεσότης as ‘central 
position’ proposed by LSJ. The subject of the passage (746a6-7) is the criticism of the 
unrealistically ideal character of the theorized city. Among the very demanding 
ordinances citizens would likely not tolerate (including a fixed level of wealth and 
regulations about the number of children and the size of the family), the Athenian 
visitor mentions  
houses, as we said, both all around in circle and as μεσότητας of both the 
countryside and the city23 (my translation).  
Despite the agreement of modern translators of the Laws with the meaning proposed 
by LSJ, the point made here simply cannot be that the houses must be in a ‘central 
position’.24 The backward reference clearly points to the creation of the city described 
earlier (745b3-e6), according to which the portions of land should be allocated to 
citizens in a coupled way, in order to guarantee to everyone, both in the city and in the 
countryside, one possession close to the centre and another one close to the borders.25 
                                                             
22 Cf. Mirabilium auscultationes, 846a17 ff. (Λέγεται τὸν ἀγαλματοποιὸν Φειδίαν 
κατασκευάζοντα τὴν ἐν ἀκροπόλει Ἀθηνᾶν ἐν μεσότητι ταύτης τῆς ἀσπίδος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ 
πρόσωπον ἐντυπώσασθαι, καὶ συνδῆσαι τῷ ἀγάλματι διά τινος ἀφανοῦς δημιουργίας, 
ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, εἴ τις βούλοιτο αὐτὸ περιαιρεῖν, τὸ σύμπαν ἄγαλμα λύειν τε καὶ συγχεῖν) 
and De Mundo, 399b33 ff. (Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγαλματοποιὸν Φειδίαν κατασκευάζοντα τὴν 
ἐν ἀκροπόλει Ἀθηνᾶν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ταύτης ἀσπίδι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πρόσωπον ἐντυπώσασθαι, καὶ 
συνδῆσαι τῷ [400a1] ἀγάλματι διά τινος ἀφανοῦς δημιουργίας, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης, εἴ τις 
βούλοιτο αὐτὸ περιαιρεῖν, τὸ σύμπαν ἄγαλμα λύειν τε καὶ συγχεῖν). 
23 746a6-7: ἔτι δὲ χώρας τε καὶ ἄστεος, ὡς εἴρηκεν, μεσότητάς τε καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ οἰκήσεις 
πάντῃ.  
24 As in the translations by Saunders (‘What about this description of a city and 
countryside with houses at the centre and in all directions round about?’), Jowett (‘and 
will endure, further, the situation of the land with the city in the middle and dwellings 
round about’), and Bury (‘and will submit also to the arrangements he has defined for 
country and city, with the dwellings set in the centre and round the circumference’). 
25 First, the legislator must locate the centre of the country and place the city therein 
(745b 3-4: πρῶτον μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ τῆς χώρας ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν μέσῳ), reserving 
the central area for the acropolis. Then the whole territory (including the city and the 
countryside) must be equally divided according to its productivity, in twelve slices 
containing a total of five thousands and forty holdings. The holdings must be divided in 
two, and the halves distributed to the effect of fairly distribute in the population both the 
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In other words, the point is not that houses must be centrally located, but rather that 
each house must be constituted by two plots that are poles apart, in order to balance 
advantages and drawbacks implied by their different distances from the city centre. In 
this sense, houses must be fair and proportionate ‘mediating balances’ determined by 
a calculus and a reasoning. 
2.2. Μεσότης as ‘mediating balance’ in Plato and late mathematicians 
Further criticism of the entry for μεσότης in LSJ can be raised for the second meaning 
of mathematical ‘mean’. Regrettably, the lexicon fails to report a very interesting 
feature of the mathematical use of the word which is illuminating for understanding 
its meaning. This is the possibility for μεσότης to refer to the whole of a three-term 
mathematical ἀναλογία, as well as to its ‘medium’ term only. In other words, it is 
possible to call μεσότης both a proportion like 2:4::4:8, and its ‘intermediate’ term 4.26 
Both the uses of μεσότης referring to the whole proportion (ἀναλογία) and to the 
mean term (τὸ μέσον) only, which I shall indicate by μεσότηςα and μεσότηςμ 
respectively, are clearly observable in Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic (I-II 
AD)27. In II 22, 1, Nicomachus introduces ten different types of ‘progressions’ or 
‘proportions’ (ἀναλογίαι), attributing the knowledge of the first three (the arithmetic, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
advantage and disadvantage due to living at different distances from the city centre (c6-
d2: τὸ πρὸς τῇ πόλει μέρος τῷ πρὸς τοῖς ἐσχάτοις εἷς κλῆρος δεύτερον ἀπὸ πόλεως τῷ ἀπ’ 
ἐσχάτων δευτέρῳ, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως πάντα). The same division must be repeated, for the 
same reason, for the city ‘and each man should be allotted two houses, one near the centre 
of the state, one near the boundary’ (e2-5: τέμνειν δ’ αὖ καὶ τὰ δώδεκα τῆς πόλεως 
τμήματα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην χώραν διένεμον· καὶ δύο νέμεσθαι 
ἕκαστον οἰκήσεις, τήν τε ἐγγὺς τοῦ μέσου καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐσχάτων).  
26 This usage is clearly reconstructed by Tracy (1969:344-346). 
27 In I 8, 10 there are two occurrences of the term μεσότης which clearly indicate the 
‘intermediate term’ of a proportion (l. 9: a single μεσότης or two μεσότητες between the 
extreme terms of a series can be found; l. 19: in certain series - those obtained by 
progressive division in two, where the number of members of the series is even - the 
extremes necessarily have two μεσότητες, not one). In I 8, 11 (3) the converse point is 
made: in some other series (those obtained by progressive division in two, where the 
number of members of the series is odd) the μεσότης in necessarily one. Here we again 
have μεσότης as ‘mean term’. The same meaning is found in I 9, 6 (l. 6), where the idea of 
reciprocal substitution of corresponding terms belonging to opposite ‘sides’ in relation to 
the μεσότης (16 and 4 or 32 and 2 in the series 2, 4, 8,16, 32) is presented (ἐπ’ ἐκείνων μὲν 
ἡ ἀντιπερίστασις τῶν μερῶν ἀπ’ἀκροτήτων εἰς μεσότητα ἢ μεσότητας : ‘the reciprocal 
arrangement of parts from extremes to mean term or terms’ according to D’Ooge’s 
translation). The same usage of the term is found in the illustration of the arithmetical 
properties of the μεσότης in relation to the extremes in different kinds of numbers (I 10, 
10, l. 8). This usage of μεσότης is still present in the second book, together with the one 
denoting the whole of a mathematical proportion. Occurrences of the term as ‘mean’ are at 
II 24, 6 (l. 4); 24, 9 (ll. 5 and 9); 27, 2 (l. 2); 27, 4 (l. 2); 29, 2 (l. 11); 29, 3 (l. 9). 
Chapter 1 — 
 17 
geometric and harmonic) to Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. The word employed at 
the beginning of this section is ἀναλογία, but very soon (line 6) the term μεσότης is 
used as well, in relation to the fourth, fifth and sixth type of progressions. This 
suggests that μεσότηςα and ἀναλογία are interchangeable, and the idea finds further 
support in II 22, 3 (ll. 12- 13), where the adjective ‘geometric’ (used in the beginning 
for ἀναλογία) is attributed to μεσότης. Nicomachus’ following treatment is so rich of 
passages where μεσότηςα and ἀναλογία are interchangeable, that we consistently find 
μεσότηςα rendered with the same word used for ἀναλογία (i.e. ‘proportion’) in D’Ooge 
translation.28  
The ability of μεσότης to denote a ‘progression’ is confirmed by Pappus of 
Alexandria’s Collectio (III-IV A.D.). Already in III 68-70, Pappus exposes the idea that 
geometric arithmetic and harmonic μεσότητες can be shown to exist and understood 
by examining them in a semicircle. Here he calls the line representing the mean term 
between other two a μέση (cf. III 68, 24-25), specifying that one is such ‘in a geometric 
ἀναλογία’ while another ‘in the arithmetic μεσότης ’ (III 68, 26-28). In III 70 - 72, we 
have the same clarification we found in Nicomachus about geometric μεσότης as the 
only proper ἀναλογία, and the idea that the general term for ‘progression’ should only 
be μεσότης. The number and types of μεσότητες distinguished by Pappus are the 
same as Nicomachus’, with the first three (arithmetic, geometric, harmonic) 
representing the most ‘ancient’ ones (cf. III 80, 24-25; 84,1 - 86, 18). This use of the 
word is widely confirmed in the rest of the treatise, and justifies Hultsch’s addition of 
the formula ‘sive progressio’ after his Latin rendering of μεσότηςα as ‘medietas’29. 
Reflecting upon the double use of μεσότης Tracy (cit.) observes that  
as practically synonymous with ἀναλογία, μεσότης can only signify a 
“proportion” (i.e. a three-term progression) and not a “mean”; and when it has 
this sense of a three-term progression or “proportion”, μεσότης is distinguished 
from “the mean” as the whole from the part . (…) For μεσότης may signify in 
                                                             
28 Cf. II 23, 1 (ll. 1 and 10); II 23, 5 (l. 2) and 27, 5 (l.8), about arithmetic μεσότης. II 23, 2 
(ll. 2 and 6), about conjoining and disjoining μεσότητες. II 24, 3 (l. 1); 24, 4 (l. 4); 25, 2 
(l.6); 26,2 (l.5) and 27, 5 (l.8), about geometric μεσότης. II 25, 1 (l.1); 5 (l.1); 26, 1 (l.14) 
and 27, 7 (l.16), about harmonic μεσότης, compared in II 23, 6 (ll.14, 17 and 19) to the 
geometric and the arithmetic ones. II 28, 4 (l. 2) for the fifth and sixth μεσότητες, II 28, 6 (l. 
2) for the first six μεσότητες; II 28, 8 (l. 1) for the eighth μεσότης, and finally II 29, 1 (l. 3) 
for the last and ‘most perfect’ μεσότης. 
29 In III 78-80 the mean term is qualified again as μέση, whereas the μεσότης consists in 
the three related terms together (cf. III 78, 5-6, 12-13, 14-15). The same goes for the talk 
about the minimum terms of a μεσότης (III 90, 6 and 23), implying that the terms are 
three in total (minimum, maximum and middle one, cf. the explicit mention of the three 
terms of the μεσότητες at 80, 8). Cf. also III 82, 6-8; 19-20. 
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mathematics the whole relationship of two extremes joined by a mean, i.e. a 
“proportion”. And applied analogously to physical realities, μεσότης will 
obviously suggest a disposition in which extremes of any kind are balanced in a 
mean, i.e. a state of equilibrium among opposing factors. 
Although valuable in several respects, Tracy’s reconstruction seems too hasty in 
assuming an unqualified equivalence between μεσότηςα and ἀναλογία, and it appears 
more careful to distinguish two alternative ways in which it is possible to account for 
the double use of μεσότης: either there are two different meanings of the word 
μεσότης, one equivalent to ἀναλογία, and the other equivalent to τὸ μέσον; or there is 
one single sense of μεσότης that gives the word the ability to share the referent, in 
different circumstances, with either ἀναλογία or τὸ μέσον.  
A passage in Nicomachus’ Introduction (II 21, 1, ll.1-9) indicates that there is in fact no 
equivalence between ἀναλογία and μεσότηςα, while also suggesting that the latter of 
the two options above is correct. Here, Nicomachus writes that: 
In the division of the musical canon, once one has stretched a single string or set 
forth a flute of a single length and fixed the ends, after (i) the μεσότης is 
imparted to the flute by holes and to the string by a bridge, (ii) one might 
produce in one and another way the mentioned arithmetic, geometric, and 
harmonic μεσότητες – (iii) they would be called appropriately and abiding by 
etymology in this way, as they are differently brought about by change and shift 
of the μέσον30 (my translation) 
I distinguished three steps in the passage: (i) the μεσότης is imparted to the flute by 
holes and to the string by a bridge; (ii) one can therefore produce different sounds or 
set of sounds to be considered as ‘musical’ μεσότητες; (iii) the μεσότητες are 
produced by a shift in the ‘mean term’ (τὸ μέσον). In (iii) μεσότης clearly occurs in its 
μεσότηςμ function, and alludes to a ‘mean’ point on the instrument (where the hole is 
drilled or the bridge fixed): by shifting this μέσον the musical μεσότητες played by the 
instrument change31. The μεσότης in (i) can be referring to this μέσον set on the 
instrument by holes or by a movable bridge, as well as to the proportion between 
lengths of the pipe or the string that the μέσον establishes. In (ii) we have to face a 
                                                             
30 Ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ μουσικοῦ κανόνος κατατομῇ χορδῆς μιᾶς τεταμένης ἢ αὐλοῦ μήκους 
ἑνὸς ἐκκειμένου τῶν ἄκρων ἀμετακινήτων ὑπαρχόντων, μεταλαμβανούσης δὲ τῆς 
μεσότητος ἐν μὲν τῷ αὐλῷ (5) διὰ τρυπημάτων, ἐν δὲ τῇ χορδῇ δι’ ὑπαγωγέως, ἄλλον ἐξ 
ἄλλου τρόπον ἀποτελεῖσθαι δύνανται αἱ προλεχθεῖσαι μεσότητες, ἀριθμητική τε καὶ 
γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἁρμονική, ἵνα εἰκότως καὶ ἐτυμώτατα καλοῖντο διὰ τὴν τοῦ μέσου ὅρου 
μετάστασίν  
31 In (iii) τὸ μέσον can hardly be anything else. A reference to the movable bridge working 
as a μέσον is unlikely, as it does not cover the case of the flute. The expression does not 
refer to the mean term of the set of sounds either, since the shift of the μέσον is rather 
invoked here as the reason why such sounds change. 
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similar persistent ambiguity. Here, μεσότης must certainly refer to sounds a player 
can produce by the instrument, but it is unclear whether Nicomachus is alluding 
either to a single ‘mean proportional’ sound (a musical μεσότηςμ), i.e. a chord obtained 
by playing two ‘extreme’ notes together, or to a progressive set of three sounds (a 
musical μεσότηςα).32 Despite its ambiguity, (ii) turns out to be enlightening for the 
reconstruction of the meaning of μεσότης, since the sentence requires both that 
μεσότηςμ is not perfectly equivalent to ‘τὸ μέσον’, and that μεσότηςα is not equivalent 
to ‘ἀναλογία’. Accordingly, even if μεσότης denoted here the mean term, it cannot be 
doing so in virtue of a supposed semantic equivalence with ‘τὸ μέσον’, as this would 
entail the absurdly tautological claim that ‘different mean terms are produced by a 
shift in the mean term’. On the other hand, μεσότης may certainly be denoting a whole 
progression, but not in virtue of a supposed semantic equivalence with ἀναλογία, for 
this would spoil the kinship with τὸ μέσον and the idea that calling such sounds 
μεσότητες is appropriate and ‘abiding by etymology’.  
Several other passages in Nicomachus’ Introduction are of equal interest to establish 
the meaning of μεσότης. Nicomachus takes for granted more than once that the word 
somewhat conveys the meaning of ‘being common to the extremes as a mixture of 
them’, thus giving additional motivation to revise the common understanding of the 
meaning of the word. In proposing a classification of numbers I 8 (3, ll. 3-5), 
Nicomachus uses μεσότης as an example of something which is neither one or another 
‘extreme’, but nonetheless ‘common to both’: 
The even-times even and the even-times odd are opposite to one another, like 
extremes, and the odd-times even is common to them both like a mean term 
(μεσότης) 
The same idea returns in the course of the treatment of the third ‘middle’ kind of 
number (I 10, 1), where Nicomachus says that the ‘odd-times even’ is ‘common’ to the 
previously mentioned kinds of number (the ‘even-times even’ and the ‘even-times 
odd’), as if it were the single μεσότης between those kinds considered as extremes 
(κοινὸς ὢν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν εἰρημένων ὡσανεὶ δύο ἀκροτήτων μία τις ὢν αὐτὸς 
μεσότης). In both these passages, Nicomachus seems to consider as self-evident that 
all μεσότητες have the property of being ‘common’, as he even takes the notion 
connected with the term as capable of clarifying and illustrate his views about the 
classification of numbers.  
                                                             
32 Either a scale of three single notes, or a series made of two single notes considered as 
extremes and the chord made by the two together, considered as the ‘balancing mean’.  
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The clarification Nicomachus gives in I 10, 1 puts some restriction to the 
interpretation of the idea of μεσότης as ‘common to the extremes’. He explains that 
the kind of number at issue (the ‘odd-times even’) is ‘common’ because it shares with 
the one the property by which it differs from the other, and vice versa33. On the basis 
of this combination of shared and unshared properties, this class is said to be a 
mixture (μῖγμα) of the other two (cf. I 10, 6, line 3 and I 10, 10, line 10). The point 
about being ‘common’, then, seems to be a stretched (rhetorical, not mathematical) 
analogy between an arithmetic μεσότης (like the one consisting of 3, 8, 13) and a 
couple of properties resulting from other two couples in a physical mixture. Despite a 
prima facie appearance, then, the middle term’s ‘being common to the extremes’ 
cannot be explained by the presence of the same relationship towards the same thing, 
as for instance in the case of two extremes (1,16) that are said to have the middle (4) 
in common because they both have the property of producing a certain ratio (1/4) in 
relation to that one number (4). This relationship would make the middle term 
‘common’ in the same way as the mother of two brothers, which is a further example 
of the ‘same relationship (being son of) to the same thing (the same mother)’. Trying 
to make sense of the ‘being common to the extremes’ Nicomachus has in mind, we can 
rather imagine that in the same way as ‘dry & hot’ bodies result from ‘dry & cold’ and 
‘moist & hot’ ones, an arithmetic μεσότης (middle term) is ‘bigger than the minor & 
smaller than the major’ as it results from a term which is ‘bigger than the minor & 
bigger than the mean’ and another one which is ‘smaller than the mean & smaller than 
the major’. A similar point is made about ἀναλογία in II 22, 2, where Nicomachus 
describes it as a σύγκρισιν that accommodates and bind together its components.34 
The recurrence of the logos characterizing the proportion is apparently supposed to 
account for the ‘mixing’ of the extremes, which in turn explains why the resulting 
mean term can be seen as a ‘mixture’.  
                                                             
33 The properties in question are clearly stated in I 10, 10 : the even-times odd has the 
peculiarity ‘that the mean term is always half the sum of the extremes, if there should be 
one mean, and the sum of the means equals the sum of the extremes if two’ ; the even-
times even has the peculiarity that ‘the product of the extremes is equal to the square of 
the mean, should there be one mean term, or their product, should there be two’. 
34 τῶν ὅρων σύγκρισιν οἰκειούσης ἀλλήλοις καὶ συνδεούσης. The point is explicitly made 
about arithmetical proportion, but it is plausible to assume that the function a 
mathematical ἀναλογία performs according to quantity (κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν) is the same a 
geometric one does according to a ratio (cf. II 24, 1 and 23, 4) and any of the other types 
according to the peculiar relation among their own terms. 
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While the notion of ‘mixture’ Nicomachus associates with the word μεσότης may not 
be crystal clear, it is at least evident that the standard translation of μεσότης as ‘mean’ 
or ‘mid-point’ is not illuminating with regard to the meaning of ‘being common to the 
extremes’ the word appears to suggest to his ears, even in those occurrences of the 
term that do in fact refer to the ‘medium’ term of a mathematical progression. In fact, 
the rendering as ‘mean’ does not even remotely suggest anything like a mixture 
‘crossing’ some properties belonging to the extremes.  
To take stock, it is possible to invoke late mathematicians’ texts to highlight the 
following desiderata for a more appropriate rendering of μεσότης: 
- employment of a single word able to refer to the whole of a three-term progression 
or proportion, as well as to its ‘medium’ term alone; 
- preservation of the etymological link between μεσότης and τὸ μέσον (the mean or 
medium term); 
- adoption of a term able to suggest the idea of a mixture of the extremes that ‘crosses’ 
their opposite features. 
All the above requirements seems aptly satisfied by paraphrasing μεσότης as 
‘mediating balance’. To begin with the first requirement, it is possible to note that the 
proposed meaning of ‘mediating balance’ does in fact capture an aspect that any 
mathematical ἀναλογία considered as a whole has in common with its middle or 
medium term. To find the medium term between 3 and 27, it is necessary to achieve a 
‘mediating balance’, where the latter expression may equally refer to the organized 
whole in which the progression ‘3, 9, 27’ consists, or to its medium term 9, or again to 
the operation by which the whole and the medium are produced. To think of the 
performed operation and the resulting progression as a ‘mediating balance’ of the 
given ‘extremes’ terms appears as natural as saying that the found medium term is 
itself a ‘mediating balance’ of the extremes (9 is a medium thing which performs the 
mediating balance of 3 and 27). The proposed periphrasis and the notion it expresses 
are enough to justify the multiple referents of μεσότης in Mathematics.35  
                                                             
35 That the ability to achieve a reasoned ‘mediating balance’ between two numbers or 
magnitudes might have been what ancient mathematicians had in mind when employing 
the term μεσότης is hardly surprising. The typical problem a mathematician working on 
‘means’ had to face is in fact to find a middle term entertaining the same relation to given 
‘extremes’ numbers or magnitudes. The fascination with the challenge must have been 
equally strong for philosophers: solving problems of that kind means discovering a 
conceptual unity between terms that are prima facie irreconcilably different (the use of 
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The periphrasis as ‘mediating balance’ seems to satisfy all the other desiderata listed 
above as well. Calling the whole 2:4::4:8 or its medium term 4 as a (geometrical type 
of) ‘mediating balance’ suggests that some sort of ‘mixture of the extremes’ and ‘a 
compound which settles and binds together the terms’ has been achieved. By the same 
periphrasis, the etymology centred on the kinship with the ‘medium’ (τὸ μέσον or 
μέση) is also neatly respected. Similarly, it finally becomes understandable how a 
class of numbers showing a mixture of the properties of other two classes of numbers 
can be said to be a ‘mediating balance’ (rather than a ‘mean’) as well as a mixture of 
them. 
It is then clear that μεσότης works like English nouns ending in -tion or -ture, i.e. as an 
‘achievement’ word denoting the actual -ing as well as the result fulfilled by -ing. An 
illuminating example in this direction is the English word ‘division’, which means both 
the action of dividing and its result (either a part or the state brought about by the 
operation). If an admittedly ugly neologism could be coined to render the Greek 
μεσότης, one might then call the operation of finding a term such that 3:x::x:12 a 
‘mediature’, and thus employ the same word to describe the discovered ‘medium’ 
term 6 as well as the organized whole (3, 6, 12), pretty much in the same way as one 
can say both that 6 is a division which fits 24 four times, and that 24/4=6 is a division. 
2.3. Μεσότης in Plato and Aristotle 
As already noted, the proposed meaning of ‘mediating balance’ perfectly fits with the 
occurrence of μεσότης in Plato’s Laws (V, 746a6-7, cf. supra). The same can be said of 
the remaining four occurrences of the word in his dialogues, uttered by the 
Pythagorean character Timaeus in the homonymous dialogue (Tim. 32a8, b3, 36a 3, 
43d 6). In all these cases, the word also has a clear mathematical connotation that 
perfectly fits with the examination conducted so far. In a first passage, μεσότης can 
indifferently be referring to the activity of the demiurge, or to the mean term of a 
geometric proportion:  
For whenever of three numbers which are either solids or squares the middle 
term (τὸ μέσον) between any two of them is such that what the first term is to it, 
it is to the last, and, conversely, what the last term is to the middle (τὸ μέσον), it 
is to the first, then, since the middle term (τὸ μέσον) turns out to be both first 
and last, and likewise both the last and the first turn out to be middle terms 
(μέσα), they will all of necessity turn out to have the same relationship to each 
                                                                                                                                                                          
analogy to argue for the peculiar unity of being in Aristotle’s Metaph. IV is exemplar in this 
sense). 
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other, and, given this, will all be unified. So if the body of the universe were to 
have come to be as a two dimensional plane, a single mediating balance 
(μεσότης) would have sufficed to bind together its conjoining terms with itself. 
As it was, however, the universe was to be a solid, and solids are never joined 
together by just one, but always by two mediating balances (μεσότητας). Hence 
the god set water and air between fire and earth, and made them as 
proportionate to one another as was possible, so that what fire is to air, air is to 
water, and what air is to water, water is to earth (31c4-32a7, trans. Zeyl, slightly 
modified) 
A second passage seems to favour the reference to the mean term of a proportion: 
After this he went on to fill the double and triple intervals by cutting off still 
more portions from the mixture and placing these between them, in such a way 
that in each interval there were two mediating balances (μεσότητας), one 
exceeding the first extreme by the same fraction of the extremes by which it 
was exceeded by the second, and the other exceeding the first extreme by a 
number equal to that by which it was exceeded by the second (35c2-36a5, 
trans. Zeyl, slightly modified) 
In a last one, μεσότης appears instead to be indicating the bond or connection 
(συνδέσεις, connected to μεσότητας in 43d6 by an apparently epexegetical καὶ) 
established between the terms of a proportion: 
And they further shook the orbit of the Different right through, with the result 
that they twisted every which way the three intervals of the double and the 
three of the triple, as well as the mediating balances and connections 
(μεσότητας καὶ συνδέσεις) of the ratios of 3/2, 4/3 and 9/8 (43d3-7, trans. Zeyl 
slightly modified) 
The flexibility secured by the proposed understanding of μεσότης as a ‘mediating 
balance’ proves more useful with regard to the several uses of the term in Aristotle. A 
first one concerns Aristotle’s theory of time, and more specifically his definition of the 
‘now’ or ‘instant’. In Phys. VIII (251b 19-28), Aristotle offers an argument for the 
eternity of time (and motion) based on the assumption that the ‘now’ (τὸ νῦν), without 
which he thinks we cannot conceive time, is a mediature of some kind (μεσότης τις). In 
the relevant part of the argument (b19-23), he states that 
If, then, it is impossible for time both to be and to be thought of apart from the 
now, and if the now is a mediating balance of some kind and, having 
simultaneously a beginning and an end, it is both a beginning of the time 
<which> followed <it> and an end of that <which> preceded <it>, then time 
must always exist36 (transl. by Graham, modified) 
                                                             
36 εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν καὶ εἶναι καὶ νοῆσαι χρόνον ἄνευ τοῦ νῦν, τὸ δὲ νῦν ἐστι μεσότης 
τις, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχον ἅμα, ἀρχὴν μὲν τοῦ ἐσομένου χρόνου, τελευτὴν δὲ τοῦ 
παρελθόντος, ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι χρόνον.  
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With regard to such use, LSJ proposes an extension of the spatial meaning of ‘central 
position’.37 In fact, if the only point raised here were that the now lies in between the 
future and the past, the claim would be offering no argument at all to support the 
conclusion that ‘time must always exist’. The revised meaning is on the other hand 
helpful once again, for it allows one to appreciate that under the assumption that the 
‘now’ is some sort of ‘mediating balance’ of what comes after and what came before, 
picking any instant in time will logically imply a future and a past time. The rationale 
seems to be that the ‘now’, being a μεσότης, does necessarily depend on the two 
extremes starting from which it is determined, pretty much in the same way as 6 can 
be described as a μεσότης only in virtue of the extremes it entertains a certain relation 
with (e.g., 3 and 12). The only way in which one can identify a time-limit (a ‘now’) is 
by considering it in a time-span, because the time-limit is a ‘mediature’ or mediating 
balance of the extreme limits of the time-span containing it. Quite obviously, the 
extremes in question, being time-limits themselves (and thus both a ‘now’), should in 
turn be identified in the same way, and so on ad infinitum. This justifies Aristotle’s 
argument for the eternity of time from the assumed impossibility for time to exist and 
be thought apart from the ‘now’, combined with the thesis that the ‘now’ is a 
mediating balance of preceding and following time-limits. In this view, the ‘now’ is not 
an independently existing thing which happens to be located between two others, but 
rather an entity that cannot exist or be thought apart from what precedes and what 
follows it. Otherwise, it would be like speaking of a mediature which has no extremes, 
of a ‘mediating balance’ between no things, of an average of no terms. 
Further connotations of the word highlighted in Nicomachus that can be recognised in 
Aristotle include the idea that a μεσότης is a mixture moderating opposed co-specific 
qualities. This idea seems to square well with Aristotle’s employment of the term in 
                                                             
37 LSJ also quotes an inscription in Eleusis from the age of Augustus, which appears to 
refer to the eternity of the Universe by saying that it has no beginning, end or μεσότης 
(ἀρχὴν μεσότητα τέλος οὐκ ἔχων, Dittenberger [1883:III, 1125.9-11]). The reference to a 
middle time suggested by LSJ seems unnecessary. The inscription seems rather 
(polemically?) reminiscent of a Pythagorean dictum attributed to Ocellus (fr. 8 in Diels-
Kranz, 1951:440-441), according to which there exists a ‘first triad’ consisting in 
beginning, end and μεσότης (ἡ τριὰς πρώτη συνέστησεν ἀρχήν, μεσότητα καὶ τελευτήν). A 
similar claim is reported by Aristotle in De Caelo, 268a10 -13 [268a10] : ‘as the 
Pythagoreans say, the world and all that is in it is determined by the number three, since 
beginning and middle (μέσον) and end give the number of an 'all', and the number they 
give is the triad’. Cf. also Plato, Laws, IV, 715e7-716a1. On the work ascribed to Ocellus 
called De universi natura as a late Hellenistic forgery, cf. Freeman (1948:81), and Kahn 
(2001:79). 
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connection with his treatment of physical mixtures in GC II 7. Here, Aristotle states 
that the way in which mixed bodies result from elements is different from the one 
characterizing the transmutation of the elements into each other (334b23-29) 
And properly speaking <it is> the elements <that> mutate in this way, whereas 
flesh and bones and similar things <come to be> out of these when, becoming 
the hot cold and the cold hot, they have been brought to the middle term (τὸ 
μέσον). For in such cases there is none of the two, and yet the middle term is 
many and not indivisible. Similarly, <it is> according to a mediating balance 
(κατὰ μεσότητα) <that> the dry and the moist and the things of this kind 
produce flesh and bones and the other things. (my transl.) 
The idea seems to be that elements are characterized by couples of basic opposite 
(dry/moist and cold/hot), and their way of resulting from one another postulates the 
full substitution of one property: to get fire (‘dry & hot’) from earth (‘dry & cold’), 
‘cold’ must be wholly substituted by (as opposed to ‘harmonized with’ and ‘moderated 
by’) ‘hot’. Mixtures deriving from the elements do instead result in the way proper of a 
‘mediating balance’, i.e. as a ‘moderate’ thing which relates by a single peculiar 
proportion to each of the two extremes.  
A further final confirmation of the proposed semantics of μεσότης comes from 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where the word is repeatedly employed in connection 
with the description of virtues of character according to the much discussed and 
controversial doctrine of the mean. In this context, it is widely assumed that the word 
expresses the idea that such virtues are states of ‘in-betweenness’ or ‘intermediacy’ 
between two opposite bad states or ‘vices’. This practice is in agreement with LSJ’s 
definition, which in connection with Aristotle’s theory of virtues suggest the meaning 
of ‘mean state between two extremes’. 
Against an unqualified endorsement of the received reading of μεσότης in the doctrine 
of the mean, there is at least one passage in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics where the 
meaning of μεσότης as ‘mean state’ appears questionable. In 1106b27-28, we find him 
offering a very puzzling conclusion summing up an argument based on the idea that 
virtue of character ‘hits the mean’ with regard to actions and emotions. According to 
the proposed meaning of μεσότης, what Aristotle is supposed to say here is that 
‘virtue is therefore a mean state, as it is able to hit the mean’.38 The logic behind this 
statement is clearly flawed, as the claim that virtue is a mean state receives no support 
or explanation from the thesis that virtue is able to determine the ‘mean’ result (τὸ 
μέσον). Even if we suppose that the centre of the bull’s eye is aptly described as 
                                                             
38 μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. 
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‘mean’, why should this imply the ‘intermediacy’ of the archer’s ability to hit the 
target? The latter statement is all Aristotle can get from the argument he just 
presented, though, and as long as the argument is expected to support the claim that 
virtue of character is a ‘mean state’ it must be flagged as a non sequitur.  
The proposed revision of the semantics of μεσότης can fix the problem of the apparent 
a non sequitur in the introductive argument for the doctrine of the mean. Aristotle’s 
reasoning becomes sound if we substitute ‘mean state’ with ‘mediating balance’ or 
‘mediature’, and read the conclusion existentially and with regard to the operation of 
finding the mean, rather than as a definition identifying virtue of character with a 
mean state. In other words, the conclusion Aristotle has in mind here is only that 
‘there is therefore a certain mediating balance, since virtue is able to hit the mean’. 
Read this way, the sentence appears unproblematic: since virtue of character is 
capable to ‘hit the mean’ and consistently produce mean results involving a skilful and 
reasoned balance that keeps bad extremes at bay, there is an activity of ‘mediature’ or 
‘mean balancing’ which belongs to it. That the conclusion Aristotle is after is in fact, at 
this stage, the ‘existential’ statement above (rather than a stronger claim already 
identifying virtue with a mean state) is confirmed by the final words in the 
preparatory argument (1106b28-34). Here, he says that ‘it is also for this reason that 
while the excess and the deficiency belong to badness, the ‘mediature’ belongs to 
excellence’.39 
The flexibility granted by the proposed reconstruction of the meaning of μεσότης 
turns out to be appropriate and advantageous also in the immediately following 
‘definitional passage’. Here, Aristotle displays some reluctance to identify virtue of 
character with a μεσότης, and prefers to say that it is a state that ‘depends upon’ a 
μεσότης40. Were μεσότης be already referring to a ‘mean state’, nothing would have 
precluded a simple identity between it and the virtuous hexis. Aristotle’s weaker and 
more cautious expression does instead show full awareness of what he has grounds to 
claim so far, namely that virtue of character is defined by the mean results it produces, 
and thence from a characteristic activity of ‘mediature’. 
We can therefore reasonably conclude that the flexibility of the word μεσότης, 
conferred by its being an achievement word denoting whatever (state, activity or 
                                                             
39 καὶ διὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ’ ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης 
40 1106b36-1107a2: Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, 
ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. Irwin and Crisp render the relevant words as 
‘a state (…) consisting in a mean’; Rowe as ‘a disposition (…) depending on intermediacy’. 
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concrete thing) performs a ‘mediating balance’, is fully confirmed and in fact required 
by Aristotle’s use of the word in his argument for the doctrine of the mean. 
2.4. The revised meaning of μεσότης 
Some of the occurrences of μεσότης found in Plato, Aristotle and Nicomachus are 
irremediably puzzling if we limit ourselves to the received understanding of the word 
offered by the LSJ lexicon. As observed, a different and more flexible meaning of the 
word proves necessary to make sense of the employment of the word in those 
authors, thus grounding the claim that μεσότης is an achievement word conveying the 
meaning of ‘mediating balance’. My proposal yields particularly interesting results 
with regard to Aristotle, as it allows a less problematic reconstruction of his 
arguments for the eternity of time and for the doctrine of virtue as a Mean. The most 
important outcome for our purposes, however, is going to be the discovery of novel 
exegetical possibilities concerning his claim that perception is a μεσότης.  
3. A solution to the interpretive impasse: perception as a μεσότης-like 
homeostatic process 
The revision of the meaning of μεσότης proposed above opens new interpretative 
possibilities in DA II 11 by making the referent of the claim that αἴσθησις is a 
‘mediating balance’ less obvious than it appeared. In DA II 11, 424a2-5 Aristotle points 
out that αἴσθησις is like a sort of μεσότης immediately after having rehearsed that 
perceiving is a certain being affected. As it is typical with ‘achievement words’, the 
term μεσότης can denote both concrete and abstract things that are obtaining the 
relevant achievement, including things and their states as well as activities. If we 
accept the meaning of ‘mediating balance’ for μεσότης, then, Aristotle may be 
describing either the condition of what perceives by using αἴσθησις in its meaning of 
‘sense’ or ‘sense-organ’, or the activity of perceiving, thence employing αἴσθησις to 
mean ‘sensation’. A further interpretive possibility is thus gained, according to which 
perceiving is being theorized as a mediating balance activity, with a use of the word 
μεσότης similar to the one observed in the introductory argument for the doctrine of 
the mean in EN II. In other words, μεσότης may be indicating what the organ does, 
rather than what it is.  
The ‘activity reading’ AisthMesot has to be preferred as providing a solution to the 
interpretive impasse described above. Despite the revised meaning of μεσότης, no 
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progress would be made with regard to the entrenched problems concerning the 
initial and acquired blind spots BlindSpot and the ABS problem if one reads 
AisthMesot as a description of the state of the sense-organ as a ‘mediating balance’ of 
the opposite properties constituting it. On the other hand, the activity reading of 
αἴσθησις, coupled with the improved understanding of μεσότης as ‘mediating 
balance’, affords a new interpretation of AisthMesot that sheds new light not only on 
Aristotle’s explanation of the blind spot, but also on the vexed question of 
physiological aspects in his theory of perception. 
The described interpretive impasse that current debate leads to can be captured in 
terms of the following, apparently irresolvable dilemma: either the sense-organ’s 
receptive condition must be non-F in order to be liable to be ordinarily affected by F, 
since such an affection is necessary in order to perceive the correspondent 
perceptible property (G or F); or the sense-organ’s receptive condition is not 
determined by its being liable to be ordinarily affected by any F, since no ordinary 
affection is necessary in order to perceive the correspondent perceptible property. If 
the first horn is embraced, then BlindSpot makes sense, but the ABS problem follows 
by necessity. On the other hand, by endorsing the second horn one avoids the ABS 
problem while simultaneously losing the grounds for the blind spot phenomenon.  
In fact, it would be mistaken to think that the ABS problem does necessarily follow for 
every reconstruction endorsing the first horn of the interpretive dilemma above. What 
is required to provide secure grounds to BlindSpot is just the liability to ordinary 
affection, but not the actual taking place of an ordinary change. As Burnyeat (1992:20) 
notes 
it is one thing to say that it takes a strong hard hand to appreciate the delicate 
softness of the hand it is holding, quite another to suggest that the strong hard 
hand softens as it holds the other, or that a hand which touches the pavement 
literally becomes itself as hard as concrete 
I also believe that Spiritualists turn out to be right in stressing that for Aristotle no 
literal heating or hardening of the sense-organ is taking place as we sense hardness or 
heat, and more generally that in his view no ordinary change in the organ’s receptive 
condition is accompanying perception. In my view, however, Aristotle’s reason to 
embrace this idea is that the ABS problem would otherwise follow, and not his 
commitment to a theory of ‘quasi-physical’ alterations.  
To be sure, the denial of the actual taking place of an ordinary change in the sense-
organ does not entail, nor suggest, the presence of ‘quasi-physical’ changes: the logical 
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possibility of a physiology of perception based on a homeostatic mechanism secures a 
chance to reconcile the presence of physical processes taking place in sense-organs 
during perception with the lack of change in the sense organ’s receptive condition. 
This logically possible hypothesis would also make sense of the blind spot 
phenomenon described by Aristotle. While liable to be affected by F, a sense-organ 
may instantaneously react to the incoming affection caused by an F-subject, adjusting 
its state in order to counter-balance the affection to the effect of preserving its initial 
state and receptive condition.41 
The reconstruction of the meaning of μεσότης as ‘mediating balance’ does in my view 
show that a homeostatic physiology of perception is more than a mere logical 
possibility, and rather constitutes the meaning of Aristotle’s claim that αἴσθησις is a 
μεσότης. A homeostatic process can indeed be said to be ‘like a sort of mediating 
balance’, since it features three magnitudes related by a precise relation, in a way that 
resembles the terms of a mathematical μεσότης. In the hypothesis of a homeostatic 
physiology, the sense organ performs, thanks to its perceptual power, a measured 
adjustment in the intensity of some relevant physical property in the sensory 
apparatus, which aims at the preservation of the physiological condition of receptivity. 
As the organ of touch is affected by a warmer object, for instance, a symmetrical 
measured diminishing of its warmth takes place. Three magnitudes can be identified, 
which are related in a way that is similar to the one linking together the extreme and 
medium terms of a mathematical proportion. In the example of perception of heat, the 
                                                             
41 Among the commentators I am aware of, Tracy (1969) is the one who comes closer to 
attributing to Aristotle a homeostatic physiology of perception. What he has in mind, 
however, is different from the instantaneous ‘counterbalancing’ process I am entertaining 
here. In his view, what takes place in sense organs is a literal affection, which is then 
followed by a recovering of the sense organ’s receptive condition. He says (1969:207) that 
‘if the objective quality is strong enough, the qualitative change which it sets up in the 
medium evokes a corresponding change in the sense organ, i.e. the organ responds in the 
direction of that quality in proportion to its intensity. In doing so, the organ becomes like 
the objective quality, thus taking on the form of the object without its matter’. By 
reference to the perceptual μεσότης of 424a5-7, Tracy adds (ibid.) that ‘[b]ecause the 
sense is in form a μεσότης, a single equilibrium which responds in one direction or 
another according to the quality presented and then returns to its original “middle state” 
when the stimulating cause is removed, the sense organ is capable of “judging” between 
one quality and another’. It is therefore in this sense that Tracy talks of Aristotle’s μεσότης 
as a dynamic state, which is able to react proportionately to external stimuli (1969: 221-
22). A similar hypothesis is dialectally entertained by Magee (2000:318-319), as he 
examines the theoretical possibility of a literalist account in which the ‘fading’ of the literal 
affection allows the recover of the initial receptive condition. Magee does in fact reject the 
hypothesis, arguing that such a ‘strobic’ effect cannot secure the continuity of perceptual 
awareness if the latter supervenes on the hypothesized literalist physiology.  
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magnitudes constituting the extremes of the perceptual ‘μεσότης’ are (i) the intensity 
of warmth the organ would have if it passively suffered the agency of the external 
agent (were there no counter-affection opposing it) and (ii) the one it would end up 
possessing were the proportionate adjustment (the decrease of temperature) taking 
place in the absence of external stimulation. The medium term of the ‘mediature’ (τὸ 
μέσον) is thence nothing but the receptive condition of the organ, which is possessed 
before the stimulation and eventually preserved after it, thanks to the peculiar activity 
of the sense organ. It is in this sense that Aristotle’s μεσότης-like perception, being 
‘like a sort of mediating balance of the contrariety in the perceptible qualities’, is in 
fact a proportioned ‘homeostatic’ counterbalancing of an incoming affection being 
caused by a perceptible object. 
Having in mind a μεσότης-like homeostatic physiology of perception, Aristotle can 
boast the availability of an explanation for the blind spot phenomenon, one that can be 
confidently held without worrying about generating the problem of acquired blind 
spots. The receptive condition must be such to allow the liability to an affection from F 
in order for F to be perceived, in accordance to Aristotle’s general theory of similarity 
and dissimilarity in affections. The μεσότης-like homeostatic physiology is thus 
entitled to the same explanation of BlindSpot available to literalism: the blind spot is a 
result of the actual similarity between the organ and the perceptible object. We do not 
perceive what has our own temperature because no affection –and thence no counter-
affection or proportioned active resistance– is possible. In opposition to literalism, 
however, the μεσότης-like homeostatic physiology also avoids the ABS problem: 
thanks to the homeostatic counter-affection, the sense organ that is going to perceive 
F will not become F while perceiving it. The organ will keep being able to perceive F 
without acquiring any new blind-spot, and it will also keep perceiving it as long as F is 
exercising its causal power on it by counterbalancing the incoming affection this 
actualized power’s agency is striving to produce. 
In my view, the claim that αἴσθησις is like a certain μεσότης may be Aristotle’s 
description of the physiological aspect of perception. If I am right, such description 
has been left dormant and neglected for centuries. Its re-discovery can supply a much 
needed widening of the textual basis on which the controversy between Literalists, 
Spiritualists and Structuralists has been recently grounded, together with some fresh 
hope to advance our understanding of what happens, in Aristotle’s mind, as I perceive 
the white screen in front of me and the hard and smooth keys I am typing on. Further 
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support for such an important and bold proposal is certainly needed, and other 
advantages of it can be demonstrated. It is to this task that I shall turn in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 2 - The homeostatic physiology of 
perceptual activities 
According to the revised definition of μεσότης I proposed earlier, the Greek word is in 
itself neutral with regard to whether the denoted ‘mediating balance’ is a state or 
activity. In this regard, the manoeuvre by which I embrace an ‘activity reading’ of the 
claim that αἴσθησις is a μεσότης at the end of last chapter may appear too hasty, and 
overly confident. In fact, I myself believe that in comparison to the bold novelty of the 
proposal, the thinness of the merely logical reasoning by which I preferred it to the 
traditional ‘state’ reading is inadequate: after all, how can we be sure that the claimed 
ability to solve the interpretive impasse on the subject – the clue for this reading so far 
– is not the result of a misleading reasoning that never crossed Aristotle’s mind?  
In this section of the work, I shall consolidate the reconstruction of Aristotle’s 
physiology of perception I sketched at the end of last chapter, by offering further 
textual and logical evidence in its favour. Further confirmation for my reading will be 
provided by considering a series of difficulties the standard ‘state reading’ of 
AisthMesot has to face in DA II 11, which can be solved or altogether avoided by the 
activity reading I offered. I shall then survey the remaining occurrences of μεσότης in 
conjunction with  perception in Aristotle’s corpus, in order to show that all but one 
has to be understood as referring to the homeostatic physiological activity I described. 
The only exception is constituted by a passage in Meteorologica, which is at any rate 
perfectly compatible with the reconstruction I elaborate. In the remainder of the 
chapter, I shall examine several details of Aristotle’s theory of perception that become 
perfectly understandable thanks to the new light my interpretation can shed on them. 
Among the aspects I shall consider, Aristotle’s claim that perception is an alteration of 
a ‘certain kind’ will be particularly revealing. Further important confirmations will 
then come from Aristotle’s employment of the μεσότης-like physiology to account for 
an ample variety of perceptual phenomena, including images, illusions, distortions 
and feelings of pleasure and pain. Finally, I shall address the question of the role of 
media in the causal interaction between perceptible source objects and sense-organs, 
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and show that, in spite of a prima facie appearance, the interpretation I propose can 
indeed supply a satisfying explanation of this feature of Aristotle’s theory. 
1. Against the standard State reading of AisthMesot in DA II 11: 
consolidation of my proposal 
The support I gave so far for my reading of AisthMesot in DA II 11 is admittedly scant 
in comparison to the embarrassing boldness needed to discard the reputable 
traditional reading, which remains valid even accepting my revision of the definition 
of the word μεσότης. Several more reasons to prefer an activity reading to the 
traditional ‘state’ reading exist, however, which are fully independent from the need 
to provide a solution to the interpretive impasse concerning BlindSpot and the ABS 
problem. The activity reading of AisthMesot in DA II 11 does in fact avoid several 
other problems that can be raised against the ‘state’ reading, including the 
impossibility to respect the meaning of the word μεσότης in both the traditional or 
revised understanding of it, and the difficulty of accounting for the explanatory 
relation Aristotle establishes between AisthMesot and BlindSpot.  
In DA II 11 (423b27-424a10), Aristotle builds a complex series of explanatory 
relations: perception is a certain affection, in which ‘the agent makes that one such as 
itself is in actuality, as <that one> is in potentiality’ (424a1-2). Having said this, 
Aristotle states that on the assumption of AisthMesot we explain BlindSpot. A further 
explanatory claim is made with regard to perceptual discrimination itself: it is 
‘because (or by means) of’ (διὰ τοῦτο) the fact that αἴσθησις is a μεσότης that one 
discriminates perceptible aspects, thanks to the ability of the medium term to become 
both the opposite perceptible qualities, like black and white or hot and cold (424a6-
10). AisthMesot, then, explains at the same time why we perceive, and why we are 
subject to the blind spot phenomenon described above.  
The idea that AisthMesot refers to an intermediate blend of tangible properties 
characterizing the organ of touch fits badly with the double explanatory role Aristotle 
assigns to the thesis in DA II 11. While there must be some explanatory role 
AisthMesot is playing here with regard to BlindSpot, the supposed intermediacy of the 
elemental constitution of the sense-organ of touch cannot be the reason why we are 
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blind to certain tangible properties.42 On the assumption that perception is an 
affection, the mere invocation of the involved requirement about dissimilarity and 
potentiality (the patient must be potentially F in order to be affected by F), in 
conjunction with the idea that no body deprived of tangible properties exists, is 
sufficient to explain the phenomenon. In other words, it is not because of the physical 
condition of ‘intermediacy’ of the sense organ that we are blind to the same degree of 
temperature our own sense organ possesses. Thus, the explanatory function of 
AisthMesot with regard to BlindSpot is not immediately clear in the frame of the 
traditional ‘state reading’.  
An attempt at clarifying the explanatory function of AisthMesot along the lines of a 
‘state reading’ is made by Sorabji (1992:215), who speaks of an inference to the best 
explanation with regard to the common sense observation that while we are blind to 
our own temperature, we are sensitive to degrees which are different in two opposite 
ways (as colder or hotter), rather than in just one way (e.g., just to what is colder). In 
Sorabji’s view, this ‘suggests that sense is as it were a sort of mid-point between 
opposites in perceptibles’. If we accept this suggestion, Aristotle’s claim seems to be 
that the principles concerning the sense-organ’s liability to affections by tangible 
properties are supplemented by a consideration about the ‘bi-directionality’ relative 
to couples of extremes defining the range of perceptible objects. If we consider that 
Aristotle’s point must be about the sense-organ (for he is explaining the blind spot 
phenomenon), the reasoning leading to both AisthMesot and BlindSpot would then be 
built on the following premisses: 
1. perception is affection 
2. in order to be affected by some perceptible F, a sense-organs must be actually 
non-F but potentially F  
3. Being a body, the sense organ must be characterized by some F tangible 
quality (tangible qualities are properties of bodies qua bodies: no body 
deprived of tangible properties exists) 
4. Senses are ‘bi-directionally’ relative to couples of extremes defining the range 
of their perceptible objects  
The conclusion would be that the sense-organ of touch is an ‘intermediate’ blend of 
tangible properties which is blind to what possesses such properties in the same 
                                                             
42 As Burnyeat (1995:422-423) notes, Aristotle’s analysis of the physical constitution of 
sense-organs does not justify a less literal interpretation of the ‘intermediacy’ as an 
allusion to some special ‘micro-structure’. 
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‘intermediate’ degree. If this reconstruction is right, though, the argument should be 
valid for touch only, since neither AisthMesot nor BlindSpot should follow without 
reference to the peculiarities of tangible properties (premises 3). Yet, Aristotle does in 
fact extend AisthMesot to all senses some lines below (424a7-10)  
(…) αἴσθησις is a certain μεσότης of the opposition in the perceptible items, and 
for this reason it discriminate the perceptible items. The reason is that what is 
in the middle is able to discern, for it becomes the other relatively to either 
extreme, and it must be actually neither but potentially both, in the same way as 
what is to perceive white and black, so with regard to all the other sense-
organs. And with regard to the organ of touch, it must be neither hot nor cold 
(my transl.) 
 The apparent extension of AisthMesot to all senses is problematic for the ‘state 
reading’ reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument sketched above. His reasoning goes 
roughly along the following lines: we have BlindSpot in the case of touch, on the 
assumption that touch, as all the other senses, abides by AisthMesot. If the ‘state 
reading’ reconstruction were right, however, one would expect Aristotle to say 
something like ‘in the case of touch we have BlindSpot, and since all sense-organs 
perceive a bipolarized range of perceptible qualities, we also have a further 
peculiarity of touch, namely AisthMesot’.  
The problem the state reading of AisthMesot incurs in can be expressed by the 
following dilemma: either AisthMesot is not grounded on the peculiar nature of 
tangible properties (cf. premise 3 above), and thence applicable to all senses 
regardless of BlindSpot, against the explanatory relations Aristotle poses; or 
AisthMesot is founded on the peculiarity of what is tangible and thence limited to 
touch in the same way as BlindSpot, against Aristotle’s extension of AisthMesot to all 
senses. In other words, on the state reading of AisthMesot one cannot save both the 
extension of AisthMesot to all senses and the explanatory relations posed in the 
passage, without attributing to Aristotle an unclear and possibly mistaken argument. 
The only viable state reading seems to consist in denying that Aristotle is in fact 
extending AisthMesot to all senses, by assuming, with a rather stretched 
interpretation, that the final sentences in 424a7-10 focus on the fact that the organ is 
actually neither of the two extremes in the range of its perceptible objects.  
A further difficulty concerning the extension of AisthMesot can be raised, in 
consideration of the fact that the idea on which the standard ‘state reading’ is 
grounded – that is, that the sense-organ is an ‘intermediate’ blend of perceptible 
properties it perceives – cannot in fact be applicable to senses other than touch. While 
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the claim that the sense organ of touch has a mean temperature and consistency 
appears plausible, it hardly makes sense for Aristotle to extend a similar idea to sight 
and hearing, whose sense-organs are not for him characterized by an ‘intermediate’ 
blend of opposite audible and visible properties. In fact, the organ of hearing is made 
of air housed inside the ears, that stands still deprived of the ‘movements’ sounds 
consist in (DA II 8, 420a 3-11; 419b5-24). Similarly, the organ of sight is the ‘jelly’ 
inside the ocular bulb, which is transparent in potentiality (i.e. in a state of darkness) 
and thus receptive of light (DA II 7, 418b4-13, b27-31; Sens. 2, 438a13-24, b7-15 
[especially b8-11 ]). In both cases, the physical condition that makes sense-organs 
liable to be affected by the relevant perceptible properties is a state of deprivation of 
such properties, rather than a state of ‘intermediacy’ between them. 
Aristotle’s view is more difficult to assess for the organs of smell and taste, but a 
description of them as ‘intermediate’ blends of perceptible qualities seems equally 
unlikely. The sense organ of smell, located inside the nostrils (HA I 15, 494b12; DA II 
9, 421b16, GA V 2, 781b7-10), is said to be potentially dry (DA II 9, 422a6-7) and fiery, 
and potentially like odours it perceives. The latter are themselves described as fiery 
‘smoke-like evaporations’ (Sens. 2 439a20-25; more precisely, they are due to the 
special ‘washing’ of sapid dry in the moist, cf. Sens. 5, 442b27-443b16, cf. DA II 7, 
419a32-b1).43 Aristotle’s point may therefore be that the ‘fiery’ air is what both the 
medium and the organ are made of, the difference being the presence of the effect of the 
warmer ‘sapid’ dry in the medium. Something analogous can be said, with regard to the 
point I am interested in here, in the case of taste. The latter’s objects are importantly 
connected with the same ‘nutritive sapid dry’ type of property at the base of smells 
(DA III 12, 434b21-22, Sens. 4, 441b15-442a12). In the case of tastes, however, the 
moist bodies that ‘activate’ the perceptibility of source properties do not work as 
media. In fact, moisture works as an ingredient of the actual taste, and not as its 
transmitting ‘host’, since tastes are moist solutions of relevant dry substances (DA II 
10, 422a8- 17). Despite this peculiarity nothing rules out that, by analogy with the 
other senses, the receiving sense organ must be deprived of perceptible properties 
that have to be received (cf. 422b15-16). The requirement is actually suggested by the 
                                                             
43 It is worth noting that in DA III 1, 425a5 Aristotle gives reasons for the claim that the 
organ of smell is either air or water (cf. Johansen, 209-10). There needs to be no 
contradiction with DA III 1’s reasons for concluding that the organ of smell is made of 
either air or water (pace Johansen, 1997:209-10), if ‘fire’ is understood according to the 
use of Meteorologica (I 3, 340b22, II 2, 354b25; cf. also I 4, 341b19 and 8, 345b33), that is 
as a wet -liquid or gaseous- flammable combustible. 
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impairment due to an actual flavouring undergone by the tongue Aristotle recognizes 
(422b6-10).44 
As the above survey about the physical constitution of sense-organs shows, 
AisthMesot should not apply to them if the thesis aims at describing the condition of 
physical intermediacy resulting from a blend of extremes in the relevant range of 
perceptible qualities. The only way to avoid such a difficulty would be then, once 
again, to adopt an unnatural reading of the finale of DA II 11, according to which what 
is extended to all sense organs is not AisthMesot, but rather the requirement of being 
potentially both the extremes.  
No restrictive reading of the end of DA II 11 can avoid a further difficulty concerning 
the applicability of the standard ‘state reading’ of AisthMesot to touch itself, though. 
As Sorabji (1992:222) himself notes, the idea that the sense-organ of touch is an 
‘intermediate’ blend of perceptible properties is in fact problematic. According to 
Aristotle, the sense-organ of touch is not located in the superficial flesh, but rather 
resides in the central cardiac area. For this reason, the idea of the sense organ of touch 
being a ‘mean’ conflicts with the characterization of the heart as hot and in need of 
refrigeration in Parva Naturalia (cf. Juv., 469b6-20; Resp. 474a25-26; 478a11-25). 
A final difficulty for the traditional ‘state reading’ of AisthMesot is conditional upon 
the acceptance of the revised definition of μεσότης I proposed in last chapter. As I 
argued, the word denotes a ‘mediating balance’ of extremes according to a defined 
logical relation or proportion. The term Aristotle decides to employ, then, does not 
merely indicate any quantity or point laying between two extremes, but rather one 
precisely fixed abiding by the relevant relation rule or proportion (logos). In a 
μεσότης, the same logos (usually a proportion between quantities) must occur 
between, on the one hand, the lesser extreme and the mean, and on the other hand the 
mean and the greater extreme (more on this later). Once we assume that the standard 
reading commits Aristotle to a ‘mid-point’ which is exactly defined by a logos, the 
inference to the best explanation suggested by Sorabji disappear. If the phenomena to 
                                                             
44 This is sufficient to explain why neither an excessively moist tongue nor a dry one can 
perceive (DA II 10 422a34-b6), for in both cases some condition for the actual exercise of 
the perceptible incoming affection is missing. A flavour has no power on a dry body that 
remains dry, since a relevant dry object only becomes flavoured when dissolved in (and 
mixed with) a moist one (422a17-19); on the other hand, the actual existence of taste is 
also conditional on the proportional amount of moist matter to be flavoured. The latter 
should not be excessive: a pinch of salt dissolved in the whole volume of Loch Ness’ 
freshwater would not make it salty (cf. Sens. 6, 446a7-10). 
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be accounted are the bi-directional distribution of the range of perceptible objects and 
the existence of a blind spot, the commitment to a precise and restrictive ‘mean’ looks 
unnecessary and gratuitous. The consequence of a blind spot does in fact follow for 
any tangible F property (e.g., any degree of hot/cold) including those at the extremes 
of the perceptible range, and not just for ‘intermediate’ properties. Similarly, any 
tangible property roughly falling in the middle of the perceptible range would 
adequately account for the bi-directionality of perception. As far as the rationale for 
such phenomena is concerned, AisthMesot would be clearly supererogatory.  
None of the difficulties the state reading has to face in DA II 11 affects the activity 
reading I propose. To begin with the latter, it is clear that if the perceptual μεσότης is 
a physiological activity of homeostatic ‘counterbalancing’, a precise proportion 
between the intensity of the incoming affection and the internal one opposing it has to 
be secured. The precise logos entailed by the meaning of μεσότης in light of the 
revised definition of the word I offered is therefore perfectly sound.  
With regard to the difficulties in the application of AisthMesot to touch and the other 
senses, it is evident that they only raise under the assumption that the thesis is an 
absolute description of the constitution of the sense-organ, which depicts them as 
‘intermediate’ mixtures of relevant perceptible properties. According to my view, 
however, Aristotle’s point is rather that sense-organs undergo a ‘μεσότης-like’ 
homeostatic process. For this reason, the organ of touch must be able to become 
‘colder and warmer’ in so far as it is required to increase its thermal intensity when 
affected by what is colder, thus discriminating its coldness without actually becoming 
colder as it preserves its state by a homeostatic adjustment. The non-intermediate 
physical state of the heart described in Parva Naturalia constitutes no real difficulty, 
then. If the state of the organ is described as a ‘mean’ with regard to its being the 
result of such an operation, DA II 11 needs to entail no discrepancy with the theory of 
a ‘hot’ heart in need of refrigeration: a hot and moist sense-organ can be described as 
a ‘mediating balance’ without being a lukewarm intermediate mixture of cold an hot, if 
by this one means that such a state results from a homeostatic counter-balance, i.e. by 
the reciprocal opposition of heating and cooling, or drying and moistening processes. 
For the same reason, the extension of AisthMesot to the other senses, and even the 
description of each organ as a ‘mean’, is not at all problematic once the μεσότης-like 
homeostatic physiology I propose is accepted.  
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Aristotle’s principal point in introducing AisthMesot in DA II 11 remains that the blind 
spot of touch must be explained on the assumption that the act of touch is, as the 
perceiving acts of the other four senses, a μεσότης-like homeostatic counterbalance.45 
Were no homeostatic counterbalance taking place, we would in fact have to admit that 
as soon as the organ is affected by losing its receptive condition, a new blind spot is 
acquired (what I called the ‘ABS problem’, cf. ch. 1), or surrender to the lack of 
explanation for the commonly recognizable phenomenon of a tactile blind spot.46  
In my account, it is because of its role as the ‘middle’ term of the perceptual μεσότης 
that the condition of the sense organ can be described as a mean. In order to perform 
such a role the organ must be capable of changing in two opposite directions at the 
same time, since this is required to adjust its state and prevent the loss of its receptive 
condition. This is the reason why Aristotle says that the ‘medium term’ of the 
perceptual ‘mediature’ is able to discriminate because ‘it becomes the opposite 
extreme in respect of each of the perceptible items’ (424a6-7: γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς 
ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων), adding that for this reason what is going to 
perceive two opposite qualities must be none of them in actuality, but both of them in 
potentiality.47In order to perceive white (or hot), the organ is potentially not just 
white (or hot), but rather both black and white (or hot and cold), because the 
homeostatic process requires it to be subject to symmetric affections of different sign. 
This explains why the organs of sight and hearing, although deprived of visible and 
audible properties, and thence unsuitable to be described as an intermediate blend of 
them, are nonetheless declared to be ‘intermediate’: once again, they are such since in 
the homeostatic μεσότης-like process the preserved receptive condition plays the role 
of the ‘mean’ term. 
                                                             
45 The remark is expressed by ὡς plus absolute genitive (ὡς … τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὔσης). The 
construction may be understood as expression of an assumption or belief of the speaker 
(which one can render by a simple participle as ‘αἴσθησις being like a certain μεσότης’, or 
by the phrase ‘in the belief that’ (cf. Smyth 1920: 464, 473). 
46 As Burnyeat (1992: 21 note 3) notes quoting Theophrastus, the idea of a blind spot is a 
received endoxon. 
47 Sorabji (1992:215) rightly insists that the literalist makes here better sense than 
Structuralist views proposing a physiology of ‘codifying’ alterations, for the final 
statement that the organ must be potentially F ‘cannot be brushed aside as if it were the 
merely negative point that the thing must not be actually black or white. It means more to 
say that it is potentially these’ (Caston’s caution [2005: 286 with note 88] suggests that he 
might be ready to accept Sorabji’s point with regard to touch in light of BlindSpot). The 
homeostatic physiology I propose squares with these sentences as effectively as 
Literalism.  
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2. Perception as a μεσότης in the discrimination of hard and soft 
The reading of AisthMesot I propose does not imply, nor aims at denying, the 
possibility for the organ of touch to be an ‘intermediate’ blend of certain tangible 
properties, even though this not the case with regard to its temperature (the organ in 
the heart is rather hot, and in need of refrigeration according to Parva Naturalia). 
What Aristotle says in Meteor. IV (382a 16-382a21) does in fact entail that the sense-
organ of touch has an intermediate consistency, and in the same passage he also 
speaks of employing the sense of touch as a mediating balance of hard and soft (ὡς 
μεσότητι χρώμενοι τῇ ἁφῇ). He says that: 
Hard and soft are not determinable relatively to one another, because it is a 
matter of <one> being <hard and soft> more or less <than the other>. However, 
since all perceptibles are discriminated with regard to perception, it is clear that 
we delimitate the hard and the soft in an absolute way with regard to touch, as 
we employ touch as a mediating balance. So we call that which exceeds it hard 
and that which falls short of it soft (my transl.) 
In the immediately preceding passage (382a8-13), hard and soft have been defined by 
reference to the behaviour of bodies under pressure: hardness is defined as the 
inclination of a body to yield into itself; vice versa, bodies that do yield into 
themselves without a reciprocal repositioning of their parts are soft (382a12-13: 
μαλακὸν δὲ τὸ ὑπεῖκον τῷ μὴ ἀντιπεριίστασθαι). As Aristotle clarifies, according to this 
definition things can be hard or soft in either an absolute or relative manner. Things 
are relatively hard or soft by comparison to each other, while they are absolutely such 
by comparison to touch. With regard to this, he claims that all perceptibles are 
discriminated by reference to perception, and absolute hardness and softness are 
accordingly established by reference to the sense of touch, as we make use of it as a 
‘mediating balance’.  
The employment of the sense-organ as a μεσότης does not affect my argument about 
the physiology of perception Aristotle theorizes. The process by which we perceive is 
a μεσότης-like homeostasis, in which the condition of the organ plays the role of the 
medium term (cf. DA II 11, 426a6-10).48 The only difference between DA II 11 and 
                                                             
48 As I already recognized in Ch.1, Aristotle describes the persisting condition of the sense 
organ as the medium term (τὸ μέσον) of the perceptual μεσότης as he explains that in the 
case of perception ‘what is in the middle is able to discern, for it becomes the other 
relatively to either extreme’. The latter phrase does in fact refer to the sense-organ’s 
preserved receptive condition that, in so far as resulting from the encounter of the 
incoming affection and the homeostatic counterbalancing, is analogous to the medium 
term of a ‘mediature’.  
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Meteor. IV 2 is merely linguistic: the former states that the organ is the medium term 
(τὸ μέσον) of the perceptual μεσότης, while the latter makes the same point by calling 
it a ‘mediating balance’ (μεσότης). In light of the use of the latter word to denote the 
‘medium term’ in a proportion observed in the works of Greek mathematicians, the 
statement in Meteorologica is all but perplexing.  
What Meteorologica adds is that in the case of touch the consistency of the organ does 
also work as the standard for determining the hardness and softness of perceived 
objects. For this reason, it is right – in fact, tautological – to say that the organ’s 
consistency is intermediate in comparison to what is hard and soft.49 The thesis about 
the standard consistency of the organ of touch, however, is in my view independent 
from the one about its being employed as a ‘mediating balance’, and none of the two 
raises any difficulty against my proposal. 
It is worth noting that perception of hard and soft can be handled as comfortably as 
those of hot and cold in the frame of the μεσότης-like homeostatic physiology I am 
proposing. Peripheral flesh that is directly in contact with external objects works as 
the medium for both couples of tangible properties: in the same way as heating and 
cooling affections take place on skin and peripheral ‘layers’ of flesh as ordinary 
changes (perception of coldness and heat consists in the homeostatic process, but this 
is taking place internally), the effect a hard object has on superficial flesh is the same 
the object would have on a softer inanimate object. Being soft, the patient does in both 
cases yield into itself without reciprocal repositioning of its parts (cf. Meteor. IV 2). If, 
as Aristotle seems to believe (DA III 12, 433 b-435a10), the media of perception are 
able to transmit the affection of the perceptible source object by working ‘as one’, the 
yielding of superficial flesh will produce the propagation of the original affection, in a 
way similar to what happens by pushing your face against a pin-art mould.  
According to the homeostatic ‘μεσότης-like’ physiology, internal flesh will then absorb 
the affection, in order for the ‘pressing’ affection not to be transmitted to the heart.50 It 
                                                             
49 The two claims should not be conflated though: the organ is used as the middle term of 
a ‘perceptual’ proportion, and since the word μεσότης (‘mediating balance’) can refer to 
both the middle term and the whole proportion, saying that we use the organ as a μεσότης 
is not problematic. The idea that the consistency of the sense-organ of touch is 
‘intermediate’ is an altogether different, which is a consequence of the fact that we 
determine hard and soft by perception. 
50 The preservation of its internal condition is fundamental. As MA 7 shows, little changes 
in the conditions of the heart have macroscopic effects in the whole body. More drastic 
changes affecting its receptivity would cause the death of the animal cf. DA III 13, 435b4-
19. This account fits perfectly with Aristotle’s comparison of touch to perceiving by a 
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is important to keep in mind that no material difference between superficial and 
internal flesh is postulated, though. As a consequence, the absorption of the outer 
flesh’s affection by the inner one cannot be like that of a wall absorbing a punch. The 
solution my interpretation can offer is that internal flesh will ‘homeostatically’ soften 
up in a way that is symmetrical to the pressure being exercised by external flesh. The 
process can be imagined as that of a second pin-art mould whose pins are still made of 
the same metal, while ‘dynamically’ able to soften up to counterbalance the ‘pushing 
affection’ coming from the first adjacent mould, externally affected by a hard object. 
When superficial flesh working as a medium yields under the pressure of a hard 
object, then, the ‘sensitive’ inner flesh reacts by a counterbalancing softening.51 
3. Perceptual μεσότης and the lack of perception in plants 
A further passage in which perception is associated with the notion of μεσότης occurs 
some lines after the end of DA II 11, where Aristotle accounts for the lack of 
perception in plants. Here, we read that 
[w]hat perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not admit that 
either the having of the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude; 
what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude. (…). This explains also 
why plants cannot perceive, in spite of their having a portion of soul in them 
and being affected by tangible objects themselves. For are warmed up or cooled 
down, on account of the fact that they have no mediating balance (DA II 12, 
424a26-28, a32-b1, Revised Oxford Transaltion [ROT, from now on] modified) 
The activity reading of μεσότης retains a clear advantage in the above passage: plants 
do not have any ‘mediating balance’ exactly because they are literally affected by heat 
and cold, while sense-organs oppose a counter-balancing μεσότης like homeostatic 
reaction to the incoming affection, thus preserving their receptive condition. The use 
of the word μεσότης understood along the lines of the ‘state’ reading, on the other 
hand, clashes against the difficulties we already observed, and it is not capable of 
explaining the lack of perception in plants. A ‘state’ reading must invoke the 
supposedly missing ‘intermediacy’ in the physical constitution of plants, or to the lack 
of some special state Aristotle is supposed to describe as a μεσότης, and both the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
shield. A shield is physically affected while it makes the unaffected warrior behind it ‘feel’ 
the blow (DA II 11, 423b12-17). 
51 The point at which the counterbalancing takes place is likely to be, in Aristotle’s mind, 
the locus where perception should be deemed to occur. The difficulty Aristotle may have 
found in committing to a precise localization of this part of the body may be the reason for 
his uncertain stance with regard to the status of flesh as either of the sense-organ or 
medium of touch in DA II 11. 
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hypotheses clash against Aristotle’s description of the sense-organs (the only 
exception being the consistency of the organ of touch). Furthermore, in the frame of 
spiritualist and structuralist interpretations even the supposed intermediacy of the 
physical constitution of the organ would hardly explain why plants cannot perceive, 
since (as clarified in Ch. 1) the lack of perception was equally unable to explain the 
lack of perception related to the blind spot of touch in DA II 11. On the other hand, the 
literalist’s contention that the lack of intermediacy impedes ordinary heating or 
cooling is too implausible to be accepted. Plants can be heated or cooled by the sun in 
the same way as people laying on a beach.52 
The later occurrence of μεσότης reprising the topic in DA III 13 (435a10-b3) can be 
shown to support a similar activity reading. Aristotle clarifies that plants lack 
perception because no subject having a simple body, be it made of earth or any other 
elements, is suitable to implement the sense of touch, and without it no other sense 
can be possessed (435a11-20). In this context, he again employs the notion of μεσότης 
in conjunction with perception, as he says that 
the sensation of touch is like a mediating balance of all the tangibles, and the 
sense-organ is receptive not only of those difference that belong to earth, but of 
both hot and cold, and of all the other tangibles (435a20-24, my transl.) 
An awkward aspect of Aristotle’s explanation constitutes indirect evidence in favour 
of an activity reading of the passage similar to the one proposed in DA II 11. In 
consideration of the necessity to be liable to be affected by F in order to perceive F, it 
would have been expectable for Aristotle to argue that a sense-organ made of earth 
cannot be receptive of the differences of earth, while he is in fact rejecting the 
possibility of an earthy organ of touch by claiming that the receptivity of the sense of 
                                                             
52 The problem is envisaged already by Slakey (1961:475-477). Sorabji (1974:74) and 
Everson (1997:86-89) think that Aristotle is referring to the fact that plants can only be 
heated or cooled by incorporation of hot or cold matter (an interpretation proposed 
already by Themistius [p.78 Heinze] and also accepted by Hicks, 419), thus giving 
Aristotle the chance to deny that plants are in themselves liable to receive the relevant 
type of literal affection, supposedly characterized by the lack of incorporation of matter. 
The explanation is rejected as absurd by spiritualists and anti-spiritualists alike (cf. 
Burnyeat, 1992:24, and Cohen, 1992:67; Magee [2000:324-326] also observes its conflict 
with the rejection of the explanation of alteration through assumption of matter by pores 
Aristotle elaborates in GC I 8, 326b 21-24). Sorabji (1992:217) replies that Aristotle’s 
endorsement of the hypothesis only requires lack of empirical refutation in his times, and 
that the spiritualist reading turns what Aristotle proposes as an explanation (cf. 424a 32-
33: διὰ τί; 424a1: αἴτιον) into a tautology (Aristotle would be merely saying that plants 
lacks perception because they become hot but not conscious of hotness). 
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touch would be limited to the differences of earth.53 The homeostatic counterbalancing 
physiology may be helpful to provide an explanation of Aristotle’s words. Were the 
sense-organ made of earth, it would be cold (and dry), and it would not be able to 
become colder in order to perceive hot (or drier to perceive moist). Since such an 
organ would not be liable to affections coming from by cold (and dry) objects either, 
the only perceptual activity it might exercise with regard to what is similar to it would 
be one based on the lack of affection, analogous to that Aristotle admits in the 
perception of darkness by sight and silence by hearing (cf. DA II 11,422a11-14; III 2, 
425b20-22). In this sense, Aristotle can imply that a sense-organ made of earth would 
at best perceive the differences of earth, and nothing else.  
4. The μεσότης-like homeostatic physiology of perceptual activities 
Aristotle associates the described homeostatic physiology to other perceptual 
phenomena as he employs the ‘μεσότης’ talk to account for the mechanism at the basis 
of images and feelings of pleasure and pain in DA III 7, a chapter that has been 
described as a ‘folder’ of collected scraps because of its apparent lack of 
argumentative unity.54  
The second of the two occurrences of μεσότης in DA III 7 is featured in a remark about 
images as replacements for perceptions that are necessary for thinking (431a17-20). 
Here, Aristotle says that 
[i]mages belong to the thinking soul as percepts, and when it asserts or denies 
them as a good or bad thing it avoids or pursues them. That is why the soul 
never thinks without an image: in the same way as the air has such and such 
effect on the eye-jelly, that does on something else, and similarly the sense of 
hearing. The limit is one, however, and there is a single mediating balance, even 
though its being is manifold (431a15-20, my transl.) 
Two points made in the passage require some clarification. The first is the sudden 
reference to the interaction between media and sense-organs in connection to a 
further affection the latter does in turn initiate on something else. The second is the 
claim that ‘the limit’ is one and that there is one ‘mediating balance’ whose being is 
manifold (431a19-20: τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ μία <ἡ> μεσότης, τὸ δ’ εἶναι αὐτῇ πλείω). In 
my view, the two points make sense if the passage is offering a justification of the 
claim that images are like percepts, which is based on the thesis that the physiological 
                                                             
53 Sorabji (1992:216) thinks this does either constitute ‘some carelessness’, or the result 
of a peculiar way of using ‘receptive’ to indicate the qualities constituting the organ of 
touch. 
54 Cf. Burnyeat 2002: 68 with note 100.  
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process underlying imagination is numerically one and the same with the μεσότης-
like homeostatic counterbalance at the basis of perception. In this reading, Aristotle’s 
point in DA III 7 is meant to clarify the description of images as changes generated in 
the body in correspondence to perception he gave at the end of DA III 3 (428b10-
429a2). An image is not a residual of a (literal or codifying) affection impressed on a 
passive organ through a suitable medium, which is somewhat persisting in the 
sensory apparatus. The image is rather the result of an affection that the sense-organ 
produces on some internal organ as soon as it counter-balances the external incoming 
affection. In the same way as the medium exercises its agency on the sense-organ by 
affecting it in such-and-such a way, the sense organ triggers a corresponding process 
on another part of the body. As a confirmation of this reconstruction, we should notice 
how Aristotle describes the internal process associated with images as analogously 
proportionate (ἀνάλογον) to its objects (Mem., 452b 9-12). Such a process does ‘write’ 
on some part of the body in the same way as scribes write on wax, and the physical 
qualities of the bodily parts subject to the affection can explain differences and 
variations in mnemonic abilities (cf. Mem. 450a27-b5). We can therefore suppose that 
an internally directed change co-occurs with the perceptual process (i.e., with the 
μεσότης-like counterbalancing directed against the incoming affection due to external 
stimulation), and is numerically one and the same with it: there is a single ‘mediating 
balance’, but its being is many.  
In III 7, Aristotle is also apparently suggesting that the counterbalancing activity at the 
origin of perception and images is one and the same for all the different senses. The 
parallel consideration of sight and hearing suggests that one μεσότης-like mechanism 
is at work for the images and percepts of various types, corresponding to different 
senses and sense-organs. Aristotle’s mention of a single ‘last term’ and a single 
μεσότης that are manifold in their being is evidently reminiscent of the discussion of 
DA III 2 about the co-operation and unity of senses in cross-modal perceptual activity, 
which he reprises in the immediate following of DA III 7 (431a20-b1). Aristotle is 
likely indicating that the principle bringing about the counter-affection is one for all 
senses and images, and the role attributed to the common sense in Parva Naturalia 
fully confirms this idea.  
What has been observed in the passage on images and the perceptual ‘mediating 
balance’ is useful for the understanding of the preceding section of DA III 7, where 
Aristotle talks of the feelings of pleasure and pain as the result of the exercise of the 
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perceptual μεσότης with regard to what is good or bad (431 a 10-11: ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι 
καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν): 
To perceive then is like bare asserting or thinking; but when the object is 
pleasant or painful, the soul makes a sort of affirmation or negation, and 
pursues or avoids the object. To feel pleasure or pain is to act with the sensitive 
mean towards what is good or bad as such. Both avoidance and appetite when 
actual are identical with this: the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not 
different, either from one another or from the faculty of sense-perception; but 
their being is different. (431a8-431a14 ROT) 
Further useful details on the causal chain that leads from ‘motivation-involving’ 
perceptual changes to animal motion are found in MA 7, where Aristotle compares it 
to that at play in the transmission of impulses to puppets and moving toys. Here, he 
clarifies that  
In an animal the same part has the power of becoming now larger and now 
smaller, and changing its form, as the parts increase by warmth and again 
contract by cold and change their quality. This change of quality is caused by 
imaginations and sensations and by ideas. Sensations are obviously a form of 
change of quality, and imagination and thinking have the same power as the 
objects. For in a measure the form conceived be it of hot or cold or pleasant or 
fearful is like what the actual objects would be, and so we shudder and are 
frightened merely by thinking. Now all these affections are actually changes of 
quality, and with those changes some parts of the body enlarge, others grow 
smaller. And it is not hard to see that a small change occurring at the centre 
makes great and numerous changes at the circumference, just as by shifting the 
rudder a hair’s breadth you get a wide deviation at the prow. And further, when 
by reason of heat or cold or some kindred affection a change is set up in the 
region of the heart, even in an imperceptibly small part of the heart, it produces 
a vast difference in the body—blushing, let us say, or turning white, and 
tremblings and shivers and their opposites (MA 7, 701b 10-28, ROT) 
The final remark that a barely noticeable change in the heart produces macroscopic 
changes in the rest of the body is of particular importance. Since such macroscopic 
phenomena are obviously not taking place every time we perceive, the remark 
suggests an asymmetry between ‘neutral’ (purely cognitive) perception and 
‘motivation-involving’ (i.e., emotional and desiderative) perceptual activities, whose 
objects are desirable or avoidable items.55 It is therefore the latter kind of perceptual 
                                                             
55 An asymmetry similar to the one I endorse is recognized in MA, by Burnyeat (2002: 79, 
note 134: ‘Aristotle invokes heating and chilling to explain how perceptions produce 
animal movement (…), not to explain the initial perceiving’), and denied by Nussbaum-
Putnam (1992: 38). In Burnyeat’s view (1995: 433 n.38), the asymmetry is recognizable 
also in DA I 1, 403a16, where Aristotle is supposed to distinguish, among the ‘properties’ 
of the soul (πάθη in the sense of συμβεβηκότα, cf. 402b25-403a7), those counting as ἔργα 
from those that are παθήματα (cf. 403a10 and 403b12). For Burnyeat, perception is 
included in the former group, while the latter encompasses those that are λόγοι ἔνυλοί 
(403a25) which involve concomitant bodily processes. According to Burnyeat, then, the 
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activities that Aristotle must have had in mind in MA 7’s, as he described the causal 
chain leading to locomotion. The restriction seems confirmed in the immediate 
following of MA (701b 33-35), where he concludes that  
the object we pursue or avoid in the field of action is, as has been explained, the 
origin of movement, and upon the thought and imagination of this there 
necessarily follows a heating or chilling (ROT, my emphasis) 
As a further clarification, Aristotle states that what is distressful is avoidable and what 
is pleasant is desirable, and all distressful and pleasant things are accompanied by 
some cooling or heating (701b35-702a2). In his view, evidence coming from passions 
demonstrates the point:  
Blind courage and panic fears, erotic motions, and the rest of the corporeal 
affections, pleasant and painful, are all accompanied by heating or chilling, some 
in a particular member, others in the body general (702a2-5, ROT)  
In view of what I observed about the physiology of images, the asymmetry between 
purely cognitive perception and ‘motivational’ perception is not problematic. To be 
sure, the first is in my view characterized by a lack of actual changes that is secured by 
the homeostatic ‘μεσότης-like’ physiology, whereas perception of desirable and 
avoidable object involves slight changes in the cardiac principle of motion. Still, 
nothing bars the application of the same model proposed for images to the case of 
motivation-involving perceptual activities. This shows that no inconsistency needs to 
follow from the latter’s entailment of actual, ordinary (non-homeostatic) changes: the 
very same ‘mediating balance’ by which we perceive can also produce a change on 
some other part of the body, thus initiating the chain of changes that will eventually 
set the whole animal in motion. In this view, the slight changes in the cardiac area at 
the basis of ‘motivational’ perceptual activities Aristotle describes in MA are in fact the 
result of the process he mentions in DA III 7 (431 a 10-11), as he describes pleasure 
and pain as the exercise of the perceptual μεσότης with regard to what is desirable 
and good or avoidable and bad.  
Aristotle does also admit a pleasure that intrinsically belongs to perceiving. In DA III 2, 
he explains that on the assumption that αἴσθησις is a logos even unblended simple 
qualities are pleasant to perceive when they are ‘brought to the proportion’ (426a28-
                                                                                                                                                                          
asymmetry confirms Aristotle’s ‘de-physiologyzed’ account of perception, and I obviosuly 
do not agreee with him on that matter. It is worth noting that it is mainly in controversy 
with the latter point that the asymmetry between the cognitive and the emotional in DA I 
1 is rejected by Nussbaum-Putnam (1992:42-43) and Sorabji (2001:56-58). 
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b8).56 The argument makes sense if Aristotle is once again having in mind the 
μεσότης-like homeostatic physiology I reconstructed, described as a calculated 
adjustment ‘measuring’ the incoming affection and proportionately reacting in order 
to preserve the receptive condition of the sensory apparatus. The further point about 
the pleasure of perceiving certain perceptible objects that are ‘brought to proportion’, 
then, may be suggesting that in some cases a perceptible stimulus (or a pattern of 
stimuli) fits well with the constitution and consequent power of the sense-organ, thus 
being the occasion for a homeostatic counterbalancing that takes place at ease. In 
other words, some objects falling in the ‘comfort zone’ represented by the range of 
maximal efficiency of the sensory system, are pleasant in so far as they cause an 
effortless exercise of a natural disposition, which perfectly satisfies Aristotle’s 
definition of pleasure (EN VII 12, 1153a13-15). The hypothesis seems confirmed by 
what Aristotle says in Sens. 5 with regard to the class of intrinsically pleasant smells 
(443b27-32). Such objects are noticeably said to be perceived with intrinsic pleasure 
by man alone. Aristotle stresses that thanks to the proportionately large quantity of 
moist available in his brain 
 their heat and stimulation are symmetric to the excess of moisture and coldness 
in the region (444a33-444b2, my transl. and emphasis)57 
5. Perception is a reaction and a ‘special’ preservative affection and 
alteration  
Further important support for the idea of a general homeostatic physiology of 
perceptual processes comes from a notoriously puzzling passage in De Insomniis, 
where Aristotle talks about red stains caused on mirrors by women during their 
menstrual periods. The conclusion he is willing to establish is twofold: sense-organs 
are sensitive to the slightest qualitative differences, and they swiftly react to received 
affections.58 A plausible reconstruction of the content of this controversial passage can 
                                                             
56 About the pleasure for sensations in themselves, cf. also the famous incipit of the 
Metaphysics: ‘All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take 
in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves’ 
(980a21-23, ROT). 
57 σύμμετρος γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ κίνησις πρὸς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ 
ὑγρότητος καὶ ψυχρότητός ἐστιν. 
58 cf. 459b23-24: ταχὺ τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ μικρᾶς διαφορᾶς αἰσθάνεται; 459b27: ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ 
ὄψις πάσχει, οὕτω καὶ ποιεῖ τι; 460a1-2: οὐ μόνον πάσχει ἡ ὄψις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιεῖ 
τι καὶ κινεῖ; 460a23-26: ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μικρῶν διαφορῶν γίνεται κίνησις, καὶ ὅτι 
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be obtained if, as a complement to the homeostatic physiology I propose, we assume 
that the ‘reflecting surfaces’ and ‘mirrors’ mentioned in the passage are not external 
objects supposedly affected by women from a distance, but rather parts of their own 
eyes. That parts of the eye are in fact reflective is after all recognized by Aristotle 
himself (Sens. 438a5-13).59 
 In the passage from Insomn., Aristotle claims that as an effect of menstruation, 
something like a an haematic haze (459b30: οἷον νεφέλη αἱματώδης) exhales from the 
veins around the eye, which produces a colouration of its reflective surface.60 As it 
generally happens, a stain is harder to wipe off on a surface that is new, smooth and 
clean, than on a rough an old one; for this reason the reaction of the eye to the mark 
left by the menstrual affection has different efficacy in relation to reflective surfaces of 
different quality (459b31-32: οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐκμάξαι τὴν τοιαύτην κηλίδα, ἐὰν δὲ παλαιόν, 
ῥᾷον). In my view, what Aristotle has in mind here is the homeostatic reaction of the 
perceptual part of the eye which strives to get rid of the menstrual ‘stain’, thus 
confirming that even the slightest affections on sense organs trigger their prompt 
reactions.61 In this reading, what Aristotle is describing is the interaction between 
physiological processes going on in some women’s eyes, and not a mysterious power 
to stain mirrors at a distance through the intermediacy of air.  
The admission of an ‘active’ dimension in the physiology of perception does also 
afford Aristotle the possibility to account for apparent movements in objects 
perceived under stressful conditions. Discussing the apparent ‘spin’ of the sun, he 
explains that this can be accounted by reference to the fact that  
                                                                                                                                                                          
ταχεῖα ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ ὅτι οὐ μόνον πάσχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντιποιεῖ τὸ τῶν χρωμάτων αἰσθητήριον, 
φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. 
59 That by talking of mirrors Aristotle has in fact eyes in mind has been suggested by 
Sprague (1985:324). In her view, however, the point seems just an illustration that 
Aristotle pushed too far to the effect of falling into confusion himself. I believe Aristotle 
may rather be intentionally describing parts of the eyes as ‘reflecting surfaces’, and 
affections taking place on such parts. 
60 Cf. 460a8-11: the menstrual discharges have a certain effect on the air adjacent to the 
reflective of the eyes, and the air does in turn leave a reddish mark on it (ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις 
σπέρματος καὶ καταμηνίων ὁ δ’ ἀὴρ κινεῖται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν κατόπτρων ἀέρα 
συνεχῆ ὄντα ποιόν τινα ποιεῖ καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον αὐτὸς πάσχει· ὁ δὲ τοῦ κατόπτρου τὴν 
ἐπιφάνειαν). 
61 I am therefore in disagreement with Woolf (1999), who thinks that the passage favours 
Sorabji’s literalist account, even though I share his belief that Aristotle must have in mind 
some ordinarily physical process going on in the organs, rather than ‘phenomenal’ 
changes of the sort theorized by Spiritualists. 
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the organ of sight being excessively strained whirls because of its weakness. 
The same reason probably accounts for the apparent twinkling of the fixed stars 
and the absence of twinkling in the planets. The planets are near, so that sight 
comes against them in its full vigour; but against the fixed stars it is quivering 
because of the distance, striving too much from afar; and its tremor produces an 
appearance of movement in the star; for it makes no difference whether 
movement is set up in the organ of sight or in the object of vision. (Cael. II 8, 
290a12-24, ROT modified)62  
If my proposal about a ‘homeostatic’ counterbalance physiology is correct, Aristotle is 
entitled to an explanation of the apparent scintillation of fixed stars that does not 
endorse – as the passage might otherwise suggest – the theory of ‘visual rays’ coming 
out of the eye and reaching objects of sight.63 
In the frame of the homeostatic physiology I reconstructed, it is possible to 
understand why Aristotle does sometimes feels the need to clarify that perception is 
                                                             
62 290a17-24: ἡ γὰρ ὄψις ἀποτεινομένη μακρὰν ἑλίσσεται διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν. Ὅπερ αἴτιον 
ἴσως καὶ τοῦ στίλβειν φαίνεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας τοὺς ἐνδεδεμένους, τοὺς δὲ πλάνητας μὴ 
στίλβειν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πλάνητες ἐγγύς εἰσιν, ὥστ’ ἐγκρατὴς οὖσα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀφικνεῖται ἡ ὄψις· 
πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μένοντας κραδαίνεται διὰ τὸ μῆκος, ἀποτεινομένη πόρρω λίαν. Ὁ δὲ τρόμος αὐτῆς 
ποιεῖ τοῦ ἄστρου δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κινεῖν τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τὸ ὁρώμενον. 
ROT is here misleadingly rendering ὄψις as ‘visual ray’. In 290a21 I translate πρὸς αὐτοὺς 
ἀφικνεῖται as describing sight’s ‘moving forward’ to face planets, to avoid attributing him 
the Empedoclean he normally rejects (438a25-7; Mem. 2, 452b10-11; DA III 12, 435a5-
10). This sense can be suggested by the following sentence, where sight ‘quivers’ πρὸς δὲ 
τοὺς μένοντας. At any rate, Sorabji (2004:13) helpfully recalls how Aristotle declares in GA 
(V 1, 780b35) that for his purposes it is irrelevant whether we theorize sight as travelling 
outwards or as an effect coming from the object being seen. 
63 If my reading is right, the passage in Cael. shows that Aristotle uses the verb ἀποτείνω 
(‘stretching out’, used also to refer to exertion and straining) in association with sight both 
to report a view he rejects, according to which a ray of sight exits the eye to reach distant 
object (Mem. 452b10; Sens. 438a26), and in his own explanation of optical phenomena. 
The same verb is associated with perception in two passages of the collection of 
Problemata traditionally included in Aristotle’s corpus. In both these passages, the verb 
likely indicates the straining of the sense rather than its extension outside the body. Probl. 
III, 20 treats the apparent movement of seen things caused by drunkness, and declares 
that as far as apparent movement is concerned, it makes no difference if the movement is 
inside or outside the eye (874a10-12). The effect will then be amplified if sight is 
‘stretched’ since in this way it has less hold on what is seen, and even more so if what is 
seen is distant, since the inner ‘trembling’ causes a great apparent one in the distant things 
being seen (874a14-15: ἧττον κρατεῖ ἀποτεινομένης τῆς ὄψεως, καὶ πλέον τὸ διάστημα ἐπὶ τῷ 
ἄκρῳ ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγγὺς αὕτη κίνησις; think about shooting photos with an extreme telephoto 
lens). Probl. XXXI, 17 proposes a parallel between the ‘crossed fingers’ tactile illusion and a 
visual illusion, based on the fact that a twofold organ is being used to perceive what is 
external by stretching (ἔξω ἀποτεινομένων αἰσθάνεται). Note that the reference cannot be 
to something that stretches out of the body, since this is evidently not the case with touch.  
On the other hand, the employment of the verb in association to sight in the explanation of 
rainbows and other meteorological phenomena (III 4, 375a33; 6, 377b33) appears to be 
understandable only in the frame of the theory of sight Aristotle criticizes in De Sensu, 
according to which visual rays exit the eye and reach objects at a distance.  
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not an ordinary type of alteration, but rather a very peculiar one. A distinction of this 
kind between perceptual and ordinary alteration takes place in Phys. VII 2: 
Thus we say that a thing is altered by becoming hot or sweet or thick or dry or 
white; and we make these assertions alike of what is inanimate and of what is 
animate, and further, where animate things are in question, we make them both 
of the parts that have no power of sense-perception and of the senses 
themselves. For in a way even the senses undergo alteration, since actual 
perception is a motion through the body in the course of which the sense is in a 
certain way affected. Thus the animate is capable of every kind of alteration of 
which the inanimate is capable (244b7-14, ROT modified) 
That Aristotle is making here a point about something peculiarly characterizing 
‘perceptual’ alterations as opposed to ordinary one is undeniable.64 Such a distinction 
is all but surprising in light of the homeostatic counterbalance that in my view 
characterizes perception. 
The peculiarity of the perceptual change as opposed to an ordinary alteration is 
clearly stated also in De Anima. In III 7, Aristotle declares that 
[i]t is evident that what the perceptible is making from the being in potentiality 
of what is capable of perceiving is its being in actuality, for it is not affected and 
altered. It is for this reason another kind of change, for change is an activity of 
what is imperfect, while an activity absolutely speaking is different, i.e. it is of 
what has been perfected (431 a4-7, mine) 
Once again, there is nothing surprising here: the sense-organ is not in fact changed 
during perception. Far from being a puzzling statement to be explained in the frame of 
a de-physiologized spiritualist theory, the sentence rather constitutes an indirect 
confirmation of the homeostatic physiology of perception Aristotle is committed to. 
Sense-organ are not affected or altered in their receptive conditions, even though 
perception is a certain affection and a sort of alteration.  
The reconstruction of Aristotle’s physiology of perception I am proposing can also 
shed new light on some aspects of DA II 5 emphasized by modern spiritualist 
interpreters. Aristotle draws a famous parallel between perceptual subjects switching 
                                                             
64 The meaning of Aristotle’s further remark (244b15-245a2) about the impossibility of 
failing to notice the alteration is debated. The idea that being perceptually affected and 
noticing it are two distinct aspects is embraced by Caston (2002:757-759). Johansen 
(2005:264-265) shows that this is not necessary, and Aristotle may be explaining that one 
way of being affected peculiar to the animate consists in not escaping notice when 
affected. In support of Johansen’s remark, one can add that even though Aristotle suggests 
that affection may go unnoticed when not κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, there are several affections 
that this description may encompass which would suit his point about being noticed, such 
as those accompanied by pain or other emotions. 
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from the possession of the power to perceive to the activity of perceiving, and 
knowers moving to the exercise of fully possessed bodies of knowledge: 
at birth the living thing is, in respect of sensation, at the stage which 
corresponds to the possession of knowledge. Actual sensation corresponds to 
the stage of the exercise of knowledge (τῷ θεωρεῖν) (417b17-19, ROT) 
Previously in the same chapter, he stressed that this type of transition requires a 
distinction in the notion of ‘being affected’, because of its difference from the one that 
is a sort of destruction by an opposite:  
what possesses knowledge becomes an actual knower by a transition which is 
either not an alteration of it at all (being in reality a development into its true 
self or actuality) or at least an alteration in a quite different sense. (417b5-7, 
ROT) 
As opposed to the ‘destructive’ type of being affected, this type of transition is more 
like  
a preservation of what is potential by that which, being in actuality, is also 
similar in this way as what has a potentiality rather than an actuality’ (417b3-6, 
my transl.)65 
In order to see how this description can fit perception as well as knowledge under all 
relevant aspects, including the lack of ‘destructive’ ordinary change, no ‘quasi-
physical’ change of the type theorized by modern spiritualism is necessary. All we 
need is the μεσότης-like homeostatic physiology of perception Aristotle introduces in 
DA II 11. 
A careful choice of words similarly suggesting the necessity of preserving the 
potentiality that makes senses receptive can be also observed in the finale of the same 
chapter. Having recalled at the beginning of it (DA II 5, 417a17-20) the general 
conditions for an affection to take place (i.e., the presence of an agent in actuality, and 
an initial dissimilarity between it and the patient, which allows the latter to become 
similar to the former after the affection), Aristotle finally (at 418a3-6) introduces a 
thesis about perceptual affection that is only partially similar to the general one. The 
final statement about perceptual affections rehearses the idea that what is capable of 
perceiving is affected when potentially similar to an object that is already perceptible 
in actuality (418a3-5: τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, 
καθάπερ εἴρηται). However, Aristotle now says that the perceiving subject is affected 
while not being the same as the agent (418a5: πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν).  
                                                             
65 σωτηρία μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύναμις 
ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν. 
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Aristotle’s preoccupation with the correct description of perception as a certain type 
of change that implies no actual change, i.e. as consisting of an incoming affection and 
a homeostatic change aiming at the preservation of the initial status, does also explain 
some apparent oddities in his description of the organ of hearing and taste. In DA II 8, 
he says that the connaturate air in the organ of hearing ‘changes’ as soon as the 
external resounding medium changes (DA II 8, 420a4-5: κινουμένου τοῦ ἔξω ὁ εἴσω 
κινεῖται); on the other hand, he simultaneously argues that such air is receptive in so 
far as it is unchangeable (ἀκίνητος, a10-12), adding that for this reason it is housed 
internally and protected from direct affection from the external media by an internal 
membrane and convoluted channels (a12-16). The description of the sense organ of 
taste in DA II 10 has a similar tone: 
Since the tasteable is liquid, the organ for its perception cannot be either 
actually moist or incapable of moisteining. The sense of taste is in a certain way 
affected by the tasteable qua tasteable; it is then necessary that the organ of 
taste is not moist, but rather moistened while preserving the power to be 
moistened (422a34-b5, my transl.)66 
On the ground of the evidence coming from the several passages examined above, it 
finally becomes possible to appreciate how Aristotle’s concern with the preservation 
of the initial receptive state of sense-organs is signalled by a similarly odd expression 
in DA II 11. At 424a1-2, we find him saying that in perception the agent makes the 
patient such as it is in actuality, as the latter is being in potentiality (οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ 
τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ, δυνάμει ὄν). The clause about potentiality is usually read as a 
simple rehearsal of the point about the patient’s becoming F thanks to the ability to 
become F. The homeostatic physiology I propose, however, makes it possible to 
appreciate a different possible meaning of the sentence, suggested by the odd 
placement of the clause ‘being in potentially’ (δυνάμει ὄν). In my view, what the 
passage is likely suggesting is that the organ keeps being potentially F while it is 
affected by what is actually F, and the participle ὄν has a temporal function. In other 
words, Aristotle is saying that  
Accordingly, the agent makes that one such as it actually is while <that one> is 
being potentially such (424a1-2, my transl.)  
The consequential tone of the ‘accordingly’ (ὥστε) introducing the sentence does in 
fact invite my reading: Aristotle has just established that the sense-organ of touch 
                                                             
66 ἐπεὶ δ’ ὑγρὸν τὸ γευστόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτοῦ μήτε ὑγρὸν εἶναι ἐντελεχείᾳ μήτε 
ἀδύνατον ὑγραίνεσθαι· πάσχει γάρ τι ἡ γεῦσις ὑπὸ τοῦ γευστοῦ, ᾗ γευστόν. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα 
ὑγρανθῆναι τὸ δυνάμενον μὲν ὑγραίνεσθαι σωζόμενον, μὴ ὑγρὸν δέ, τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον. 
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must be potentially the F-tangible it is receptive of, and that perceiving is ‘a certain’ 
being affected. The remark that the agent acts on a patient that preserves its 
potentiality to be affected perfectly squares with the announced peculiarity of 
perceptual affection, which is going to be explained in the immediately following 
statement about the μεσότης-like homeostatic physiology. On the assumption that the 
sense organ must be potentially F to perceive F, perceiving must arguably be an 
affection of a certain kind (τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν): in order for the 
potentiality and receptivity requirement to be preserved, the agent makes the patient 
becomes similar to it (ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν, οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ), while 
the patient keep being in potentiality (δυνάμει ὄν).  
6. Ordinary changes in the receptive condition of the sense organ impair 
perception 
In the continuation of the conclusive passage of DA II 5 quoted above (418a5-6), 
Aristotle adds that what is capable of perceiving does on the other hand become of the 
same quality as that once it has been affected (418a5-6, πεπονθὸς δ' ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν 
οἷον ἐκεῖνο). As I show in detail in Chapter 5, the latter phrase is a compressed 
reference to non-standard cases of perceptual activities, characterized by literal 
physical alterations that make sense-organs actually perceptible to themselves (what I 
describe in that chapter as the ‘indirect route’ to perceptual activation). In relation to 
such cases, Aristotle speaks of an organ that has become similar in a past moment and 
so is the same in quality (ἐκεῖνο) as the object affecting it.  
The possibility that ordinary changes affect sense-organs in certain circumstances is at 
the basis of Aristotle’s idea that perception is hindered or lost (either temporarily or 
permanently) after interacting with particularly intense perceptibles. Aristotle 
typically explains the damage on the ability to perceive by reference to the excess of 
perceptibles that affected the organ 
the excess of either the sharp or the flat destroys the hearing. (So also in the 
case of savours excess destroys the sense of taste, and in the case of colours 
excessive brightness or darkness destroys the sight, and in the case of smell 
excess of strength whether in the direction of sweetness or bitterness is 
destructive) (DA III 2, 426a30-b2, ROT ) 
The doctrine is reprised in III 13 (435b4-19), with the added remark that excessively 
intense tangibles destroy the animal itself, as expectable in consideration of the thesis 
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that no perceptual ability and thence no animal exists without the basic sense of touch 
(animals are for Aristotle defined by the possession of perception). 
 The point about the negative effect of excessively intense perceptible is interestingly 
entrenched with a remark about the different degree of impassibility of perception 
and thought in DA III 4, where Aristotle states that  
Observation of the sense-organs and their employment reveals a distinction 
between the impassibility of the sensitive faculty and that of the faculty of 
thought. After strong stimulation of a sense we are less able to exercise it than 
before, as e.g. in the case of a loud sound we cannot hear easily immediately 
after, or in the case of a bright colour or a powerful odour we cannot see or 
smell, but in the case of thought thinking about an object that is highly thinkable 
renders it more and not less able afterwards to think of objects that are less 
thinkable: the reason is that while the faculty of sensation is dependent upon 
the body, thought is separable from it (429a29-429b5, ROT) 
In Aristotle’s view, the limit to the impassibility of perception is linked to the negative 
effect of perceptibles of excessive intensity, which is in turn made possible by the fact 
that the ability to perceive, as opposed to the ability to think, is implemented in a 
material sense-organ. In a similar way, in DA II 12 he argues that since the sense-
organ is a magnitude, it is possible to explain why excessively intense perceptibles 
destroy it: 
if the movement set up by an object is too strong for the organ, the form which 
is its sensory power is disturbed; it is precisely as consonance (συμφωνία) and 
tension (τόνος) are destroyed by too violently twanging the strings of a lyre 
(424a 30-32, ROT modified) 
The idea that the preservation of the receptive power is secured by a homeostatic 
counter-affection taking place in sense-organs makes Aristotle’s attribution of 
(limited) impassibility to perception easy to understand. In normal circumstances, the 
sense organ’s receptive condition is actually unchanged in spite of the external 
incoming affection, thanks to the physiological counterbalancing opposed by the 
sensory apparatus. On the other hand, if the stimulation is too intense in comparison 
to the intensity of the ‘counterbalancing’ reaction the sensory apparatus puts forth, 
the organ will fall short of remaining unaffected: an ordinary change will take place in 
it, and the loss of its optimal receptive conditions will coincide with an impairment of 
its perceptual powers. In other words, when the intensity of the incoming stimulation 
exceeds the intensity of the homeostatic counter-affection (this may well be due to 
physiological limits of the system: think about touching a blazing fire, or looking 
straight at the sun), an ordinary, literal change affects the sensitive part of a sense-
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organ, thus causing a ‘dazzle’ that temporarily or permanently impairs the ability to 
perceive. 
The hypothesis of a homeostatic μεσότης-like physiology of perception perfectly 
agrees with Aristotle’s explanation of the loss of perceptual powers through the 
analogy of the lyre. As he says, the excess damages and spoils both the activity and the 
power perception, in the same way as it spoils and damages the consonance 
(συμφωνία) and the tension (τόνος) of the instrument (note that in III 2 Aristotle also 
explains the phenomena by appealing to the thesis that perception is a logos, in the 
same way as a ‘consonance’ and a ‘voice’ are). In the case of the sense-organ, the 
activity is a μεσότης. The achievement of an operation of this kind is clearly spoiled if 
the extremes of the perceptual ‘proportion’ are not symmetric. This happens when the 
incoming affection is excessive in comparison to the counter-affection. In such cases, 
there is no ‘fitting’ but rather a ‘mismatch’, in the same way as when one fails to play a 
chord because of an excessively violent plucking of the strings.67 For the same reason, 
a violently clumsy attempt at playing the lyre damages the physical condition enabling 
it to sound properly, either in a temporary or permanent way: breaking a string is 
physically possible as well as causing it to go out of tune. In the quoted passage of DA 
II 12, then, Aristotle offers the analogy of the lyre as an apt illustration of how a 
similar damage can be produced in the case of senses: excessively intense stimulation 
causes a literal affection and a change in the organs’ receptive conditions, which 
coincides with a temporary or permanent impairment of the ability to perceive.68 
                                                             
67 Note that in the case of a mismatch of notes required for a consonance the excess is 
relative to the notes, rather than to the current state of the subject. In the case of sense, 
this corresponds to the intensity of the homeostatic counterbalance in relation to the 
incoming stimulation, as opposed to an absolutely determined ‘excessive’ intensity of the 
incoming stimulation in itself. In this way, the model can make room for possible 
variations due to context, and thus account for the observation that light of similar 
intensity produces no damage on eyes adapted to direct sun light, while it dazzles those 
suddenly exposed to it after a long time spent in a dark room. Aristotle’s awareness of this 
phenomena (cf. GA V 1, 780a 10-13, e Ins. 2, 459b 9-12, quoted in this respect by Sisko 
1996: 144-147) suggests that this aspect of the lyre simile is not casual.  
68 Note also that there is another resemblance: the strings are elastic, and they ‘bounce’ 
back with an intensity that is symmetrical to the received affection (if the latter is not 
excessive) while preserving the original enabling condition (the tuning). On the contrary, 
strokes exceeding the appropriate range of intensity temporary or permanently impair 
such condition, thus determining a physical alteration of the initial state: having being 
struck in an improperly violent way, strings do not return to the original condition. In this 
way, the simile is indeed appropriate to illustrate what happens in the case of sense-
organs, both in ordinary cases of perception and in occasion of excessive stimulations 
which impair perceptual powers. 
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The excessive stimulation of sense-organs appears similarly involved in Aristotle’s 
explanation of after-images and illusions, placed before the passage on red ‘mirrors’ in 
De Insomniis 2 (459b 8-23). The explanation moves from the remark that the effect of 
an agent initiating a change and an alteration can persist when the relevant agency is 
no longer being exercised. Aristotle extends this possibility to perception, on account 
of its being an alteration ‘of some kind’ (459b3-5). In the following lines (459b 4-23), 
he attributes after-images and certain perceptual illusions to the persistence of 
affections in the organs, eventually linking the latter phenomena to the impairment of 
perception by excessively intense perceptibles. The difference between ordinary 
affections causing illusions and after images and those producing an impairment of 
the power to perceive seems relative to whether the change extends to the properly 
sensitive parts of the organs or not. As Aristotle says in the passage quoted above, 
persistence of the stimulation in sense organs is possible ‘both in their deeper and in 
their more superficial parts’). In the latter case, the ability to perceive is intact and the 
organ comes to perceive itself as if it were two (cf. Sens. 437a27-b10).69 
Conclusions 
The above gives robust reasons to accept my interpretation of DA II 11. In spite of the 
neutrality of the definition of μεσότης I embraced in the previous chapter, the 
standard ‘state’ reading of AisthMesot has to be abandoned in favour of the activity 
reading I offered, in so far as the latter does not incur in any of the difficulties the 
former has to face. In my account, the meaning of the word μεσότης is fully respected, 
and yet its application to all senses is not problematic, even though none of them is in 
fact an intermediate blend of the extreme perceptible properties it can perceive (the 
only exception being the consistency of the organ of touch in relation to perceptible 
hardness and softness).  
The survey of all the occasions in which the notion of μεσότης is connected to 
perceptual activities confirms the advantages on my activity reading. On its grounds, 
Aristotle can give an explanation of the lack of perception of plants by reflecting on 
their being passively heated and cooled down. Furthermore, the occurrence of the 
active μεσότης-like reaction is also at the origin of the physiological changes 
underlying imagination and ‘motivation-involving’ feelings of pleasure and pain.  
                                                             
69 For more details on the type of perception involved in such experiences, see Ch. 4 
below, section 6.2.  
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A constant preoccupation with the preservation of the receptive condition of the 
sense-organs has been observed in several places of DA, which runs parallel to 
Aristotle’s insistence on the idea that perception is peculiarly different from an 
ordinary affection an alteration, even though it is some sort of affection and alteration. 
On the other hand, the distinctions made possible by the homeostatic physiology I 
propose clarify how, after occasional ordinary changes taking place in sense-organ 
because of incoming affection of exceeding intensity, the ability to perceive is 
temporarily or permanently damaged.  
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Appendix - The homeostatic ‘μεσότης-like’ physiology and the role of 
media of perception: why we do not perceive by direct contact 
A clarification is needed about an aspect of my interpretation of Aristotle’s physiology 
of perception, which is potentially problematic with regard to the transmission of 
perceptible stimulations through inanimate external media, and the thesis that 
perception cannot take place by direct contact between sense-organs and perceptible 
source-objects (DA II 7, 419a12-21). The homeostatic physiology I propose implicitly 
assumes that media become no less F that the original F-source objects that have 
affected them, and that they would thus make the relevant sense-organ F in the same 
way, if no counter-balancing affection were at play. This requirement cannot be taken 
for granted. An apparent reason for questioning it is that according to Aristotle direct 
contact between an F-source object and the corresponding sense-organ (e.g., a red 
tomato and the organ of sight, or the sounding object and the organ of hearing) cannot 
produce perception. In his view, perception can take place only when the affection on 
the sense-organ is performed by suitable media that have been ‘changed’ by 
perceptible source objects. As a consequence, there must be some special function 
peculiar to media that distinguishes the affection they produce on sense-organ from 
the one the latter would undergo were it immediately in contact with source-objects. 
According to an explanatory schema that all commentators seem to accept in spite of 
the differences in their views, an F-source object affects the medium to the effect of 
making it ‘F’ in a certain ‘special’ way, and this peculiar implementation of F is the 
function of media Aristotle has in mind as he denies perception by direct contact with 
source objects. In this schema, the medium does in turn affect the sense-organ 
likewise, namely by making it ‘F’ only in a certain way, which is different from the way 
in which the source object is F.70 Even literalist interpreters are ready to accept that 
there are differences in the way in which media and source-object are said to be F. In 
fact, Aristotle himself recognizes that all transparent bodies deprived of proprietary 
boundaries, including water and air working as media and sensoria of sight, are 
deprived of proprietary colours and rather coloured in a ‘borrowed’ way. In such 
cases, the colour is an extrinsic propriety due to the affection received by solid bodies, 
                                                             
70 Spiritualists talk of a ‘quasi-physical’ or ‘phenomenal’ affection on media, while 
Structuralists generally invoke the idea of a ‘codification’ or transduction’.  
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whose boundaries and colours are instead intrinsic and proprietary (cf. Sens. 3, 
439a17-439b14). 71 
Regardless of the peculiarities that the implementation of perceptibles in media may 
have in comparison with that in source objects, there is an important aspect the two 
always have in common. The perceptible F in the source object always has the power 
to affect a suitable medium, and the F-affected suitable medium does have the very 
same causal power. To be sure, the F-medium does merely ‘borrow’ the source 
object’s causal agency, since the former is F not in itself and intrinsically, but 
derivatively and extrinsically. The reason for this difference is that F-source object is F 
regardless of whether a suitable medium is there, while the medium is F only as far as 
an F-source object is (or was) there.72 
The preservation of the causal power is evident if we imagine how we can see the 
colour of a car passing by the street by looking through a glass of water and a shut 
double-glaze window. In Aristotle’s terms, the car’s colour affects the adjacent air, and 
this generates a series of similar interactions along the chain of intermediate 
transparent bodies (the two layers of glass in the window, the air, the walls of the 
glass and the water inside it). The same effect can be observed in the case of sounds, 
where one may even imagine  a possible case in which a violent sound wave strikes a 
body and makes it emit a sound (think for instance about the effect of a whistling wind 
on a bell, or to the cracking sound of a tree hit by a thunder). Similarly, in the case of 
tangible properties like hot or cold, the affection impressed by a source object to a 
medium gives the latter a similar ability to affect a suitable medium.73 As far as The F-
source-object’s power to affect a suitable medium is concerned, then, the F-affected 
                                                             
71 Sorabji’s literalist interpretation does take into account the necessity to distinguish a 
special way in which colours are received in the eye and in transparent bodies. According 
to his interpretation of Sens. 3 (2001:53-54), the eye-jelly is literally coloured in so far as it 
has the same formal cause as the coloured source object, even though the material basis is 
different and the colour is thus ‘borrowed’ (cf. also his 2004:130-131). As opposed to the 
eye-jelly, interposed transparent media are instead not literally coloured in Sorabji’s view 
(2001: 54). 
72 In my view, such a difference does not appear to justify the idea that an affected medium 
is F in a ‘phenomenal’ or ‘codified’ way. Even if this were the case, though, the 
preservation of the power to affect a suitable medium will still be in place, and thence the 
problem of justifying why the source can affect in the supposedly special way the external 
medium, but not the sense organ, even though the latter two are materially equivalent (as 
explained further in the main text). 
73 In DA II 12 (424b3-18) Aristotle refers to the case of sounds and, above all, tangibles to 
show that the effects of perceptibles are not limited to those leading to perception. 
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medium is as F as the original object. In this sense, for any perceptible F property, the 
medium is as F as the original F-source object. 
The limited sense in which a medium becomes as F as the F-source object affecting it 
is sufficient to raise a problem concerning the lack of perception by direct contact. A 
survey of Aristotle’s descriptions of media and sense-organs shows that the material 
composition of the two is identical for each of the senses. Since the ability to affect 
suitable media is shared by source objects and affected media alike, the identical 
material composition of sense-organ should in fact secure source objects with the 
possibility to exercise their agency on them by direct contact, in the same way and for 
the same reason why the source object can exercise it on media, and the affected 
media can in turn do it on sense-organs. In other words, it becomes urgent to provide 
a justification of why the F-source-object can affect the external medium, but not the 
sense organ, regardless of whether the medium become F in a different and peculiar 
way or not. 
In the case of sight, a satisfactory justification of the lack of perception by direct 
contact can be given by taking into account the receptive condition of its sense-organ. 
In Aristotle’s view, the sensitive part of the eye is dark, in so far as it is made of 
transparent matter deprived of intrinsic boundaries (such as water) in a state of 
potentiality. In this way, the organ of sight can be affected by what is enlightened 
(light being for him the state of actuality of transparent bodies deprived of intrinsic 
boundaries), but not by a similarly dark body. A solid object with its own definite 
boundary posed on the eye, then, will just prevent the contact with light (indefinite 
transparent in actuality), thus making vision impossible. To put it more simply, a 
coloured solid object placed directly on your eyes would simply act as a blindfold: it 
would prevent vision, rather than producing it.74 
As far as the other senses are concerned, the homeostatic physiology’s assumption 
that the organ strives not to change is useful to understand why a direct rather than 
mediated affection by a perceptible source object would not bring about perception. 
Consider the case of hearing. If a blow able to make air resonate were directly hitting 
the inner ‘sensitive’ air in the organ, then two possible outcome could be imagined: (i) 
the counter-affection prevents the air from resonating, then there is no real sound to 
be heard, since no sound has been actually produced; alternatively, (ii) the counter-
affection resonates, rather than counter-balancing the incoming affection, so that the 
                                                             
74 Cf. Sisko 1998:342, note 13. 
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affection being produced is not perception, but rather a becoming perceptible that 
damages the auditory organ. A reasoning similar to the one sketched for hearing can 
be easily adapted to the other senses, and this may be the reason why Aristotle 
appears so confident about the extension of the thesis that we do not perceive by 
direct contact to all senses. 





Chapter 3 - Perception as Reception of Perceptible 
Forms without Matter 
 
In the first part of DA II 12, Aristotle connects perception to the idea of ‘receiving forms 
without the matter’ (RFwM, from now on). The formula is obscure and its 
interpretation subject to an ongoing debate among scholars. The passage in which the 
idea occurs goes as follows 
Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of 
receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in 
which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or 
gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua 
bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or 
flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such 
and such a sort and according to its form. A primary sense-organ is that in which 
such a power is seated. The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their 
essence is not the same. What perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we 
must not admit that either the having the power to perceive or the sense itself is 
a magnitude; what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude75 
If we look at current literature, the interpretation of RFwM seems reducible to three 
options: 
(i) RFwM indicates that the patient is selectively affected by F, and not by other 
properties belonging to the agent because of the agent’s matter.76 
(ii) RFwM means ‘receiving F, i.e. becoming F, without receiving any quantity of matter 
from the F-thing the patient is affected by’.77 
(iii) RFwM alludes to receiving F without standing to F as matter, i.e., without becoming 
F.78 
                                                             
75 Unless specified, all Aristotle’s quotations from Barnes’ Revised Oxford Translation. 
76 This is the view emerging from translations by Smith, Hicks, Rodier, Hamlyn. Scaltsas 
(1996:26) endorses a similar position (he speaks of ‘selectivity of information’), but 
proposes that RFwM and the initial simile also constitute a first step towards denying that 
perception is a physical change (‘the criterion of receiving form without matter goes only 
half-way towards securing non-physical reception of form. (…) [T]he wax example (…) 
shows that something can receive shape without changing in size or weight, as it would if 
more matter was added to it. But it fails to show that perception is not a physical change. 
After all, the wax changes form physically’). 
77 This is Sorabji’s interpretation, supported by Everson. This reading clearly makes the 
power of RFwM a necessary but not sufficient condition for being a sense organ.  
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The latter option is subscribed by proponents of very diverse reconstructions of 
Aristotle’s theory of perception, and accordingly cashed out in different fashions . 
Transductionists like Caston read RFwM as indicating the ‘transduction’ of F by 
becoming G (where G is a quantitative structure essential to F, which is reproduced in a 
material substrate different from the original’s) and without becoming F.79 Modern 
spiritualists like Burnyeat and Johansen offer a different version of (iii) above, 
according to which the organ is subject to the ‘quasi-alteration’ of becoming F 
‘phenomenally’. In this view, the simile at the beginning of DA II 12 illustrates the 
‘quasi-changes’ supposedly taking place in sense-organ and – as a consequence– in the 
media of perception.80 Such affections are not ordinary physical changes, since their 
description in purely physical terms is impossible (their ‘appearing to a subject’ must 
be mentioned), and they do not even satisfy Aristotle’s own idea of what change is.81 
The reason why it is only the sense organs’ RFwM that counts as perceiving eventually 
                                                                                                                                                                            
78 The idea is found already in Philoponus and embraced by Brentano. For Barnes 
(1971:109-110) it establishes the negative point that perception is not a purely 
physiological change. 
79 Caston 2005:299-307. 
80 Having suggested that ‘the function of the medium is primarily to separate rather than to 
join’, Burnyeat (1995:427) concludes that ‘it is above all the sensible form and the matter of 
the object perceived that need to be separated. The separation is an aspect of the quasi-
alteration I spoke of earlier. If the transparent is coloured in a derivative way, without 
being really coloured, we can say that the sensible form, the colour, is present in the 
transparent by itself, without the material base with which it is united in the object 
perceived’ . This appears to be an expansion of Burnyeat’s earlier observation that the wax 
block does not become ‘circular’ like a circular signet ring, since the predicate ‘circular’ 
rather applies to ‘the content displayed therein’ (1992:22). Along the same lines, Johansen 
(1998:239) states that ‘the medium is only acted on by the form of the sense-object, not 
also by its matter. It receives only the form of the sense-object just as the wax receives the 
form of the signet-ring but not the iron of which the ring is made’ (cf. also his note 19, ibid.: 
‘[t]he wax block analogy applies, of course, not just to the way in which the sense- object 
affects the medium of the distance senses but also to the way in which the sense-object 
affects all the sense-faculties; cf. De an. II. 12 424a17-20. 
81 A lucid presentation and defence of the ‘phenomenal’ account of affections in media is 
offered by Johansen (1998: 120-145). He recognises that ‘[t]he medium takes on the quality 
of the sense-object only insofar as the quality appears to a perceiver. For example, the 
transparent becomes coloured only insofar as the colour appears to a viewer through it’ 
(Johansen 1998:135, cf. also pp. 135-136). Johansen rightly recognises such ‘phenomenal’ 
changes must nonetheless be real (as opposed to mere ‘Cambridge changes’), since De 
Sensu (6, 446b2-10) describes them as alterations with temporal parts that admit of delays. 
For the idea that DA II 5 makes room for such ‘special changes’, which fail to satisfy the 
criteria for ordinary change posed in the Physics, cf. Burnyeat 2005. 
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reduces, in this reconstruction, to the mere ‘fact’ that sense organs are endowed with 
perceptual powers.82 
While I believe, for reasons I am going to expose, that (iii) is indeed the most 
reasonable among the options listed above, I find myself in disagreement with the 
versions of this reading currently offered by modern Spiritualists and Transductionists. 
As I am going to argue, there is an unobserved difficulty in these views – as well as the 
other ones listed under (ii) and (i) above– have to face. The difficulty is constituted by 
the thesis – implied by Aristotle’s words at 424a24-25, but regularly neglected by 
commentators – that the power to RFwM is sufficient for being a sense organ (‘RFwM-
Sufficiency’ from now on). This restrictive claim is at odds with the variety or 
interpretations of RFwM already mentioned, which liberally grant the possibility that 
RFwM takes place also in inanimate bodies deprived of perceptual abilities.  
The liberality of RFwM is obviously not an invention of commentators: admittedly, the 
possibility that inanimate subjects are indeed capable of RFwM appear plausible in 
view of the initial illustration Aristotle employs. This illustration may in fact prima facie 
suggest a ‘wax simile’ stating that a ‘matterless’ reception of forms is similarly taking 
place in both senses and wax blocks. If such a wax simile is in fact what Aristotle is 
proposing here, however, there will be a tension between this initial liberality and the 
restriction imposed in the following lines by RFwM-Sufficiency. This contradiction is 
the problem which I shall raise and attempt to solve in this chapter.  
As RFwM-Sufficiency is regularly neglected by commentators, I shall first of all stress 
that this restrictive thesis is in fact implied by what Aristotle says in 424a24-25. Then, I 
shall accordingly deny that the simile he proposes at the beginning of II 12 entails the 
attribution to wax blocks of the power of RFwM. The key idea in my interpretation of 
the passage will be that the illustration Aristotle proposes must be read as a ‘signature 
simile’, rather than as a ‘wax simile’. In other words, the simile does not hinge on a 
parallel between the supposedly matterless character of the receptions taking place in 
wax blocks and sense organs, but rather on the matterless character of the items 
received by senses and the signet ring’s signature received by a wax block. By means of 
a careful analysis of the occurrences of the clause ‘without matter’ in Aristotle, I shall 
                                                             
82 This leads Burnyeat to the famously provoking claim that for Aristotle animal matter is 
‘pregnant with consciousness’ (1992:19). In his view (1995:428) ‘[t]he sole difference 
between the effect on the medium and the effect on the eye is the difference adverted to 
(for the case of smell) in the very last sentence of 2. 12, 424b16–18: at the eye the effect is 
seeing, in the medium it is not, because the eye has the capacity to see and the air does not’. 
Cf. Johansen (1998:146-147). 
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then show that in application to forms the expression indicates metaphysically sterile 
and causally powerless abstract items (to be explained), and thus aptly describes a 
similarity between the ‘signature’ vehicled by the signet ring and the objects received 
in perceiving. 
My reading of DA II 12 will accordingly reprise (iii) above in terms of a fundamentalist 
variety of spiritualism that departs under important respects from Burnyeat’s and 
Johansen’s interpretations. In my reading, the reception of perceptible forms without 
matter turns out to be a description of the mental process by which certain abstract 
entities are obtained by a cognising subject, which is sufficient to attribute perceptual 
abilities to the subject it takes place in. The idea that sense are RFwM, then, has nothing 
to do with ‘quasi-physical’ or ‘phenomenal’ affections taking place in sense organ as 
well as in inanimate bodies, and it does not describe (or deny) ‘literal’ or 
‘transductional’ physiological changes either.  
1. Clarification of the problem: the neglected restriction posed by 
RFwM_Sufficiency (424a24-25) 
The RFwM-Sufficiency thesis is clearly implied by Aristotle’s words at 424a24-25 
(αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις). These are important lines that deserves 
the best of our attention, as they provide a guide to the interpretation of the wax simile 
that opens the chapter. In the translation quoted above, Aristotle says: 
A primary sense-organ is that in which such a power is seated  
Possible translations like ‘that in which such a power resides is primarily a sense organ’ 
are better suited to make the implication of RFwM-Sufficiency evident, but even in the 
rendering just quoted the sentence is clearly implying that whatever possesses the 
power just described counts as a sense-organ (or a ‘primary’ one, depending on how 
one reads πρῶτον).83 In other words, the passage is committed to something stronger 
than the mere remark that sense organs are among the things that possess such a 
power.84  
                                                             
83 I must mention that RFwM-Sufficiency is in my view a clear implication of the sentence, 
but not the point Aristotle is making here. In my view, the passage is rather stressing that 
even though what works as the ‘receptacle’ of matterless F is not matter (since the latter is 
a ‘to-be-qualified’ material subject that would become ‘F-qualified’ by receiving F), the 
special receiving ‘principle’ does still reside in a material sense-organ. 
84 The latter meaning, which would make it theoretically possible to attribute the power at 
issue to wax blocks receiving the signature of signet rings (for such power would at best be 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the possession of perceptual abilities), does not 
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The strict relation between having the power to RFwM and being a sense organ cannot 
be bypassed by claiming that the expression ‘such a power’ refers here to the power of 
perception, rather than to the power to RFwM. The context strongly suggests that ‘such 
a power’ means the power of perception as just described, namely as the power of 
RFwM. If this is denied, we would be required to consider the power to perceive as 
something altogether different from the power of RFwM discussed so far. This is highly 
unlikely, though: were Aristotle indeed willing to make a completely new point here, he 
would surely have used a better expression than the very misleading ‘such a power’.  
There are accordingly two ways in which one can take the ‘power’ Aristotle is talking 
about in the passage: 
a) The power at issue is the power to RFwM, which is, absolutely speaking and with 
no further qualification, sufficient to be a sense organ 
b) The power at issue is a qualified power to RFwM – a power for ‘perceptual RFwM’ 
–which is sufficient to be a sense organ; this leaves open the possibility that the 
power to RFwM belongs, in some other way, to sealing devices as well. 
In order to embrace b), and claim that ‘such a power’ is referring to the ability for 
perceptual RFwM, one must be able to provide, already at this point and on the grounds 
of what has been said so far, a clear and convincing distinction between the reception of 
forms without matter which (supposedly) takes place in wax blocks and the one which 
characteristically belongs to senses.85 To be sure, each of the proposed reconstructions 
                                                                                                                                                                            
fit the text well. Were this the idea Aristotle wanted to convey, he would rather have 
employed a phrasing like ‘a thing in which such a power resides is the primary sense organ’. 
This reading goes against Aristotle’s words twice. First of all, it requires a determinate 
article introducing αἰσθητήριον which is nowhere in the text. Despite the wide agreement 
of translators neglecting this aspect (apart from Smith’s translation and its revision by 
Barnes, all the readings of the passage supply the article: cf. Hicks [1907:105]; Hett 
[1957:137]; Hamlyn [1968:43], Ward [1988 : 223], Silverman [1989:273], Ross’ [1961:264] 
and Polanski’s [2007:349-350] paraphrases), such an addition is strictly speaking wrong. 
Secondly, the above reading would be neglecting that the organ is said to be ‘that in which’ 
– not ‘a thing in which’– such a power resides. 
A further version of the sentence might be considered, according to which ‘that in which 
such a power primarily resides is a sense organ’. This construction may justify the 
attribution of the power to RFwM in different ways to both sense organs and wax block, as 
it suggests a distinction between things in which the power reside ‘primarily’ and ‘non-
primarily’. Such a reading can therefore be treated as equivalent to the second of the two 
ways of taking the power Aristotle is talking about which I am going to consider. 
85 A distinction has to be made here depending on whether one reads the πρῶτον in 
424a24 adverbially or as a qualification of the sense-organ (cf. the preceding note). In the 
latter case, what is needed is a distinction between the primary sense-organ’s power of 
RFwM and the power of RFwM which (supposedly) belongs to wax. In the first one, the 
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is more than capable to provide such a distinction by invoking additional features of 
perception as opposed to the RFwM supposedly going on in inanimate beings.86 None of 
the proposed interpretations, however, seems able to provide the desired distinction 
on the grounds of what Aristotle has been saying so far. This is, however, what the 
position and wording of the sentence require: it is that in which such a power (i.e. the 
power of RFwM discussed so far) resides that is declared to be a sense organ. 
Once the framing of the problem is accepted, it is clear that none of the proposed 
reading of RFwM can help solving it. In Sorabji’s reading, what RFwM means is just 
being physically affected without receiving bits of matter from the source of the 
affection. Wax blocks and sense organs (not to mention the media of perception) 
should be, under this respect, equal. There are no grounds to distinguish their RFwM 
on the basis of what has just been said, and then no grounds to say that ‘that in which 
such a power is seated’ is a sense organ. A similar problem will have to be faced if, as 
Transductionists claim, the idea of RFwM and the wax simile by which it is introduced 
mean that the form F is not received by becoming literally F, but rather by physically 
becoming G (where G is a quantitative definable ‘structure’ importantly related to F’s 
essence). Transductionists themselves concede that RFwM is not sufficient for being a 
sense organ, as such ‘receptions of F without becoming F’ can also take place in 
inanimate bodies, like a wax block.87 The sentence is problematic for modern 
Spiritualists as well. If RFwM indicates the ‘quasi-physical’ reception of perceptual 
appearances that is taking place in both media of perception and sense organs, the 
implied principle of RFwM-Sufficiency is contradictory. The problem does not 
disappear in the more traditional interpretation, according to which the point of the 
simile is to highlight that the ‘receiver’ is being selectively affected by perceptible 
                                                                                                                                                                            
distinction to be provided concerns the fact that the power supposedly belongs ‘primarily’ 
to senses and not primarily to wax.  
86 Literalist and Transductionist will tell that Aristotle refers to such additional aspects at 
the end of DA II 12 (and Caston in particular would have much to say about how Aristotle 
fleshes out this remark by introducing an original notion of consciousness in DA III 2); 
Spiritualists will claim that the distinction is due to the primitive and not further 
explainable capacity of perception. A further possibility is proposed by Scaltsas (1996:26-
29), who thinks that the initial RFwM is completed by further criteria (not receiving the 
form in one’s matter; having a perceptual principle and mean in which the form is received) 
Aristotle indicates the following explanation of why plants do no perceive (II 12, 424a32-
b3) 
87 Caston (2005:303, 304 and note 116). Caston allows the possibility of receptions of forms 
without the matter in media (2005: 307, n.121), even though he appears to deny it at least 
with regard to smells in air (ibid: 315).  
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qualities. In this case too there is no ground to establish a distinction between the wax 
block’s and the senses’ receptive powers.88  
The RFwM-sufficiency principle, then, is clearly entailed by what Aristotle says in 
424a24-25, and poses a rigid constraint on how the initial simile should be read that 
current interpretations are unwilling and unable to address. In view of RFwM-
sufficiency, the reading of the initial simile must already secure the difference between 
wax blocks and sense organs, so that the power just described clearly belongs to the 
latter only. Accordingly, either the power of RFwM is such that it does not belong to 
wax blocks at all, or the simile must provide grounds to distinguish a qualified power to 
RFwM that is sufficient to be a sense-organ. 
In the interpretation I am going to offer, I shall reprise the original insight that a form F 
is received by senses without standing as matter to F (option iii above), and formulate 
it in terms of a fundamentalist variety of spiritualism that makes the power of RFwM 
sufficient to be a sense organ. In order to support this reading, I shall provide a survey 
of the occurrences of the clause ‘without (the) matter’ showing that Aristotle 
consistently uses this expression non-adverbially and absolutely (i.e., as indication of 
lack of any matter whatsoever) to describe metaphysically sterile and causally 
powerless forms. These are abstractions (aspects actually abstracted in someone’s 
mind) corresponding to forms-in-matter, which are instead factual aspects that qualify 
and identify external subjects. The problem to be solved, then, will be to understand the 
simile in II 12 accordingly, and deny to wax blocks (or anything else with the exception 
of sense organ) the possession of such a power.  
2. Examination of the occurrences of ‘without (the) matter’ 
The exact expression ‘without the matter’ (ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης) is rare in Aristotle, as it 
occurs in the whole Corpus just seven times in total (only three times outside De 
Anima). The similar expression ‘without matter’ is slightly more frequent, with sixteen 
occurrences (five of which in De Anima). I shall assign no relevant difference to the 
presence of the determinative article that distinguishes the two expressions, and treat 
them as equivalent by using the formula ‘without (the) matter’.  
                                                             
88 Hicks himself notices (416-417) that the whole of 424a21-24 'merely expands a 18 sq. 
"receptive of the form without the matter". The difficulty is clearly recognised by Scaltsas 
(cf. note 1 above). 
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2.1 Things definitionally ‘without matter’: mathematical objects and divine beings 
In a first group of occurrences, the opposition between what is ‘with matter’ (or ‘in 
matter’) and what is ‘without matter’ expresses a distinction between essentially 
different beings and their corresponding formulae.  
In Metaphysics Z 10 Aristotle is investigating why for some definienda like syllables the 
formulae include formulae of the parts, while for other definienda like circles this is not 
the case.89 The solution he proposes (1035a1-b3) is a distinction between (i) definienda 
whose formulae include material parts the definienda can be destroyed into – like the 
snub (whose formula include the flesh the snub can be destroyed into), and a syllable 
(e.g. ‘BA’, whose formula includes the letters B and A it can be destroyed into); and (ii) 
definienda whose formulae include no such parts – like concavity and the circle (as 
opposed to the bronze circle), which feature no reference to segments and other parts 
they can be destroyed into.  
Aristotle says in 1035a28-29 that in definienda of the first group (e.g. the snub, or the 
bronze circle) form and matter are taken together, while in the second we find  
those things which do not involve matter but are without matter, and whose 
formulae are formulae of the form only 90 (my emphasis) 
He then adds that either such things are not destroyed at all, or not in the same way as 
the former (i.e. not destroyed into the parts mentioned in their formula).  
Aristotle’s regularly mentions mathematical objects, and above all concavity in 
opposition to snubness, when he deals with such ‘things without matter’. In Metaph. IV 
(E) 1 (1026a6), he uses again the example of the snub and the concave as he qualifies as 
‘bound up with the matter’ (συνειλημμένον μετὰ τῆς ὕλης) or without (perceptible) 
matter both the things themselves and their essences (τί ἐστι). Confronting a puzzle 
questioning the uniqueness of the universe in Cael. I 9 (277b 29-278a 6), Aristotle 
similarly talks of formulae without the matter and formulae in the matter, stating that 
in the case of shapes and figures (again, mathematical entities) the two are different: 91  
                                                             
89 1034b24-28: ‘[t]he formula of the circle does not include that of the segments, but that of 
the syllable includes that of the letters; yet the circle is divided into segments as the syllable 
is into letters’. In 1034b32-34 Aristotle explains that the ‘parts’ he considers here are those 
in which the substance consists, and not those which measure other things in respect of 
quantity. 
90 ὅσα δὲ μὴ συνείληπται τῇ ὕλῃ ἀλλὰ ἄνευ ὕλης, ὧν οἱ λόγοι τοῦ εἴδους μόνον. 
91 The puzzle is based on the distinction between a certain F-shape mixed ‘with matter’ 
(μεμιγμένη μετὰ τῆς ὕλης) and the F-shape in itself (αὐτή τε καθ’ αὑτὴν ἡ μορφὴ). Aristotle’s 
examples show that the distinction is between F-subjects and F: he mentions the bronze 
and the wooden circle in opposition to the shape of the circle, and the gold and bronze 
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It is well said that the shape’s formula in the matter and that without the matter 
are different, and let this be true (278a23-24, my translation and emphasis)92  
Along the same lines, Physics II 2 affirms that the objects investigated by natural 
philosophy are analogous to the snub, in so far as they are ‘neither without matter nor 
in terms of matter only’ (194a14-15: οὔτ’ ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ὕλην). The 
same idea is in Aristotle’s mind in DA III 4, as he remarks that flesh is, like the snub, a 
‘this-in-this’ and ‘not without the matter’ (429b14).  
That Aristotle’s choice of mathematical objects as paradigmatic examples of things 
‘without matter’ is not casual can be seen by reading the end of Metaphysics Z 10 in the 
light of what he says in Z 11 . In the earlier of the two chapters (1036a16-25), Aristotle 
establishes a difference between the thing without matter and the thing with the matter 
with regard to those cases where F (e.g., ‘soul’ or ‘right angle’) stands for a material F-
subject (‘Socrates’ or ‘this brazen right angle’) which coincides with its essence – e.g. 
the circle and the right angle.93 Here, he dialectically enquires whether the same can be 
said about soul (compare 1036a16-17:‘if the soul is the animal or the living thing, or 
the soul of each individual is the individual itself’ and 1036a24:‘[i]f, however, the soul is 
something different and is not identical with the animal). The reply he will eventually 
give in Z 11 seems to answer such question in the negative: 
an animal is something perceptible, and it is not possible to define it without 
reference to movement – nor, therefore, without reference to the parts and to 
their being in a certain state. (…) 
Socrates (...) is taken in two ways (for some mean by such a term the soul, and 
others mean the concrete thing), but if he is simply this particular soul and this 
                                                                                                                                                                            
sphere in opposition to the form of the sphere. The puzzle proceeds by noting that even if 
there were no F we can conceive or apprehend beyond the only one F-subject existing, the 
difference between F and this particular F-subject would still be valid, ‘the one being form 
(εἶδος), the other form in matter, i.e. a particular thing (εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῶν καθ’ 
ἕκαστον)’ (278a 7-10).  
92 He already granted this in 278a2-5: ‘when we state the essential nature (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of 
the sphere or circle we do not include in the formula gold or bronze, because they do not 
belong to its substance; but if we are speaking of the copper or gold sphere we do include 
them’. Aristotle stresses that neither this admission, nor the more general distinction 
between F-subjects and the form F itself (which one has to grant regardless of whether 
such a form exists or not separately from matter, cf. 278a16-18), is enough to argue against 
the uniqueness of the universe. The universe is perceptible and a particular, and it is made 
of all the existing perceptible matter. It is therefore impossible that there is more than one 
universe, for ‘[t]he general rule is this: a thing whose substance resides in a substratum of 
matter can never come into being in the absence of all matter’ (278b1-3). This is true for 
mathematical entities like shapes realised in matter, exemplified by the aquilinity of noses 
(278a28-32), as well as for any other form in matter, like a man (278a32-b1). 
93 1036a17-18: ‘being a circle is the circle, and being a right angle and the essence of the 
right angle is the right angle’. 
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particular body, the individual is analogous to the universal ( 1035b28-30, 
1037a7-10) 
In this context (1036b33-1037a4), Aristotle makes it explicit that what such definienda 
like Socrates are different from is first of all mathematical objects. He clarifies that 
mathematical objects are not perceptible but still made of divisible parts (like segments 
and semi-circles) that work as 'intelligible matter', and thence themselves composite 
particulars. This legitimates a distinction from perceptible ones (like Socrates), based 
on the fact that the parts of mathematical object’s formulae are not parts they can be 
dissolved into in the way, e.g., a circle is divided into semi-circles. 
It is all but casual, then, that in Z 10 Aristotle illustrated the difference between 
definienda ‘with matter’ and ‘without matter’ by the example of the right angle in the 
following way: 
the whole in one sense must be called posterior to the part in one sense, i.e. to 
the parts included in the formula and to the parts of the individual right angle 
(for both the one with the matter (ἡ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης), i.e. the brazen right angle, and 
that which is formed by individual lines, are posterior to their parts); while the 
one without matter (ἡ δ’ ἄνευ ὕλης) is posterior to the parts included in the 
formula, but prior to those included in the particular instance (1035a20-23 ROT 
modified, my emphasis) 
In this first group of occurrences, then, the clause ‘without matter’ means ‘definitionally 
deprived of matter’. What is ‘without matter’ in this sense are those definienda like 
mathematical objects, whose being and formulae mention no material part in which the 
things can be dissolved.94  
In Aristotle’s universe, the only other real things beyond mathematical objects that 
could satisfy the ‘definitionally without matter’ criterion are eternal divine beings. In 
fact, in Metaph. XII () 6 we do find an occurrence of ‘without matter’ that refers to 
such subjects. Aristotle argues here that a changeless and therefore eternal substance 
must be ‘without matter’, and that for this reason such a being is by its own essence an 
actuality: 
                                                             
94 The same idea seems at work in PA I 3 (643a24-25), where Aristotle remarks that no part 
of an animal is (definitionally) without matter to support the statement that in the 
definition of animal kinds the difference is the ‘form (εἶδος) in the matter’. The point seems 
to be that if aspects like size and shape are to be included in the difference that defines an 
animal species, these aspects will have to be considered as essentially instantiated in 
suitable matter (as in the case of the definition of 'snub' or 'bronze circle'), rather than as 
purely mathematical entities (as in the definition of 'concavity' or 'circle'). This reading fits 
perfectly with the following lines (643a27-31) where Aristotle employs geometrical figures 
as examples.  
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There must, then, be such a principle, whose very substance is actuality. Further, 
then, these substances must be without matter (ταύτας δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἄνευ 
ὕλης); for they must be eternal, at least if anything else is eternal. Therefore they 
must be actuality (1071b19-22, my emphasis). 
It is worth noting that in this first group of occurrences, Aristotle’s use of the clause 
‘without matter’ is absolute and non-adverbial. It is absolute in the sense that the 
expression refers to matter with no further qualification or specification, rather than 
being relative to some other thing’s specific matter. In doing so, the expression is non-
adverbial, as it describes types of things, rather than the fact that some event or 
affection takes place ‘immaterially’. 
A further noteworthy aspect is represented by the cautious precision of Metaph. VII (Z) 
10, where ‘those without matter’ is accompanied by the more specific description 
‘those which do not involve matter (…) whose formulae are formulae of the form only’ 
(1035a28). As the examination of the next group of occurrences will show, leaving a 
generic expression like ‘those without matter’ alone would have been potentially 
misleading in view of the other use of ‘without matter’ that applies to the forms of 
perceptible subjects which are not ‘without matter’ in the same sense. 
2.2 Forms ‘without matter’ as metaphysically sterile and causally powerless 
In Metaph. XII 3 (1070a14-17), Aristotle uses the clause ‘without matter’ in a way that 
seems irreducible to the meaning of ‘definitionally deprived of matter’ just outlined. No 
mathematical objects or eternal beings are involved, and the clause rather applies to 
things that are in fact not ‘definitionally deprived of matter’. In this passage, Aristotle 
seems concerned with the possibility of calling into question the claim that ‘no 
substance exists beyond the composite’ by saying that the form of a F, e.g. a house, can 
in fact exist separately from concrete F-specimens:95 
No substance exists beyond the composite: the form of the house, for instance, 
<does not exist beyond the composite,> if not as the Art: and of these things there 
is no generation or corruption – it is instead in another way that the house 
                                                             
95 Aristotle appears to choose his words very carefully here. In fact, the claim that ‘no 
substance exists beyond the composite’ is not incompatible with the existence of real and 
independent subjects absolutely separated from matter (like Aristotle’s God): the phrasing 
suggests that the point is about some F that can be instantiated in a composite F-specimen. 
The possibility of a F that is not instantiated in any composite is therefore theoretically 
open without requiring the rejection of the claim about inseparability Aristotle formulates 
here. 
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without matter (or the health, or each thing which is according to an Art) is and is 
not).96(my translation and emphasis) 
In the passage, the expression ‘the form of the house’ (οἰκίας τὸ εἶδος), that refers to 
what it is said not to exist ‘if not as the Art’ – and thence ‘to be or not to be’ without 
being subject to generation or corruption, clearly corresponds to the following ‘the 
house without matter’ (οἰκία τε ἡ ἄνευ ὕλης). That this equivalence can indeed be 
attributed to Aristotle is confirmed by PA I 1, where we read that the Art consists in a 
formula (logos) of the product ‘without the matter’ (640a31: Ἡ δὲ τέχνη λόγος τοῦ 
ἔργου ὁ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστίν) .The F which exists ‘without matter’ as the corresponding 
Art realizing it in matter is therefore a form and a formula. However, such forms and 
formulae ‘without matter’ are not definitionally without matter (as the use of the clause 
observed earlier prescribes), for the definition of ‘house’ must include a reference to 
suitable material parts (Phys II 2, 194a22-27; DA I 1, 403a26-403b19). 
In 1070a14-17, Aristotle’s point seems to be that the existence and non-existence of a 
form F apart from F-composites can be in some way conceded when F is an artefact, 
without violating the general claim that such a F cannot exist separately from any 
composite material subject. Aristotle employs here the clause ‘without matter’ to 
pinpoint the form F which exists in subjects that possess F ‘according to an Art’. In such 
cases, F exists apart from particular F-subjects in the sense that it belongs to subjects 
that are not themselves F-subjects: the house exists in the professional builder – a 
subject that is not a house – as a form without matter.97 In this sense, such a form may 
exist or not exist, but it is not subject to generation and corruption since it is not itself a 
substance. 
An implication of this reading of Metaph. XII 3 is that the forms-without-matter 
Aristotle is talking about are metaphysically sterile. As we just saw, an F-without-
matter, as opposed to an F-subject, can be said to be or not to be apart from composite 
F-specimens, even though it cannot exist apart from any composite subject (if F is an 
artefact, such items ‘without matter’ exists ‘separately’ from F-specimens as the 
                                                             
96 οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν συνθετὴν οὐσίαν, οἷον οἰκίας τὸ εἶδος, εἰ μὴ ἡ τέχνη (οὐδ’ ἔστι γένεσις 
καὶ φθορὰ τούτων, ἀλλ’ ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἰκία τε ἡ ἄνευ ὕλης καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ 
πᾶν τὸ κατὰ τέχνην). 
97 Accordingly, the claim stating the inseparability of F (where F is a subject fully realizable 
in matter) is invalid if taken as a partially qualified thesis stating the inseparability of F (in 
general) from F-composites (any ‘house’ from particular houses), but it is unambiguously 
right if taken as an absolute claim stating the inseparability of F from any composite 
(including non-F-composites), or as a fully qualified one stating the inseparability of F-with-
matter from F-composites, and/or the inseparability of F-without-matter from composites 
that possess F according to an Art.  
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corresponding Art). For this reason (i.e., because a ‘form-without-matter’ F can exist in 
a subject which is not an F-subject), F-without-matter is spoiled of the metaphysical 
‘jobs’ of qualifying and identifying a subject, which in Aristotle’s philosophy belong to 
forms (accidental ones qualify subjects, substantial ones identify them).98 In this sense, 
the attribution of the qualifying and identifying job will strictly speaking belong to 
those forms that are in fact ‘fused’ with matter and actually realised in matter.  
A further occurrence of ‘without matter’ in GC I 10 can confirm the observed 
metaphysical sterility. Here, Aristotle says that since tin mixed with bronze changes its 
colour while adding almost nothing to it in terms of size, it belongs to the latter almost 
as a property ‘without matter’ (328b12-13: ὁ γὰρ καττίτερος ὡς πάθος τι ὢν ἄνευ ὕλης 
τοῦ χαλκοῦ σχεδὸν). Despite a prima facie support to the idea of RFwM as becoming F 
without incorporating bits of matter from the acting F-subject, this passage does in fact 
make perfect sense if read as stating that bronze receives Q (the quantity of tin 
qualifying the acting subject) almost as a Q-without-matter since it looks like Q is not 
qualifying it (the quantity of bronze remains practically the same). 
The exceptional metaphysical sterility of F-without-matter with regard to the 
‘identification’ or ‘qualification’ of the subjects it belongs to is hardly surprising, if one 
considers the role of matter in the composition of particular subjects. In Aristotle’s 
view, matter guarantees the continuity of change and offers a location on the 
spatiotemporal continuum. Furthermore, matter is endowed with generic, ‘to-be-
determined’, properties such as ‘thermicity’ and ‘hydricity’: matter necessarily have 
some degree of hot and cold, and moist and dry.99 Since the job of forms ‘in’ and ‘with’ 
matter is to identify or qualify the composite subjects they belong to, it is reasonable to 
expect that the forms ‘without the matter’ are not ‘instantiated in’ and ‘fused with’ 
matter in the same ‘identifying or qualifying’ way. That this expectation about forms-
without-the-matter is well grounded can be shown by the following consideration: 
since forms are not ‘fused with’ matter, they have no suitable substrate to exert their 
metaphysical job on. In other words, there is no ‘to-be-identified’ continuum endowed 
with spatio-temporal location, and no ‘to-be-qualified’ generic ‘thermicity’ and 
‘hydricity’. In the absence of such a substrate, the forms’ qualifying and identifying job 
cannot be performed.  
                                                             
98 My understanding of the role of forms and matter in the identification and qualification of 
subjects depends on the reconstruction of Aristotle’s views offered by Scaltsas (1994). 
99 Scaltsas (1994:25-27). 
Chapter 3 — 
 78 
A further peculiarity of F-without-matter concerns causal efficacy: any F-without-
matter will be causally powerless. The lack of causal efficacy is already expectable 
because of the observed metaphysical sterility: since F belongs to a without making it 
an F-specimen, the causal power that belongs to F-subjects qua F (e.g., the power to 
generate a human being belonging to individuals in so far as they are human beings; 
the power to heat a cold object belonging to a hot object qua hot) will not belong to the 
(non-F) subjects that ‘host’ F-without-matter.  
A further reason for the causal inefficacy of forms-without-matter comes from the fact 
that matter contributes to subjects their location on the spatio-temporal continuum. 
This makes matter a necessary (not sufficient) condition for having causal efficacy, 
since for Aristotle local proximity between suitable subjects (a patient and an agent) is 
necessary for causal interaction to take place (Phys. III 2, 202a5-9).100 To the extent to 
which one can deduce lack of spatio-temporal location from being ‘without matter’, 
then, causal inefficacy seems to be an expectable feature of forms-without-matter101. 
This perfectly squares with Aristotle’s observation that every perceptible body 
possesses the power of acting or being acted upon, or both (Cael. 275b5-6).102 
That forms-without-matter are in fact causally powerless seems to be what Aristotle 
himself is suggesting in a further occurrence of the clause ‘without matter’ in GC I 5 
(322a28).103 Here, he states that the form ‘without matter’ of an artefact, like a pipe, is a 
power once it is ‘in matter’. Judging from the following lines (322a29-322a34), 
Aristotle is here willing to stress that the forms in the suitable ‘feeding material’ and in 
the subject fed with it are interacting causal powers. In growth, the subject’s form 
persists and allocates the added matter with no quantitative modification whatsoever. 
On the other hand, the same form may also persist and do its job while some 
                                                             
100 As already observed, forms are responsible for the full determination of those generic 
properties of matter, either as substantial aspects identifying subjects, or as accessory 
aspects that qualify them. In this sense, forms are further necessary (not sufficient) 
conditions for subjects to have causal efficacy.  
101 At the very least, a distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘non-intrinsic’ spatio-temporal 
location must be provided to recognise the different way of being located respectively 
characterising forms-with-matter and forms-without-matter. 
102 Cf. Scaltsas (1994:27), who therefore mentions ‘being a causal agent and/or patient’ 
among the generic essential properties of Aristotle’s physical matter. 
103 The critical editions by Mugler (1966) and Rashed (2005) both save the MSS’ ἄνευ τῆς 
ὕλης, whose excision by Joachim (1922:135) as a ‘marginal note intended to explain or 
correct the un-Aristotelian ἄϋλος’ (a hapax meaning ‘immaterial’, which Joachim rightly 
corrects in αὐλός) is accepted in Barnes’ ROT (‘[t]he form is a kind of power in matter—a 
duct, as it were’). 
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quantitative modification is impressed on the subject by the surplus of matter.104 This 
reading of the contrast between the form-without-matter and the form-in-matter is 
supported by a similar point Aristotle made some lines earlier (322a17-19, which is 
separated by the contrast made here only by a series of remarks about the difference 
between nutrition and growth in 322a20-28):  
Quantity in general does not come-to-be any more than animal which is neither 
man nor any other of the specific forms of animal—the universal in this case 
corresponds to the quantity in that. But what does come-to-be in growth is flesh 
or bone—or a hand or arm and their homoeomeries  
Aristotle’s earlier point was that the amount of matter transformed and ‘incorporated’ 
in a subject is not in fact existing out there as a Q-quantity of abstract generic matter, 
but always as a certain subject (or part of a subject) possessing a Q-quantity of such-
and-such matter. In this context, the specification we already commented – according 
to which ‘this form-without-matter’ is a certain power once it is ‘in the matter’ (τοῦτο 
δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄνευ ὕλης, οἷον αὐλός, δύναμίς τις ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστίν), reprises that earlier 
distinction between generic ‘abstractions’ (like ‘Q-quantity’ or ‘animal’) and concrete 
subjects or parts or subjects (like a hand or an arm).  
 Aristotle’s use of the clause with regard to forms, then, expresses an idea that is very 
different from the one observed earlier with regard to things definitionally deprived of 
matter (like mathematical objects and divine eternal beings). In the passages we just 
examined, the clause ‘without matter’ refers to forms that are not definitionally without 
matter in the way mathematical objects and eternal divine beings are. According to this 
second use of the clause, a form-without-matter F is instead something existing in 
composite subjects as an Art, i.e. as a metaphysically sterile and causally powerless 
item (F does not make the subject it belongs to an F-specimen). 
2.3 Forms-without-matter as abstract cognised aspects of reality 
In a final group of occurrences, Aristotle associates forms without-matter with 
cognitive activities. This association is not surprising: we are by now prepared to it as 
we already saw how Metaph. XII (Λ) identifies the forms-without-matter of the work to 
                                                             
104 An example in the first sense is a pipe doubling in size with no modification of the initial 
proportion between its length, internal diameter and external diameter. In the second case, 
which for Aristotle is analogous to a mixture of wine and water becoming more watery, the 
pipe will instead preserve its identity as a pipe while modifying the mentioned proportion: 
e.g., keeping the same length and outer diameter, it will reduce its internal diameter. Note a 
further analogy with the case of wine: both modifications are somewhat ‘pejorative’, since 
the more watery wine becomes a ‘lesser wine’, and the pipe with a lower capacity a ‘lesser 
pipe’.  
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be accomplished with corresponding Arts, which are for him branches of ‘productive’ 
knowledge (cf. Metaph. VI [E] 2, 1046a36-1046b4). In chapter 9 of the same book of the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle himself confirms this association between productive branches 
of knowledge and forms-without-matter, and extends it to explicitly include theoretical 
knowledge as well. Aristotle specifies here the cases in which the thinking subject 
(‘what is thinking’) and its object (‘what is being thought’) are the same. He says that 
the latter ‘identification’ takes place when the factual object (τὸ πρᾶγμα) coincides with 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), which happens in productive branches of knowledge when the 
factual object is the essence and the substance (οὐσία) ‘without matter’, and in 
theoretical branches of knowledge when the object is the formula (λόγος).105 
The same idea about the coincidence and identity of what is thinking and what is being 
thought is expressed in DA III 4, where the clause ‘without matter’ occurs once again. 
This time, Aristotle’s words feature no association with Arts, and the clause is instead 
used in a claim restricted to ‘theoretical branches of knowledge and what is knowable 
in the same way’. Aristotle establishes here that it is with regard to what is ‘without 
matter’ that the mentioned identification (i.e., the identification of what is thinking and 
what is being thought) takes place, and that thought is a power dealing with the things 
having matter as ‘without matter’.106 
The association with cognitive activities returns in DA III 6, where Aristotle examines 
some features of things ‘without matter’ by drawing an analogy between thought and 
perception. When thoughts express the essence of something according to its 
definition, they are always true and do not count as propositions predicating something 
of something else, which may instead be false. With regard to this aspect, Aristotle 
draws an analogy with perception: in a similar way, perceiving white is always true, 
whilst believing that the white is a man can be false. The conclusion, which makes no 
explicit distinction between thought and perception, states that this is how it works 
with those without matter (III 6, 430b30: οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα ἄνευ ὕλης). 
There is little doubt that these occurrences of ‘without matter’ in conjunction with 
intellectual (and in the latter case, perceptual) cognition refer to forms rather than 
subjects. Aristotle himself tells us that what is in our soul (ψυχή) as we engage in 
                                                             
105 1074b38-1075a3: ἢ ἐπ’ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ 
οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις. 
106 430a3-8: ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ 
ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν (…) (ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ 
νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων). 
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perceptual and intellectual cognition are forms of subjects rather than subjects, e.g. the 
form of a stone rather than a stone (DA III 8, 431b25-432a1).107 Further confirmation 
in this direction comes from Aristotle’s description of perception as RFwM in DA II 12, 
which also enforces the idea that the remark about ‘those things without matter’ in III 6 
does indeed include both intellectual and perceptual cognition. The same, then, can be 
said of the other occurrences of the same idea in DA III 2, where Aristotle says that each 
sensory organ is able of RFwM (425b 23-24), and in III 12 (434a28-30), where he 
states that subjects that are not able of RFwM cannot have perception108. In fact, in light 
of the consistently ‘absolute’ and ‘non-adverbial’ use we observed so far for both 
subjects and forms, all the latter occurrences of ‘without matter’ are likely to be 
understood according to the same pattern. 109  
Together with the observed metaphysical sterility and the lack of causal efficacy, the 
above association with cognitive activities concurs to suggest that the expression ‘form-
without-matter’ is a metaphysical description of abstract entities. To appreciate the 
plausibility of this proposal, it is sufficient to recapitulate what has emerged from the 
                                                             
107 He adds (432a1-3) that a sense is the form of what is perceptible (arguably, perceptible 
forms, since what we know is not the stone, but its form) and intellect the form of forms). 
Sorabji (1992:213-214) argued that in this last passage Aristotle refrains from describing 
the processes as ‘receptions’, and that the reason for this is that Aristotle uses ‘reception’ 
formulas to describe the physical alteration in the organs, that only provides the material 
aspect of perception. This is of course a possible interpretation. However, considering that 
in DA II 2 (414a4-14) Aristotle says that we have episteme (undoubtedly an intellectual 
form of knowledge, cf. III 3) by being receptive of episteme grant us an equally legitimate 
chance to reject Sorabji’s suggestion.  
108 αἴσθησιν δ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῶσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ὅσων τὸ σῶμα ἁπλοῦν 
ἐνδέχεται αὐτὴν ἔχειν, [οὔτε ἄνευ ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον] οὔτε ὅσα μὴ δεκτικὰ τῶν 
εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης.  
109 The occurrence of ‘without matter’ in DA III 8, 432a9-10 is the only possible exception I 
found to the absolute use of the clause. Aristotle is apparently explaining that it is 
impossible to contemplate anything without an image, since intelligibles exist in 
perceptibles. To argue for the latter thesis, Aristotle says that ‘imaginative states 
(φαντάσματα) are like perceptual states (αἰσθήματά), save without matter’. Since 
phantasia is a change triggered by perception and taking place somewhere in the body (cf. 
the end of DA III 3), one may think that ‘without matter’ must be employed in a ‘relative’ 
rather than ‘absolute’ way, i.e. as meaning ‘without the matter of the perceptual states’, 
rather than ‘without any matter’. On the other hand, a possible different interpretation that 
saves the ‘absolute’ character of the clause may be provided, if Aristotle’s point is rather 
that as far as intellection goes, perceptual states and imaginative states are the same, save 
‘without matter’, in so far as they are different with regard to their abstract content. A 
possible difference regarding content may be, for instance, that the imaginative state whose 
content is ‘red tomato’ is not necessarily cognized as being present here and now, while the 
corresponding perceptual state is). 
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survey of the occurrences of the expression ‘without matter’ referring to forms (as 
opposed to thing that are ‘definitionally without matter’): 
 Forms without matter are metaphysically sterile and causally powerless;  
 they exist and non-exist in the same way as Art, thence not as a subject of 
generation and corruption, and not separately from any material subject, 
though an F-without-matter can exist separately from F-subjects; 
 AN F-without-matter is identical to what is thinking it when it is being thought; 
 Both in perception and thought, forms-without-matter are true when grasped 
in their simplicity, possibly false when combined by (non-essential) 
predication; 
 Senses receive forms-without-matter, and a thing in which such a power 
resides is a sense organ; 
All the above features suggest that forms-without-matter are abstract cognised aspects 
in someone’s mind, to be distinguished from concrete aspects in material subjects (the 
latter are Forms ‘in the matter’ or ‘with the matter’). Such forms-without-matter are 
causally powerless and metaphysically sterile aspects of the real word, while forms that 
are ‘realised in’ and ‘fused with’ suitable matter are, on the other hand, aspects that 
determine their subjects’ identities, qualifications and causal powers. 
3. Application to DA II 12 
3.1 The wax simile as illustration of the form’s matterless character  
The idea that forms-without-matter are metaphysically sterile and causally powerless 
abstraction provides a promising starting point to achieve a reading of DA II 12 fully 
compatible with RFwM-Sufficiency: if being able to receive perceptible forms without 
matter means being in receipt of a perceptible F aspects as an abstraction, it makes 
sense to require that this is sufficient to be a sense organ. On the other hand, it becomes 
urgent to understand how the initial illustration involving wax blocks and signet ring 
can be compatible with such a restrictive reading of RFwM.  
The suggestion I shall explore is that the initial illustration of the claim that senses are 
capable of RFwM should be read as a ‘signature simile’ rather than as a ‘wax simile’. In 
other words, the point highlighted by the simile is not that there is a ‘matterless’ way of 
receiving forms which is supposedly common to wax blocks and senses, but rather that 
the signet ring’s ‘signature’ and the items received by senses are similarly ‘matterless’. 
The signature simile can be properly understood along these lines by reflecting on the 
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morphological complementarity between the signet ring’s and the sealed wax’s shapes. 
While an F-signature is clearly impressed as a ‘qualifying’ aspect on the F-shaped 
sealed wax, the same F is metaphysically sterile with regard to the signet ring. For the 
ring’s shape is not the same shape finally impressed on wax: in order to impress on wax 
a certain signature shape F, the ring’s own positive shape G must be non-F, whilst 
related to F as the engraved ‘negative’ of a bas-relief. The signet ring’s and the (sealed) 
wax block’s shapes must be morphologically complementary, not identical.110 
As the simile emphasizes, even though the signature is vehicled by the ring’s matter 
and thence ‘golden’ or ‘brazen’, the ring’s signature is not received ‘in so far as it is gold’ 
(that is, not in so far as it is an aspect which, fused in the ring, qualifies it as F-shaped 
piece of gold), but rather as a form-without-the matter (i.e., as an aspect that does not 
perform any qualifying or identifying function in the material subject it belongs to). 
With Aristotle’s own words: 
About every sense in general, we must assume that the sense is what is receptive 
of the perceptible forms without the matter. In a similar way, the wax receives 
that ring’s signature <which is> without iron and bronze: it indeed takes on the 
signature <which is> bronzy or golden, but not qua <that bronzy or golden 
signature> is <a piece of> bronze or gold. (424a17-21, my translation)111 
As expectable, the passage abides by the characteristic ‘non-adverbial’ and ‘absolute’ 
use of the clause ‘without matter’. The non-adverbial character of the expression 
perfectly squares with the forcedly anticipated position of the possessive genitive ‘the 
ring’s’ (τοῦ δακτυλίου) in 424a19-20 (Aristotle says ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ 
σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον). Such a phrasing is perfectly appropriate to 
express the ‘adjectival’ function of ‘without the iron or the gold’ in relation to ‘the 
signature’: Aristotle wants to point out that the forms received by senses are ‘without 
the matter’, and decides to do so by comparing them to that signature without iron or 
gold that belongs to a signet ring.112 Furthermore, the fact that Aristotle keeps 
mentioning different materials (iron and gold first, then gold and bronze) and never 
                                                             
110 The morphological complementarity is clearly described by (Polanski 2007, ad loc.). Cf. 
also Ward, who stresses the opposition between the ring’s substantial and ‘emblematic’ 
forms (the first is the ring’s own shape G, the second is the signature, i.e. the ring’s F shape 
that is going to be impressed on wax). 
111 Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ 
χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς 
ἢ χαλκός. 
112 Hicks’ (416) propose an alternative explanation, according to which τοῦ δακτυλίου 'is 
placed thus early and close to ὁ κηρὸς in order to correspond to τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν in 
relation to τὸ δεκτικὸν’.  
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one alone does instead suggest that what is at issue is being absolutely ‘matterless’: 
what is received is not just without this particular ring’s matter but more generally 
without any material whatsoever. The idea, then, is that such activities are 
characterised by the reception of matterless forms, rather than by a matterless way of 
receiving forms.113 
In full agreement with RFwM-Sufficiency, the point Aristotle highlights by means of the 
signature simile (i.e., the matterless character of the received form) does not attribute 
to either the wax or the ring the power of RFwM. That the simile does not compel one 
to attribute such power to wax blocks is easy to realise: as soon as the signing 
interaction takes place, F is impressed on the wax block as a shape-with-the-matter.  
Some elaboration is required to understand why the attribution of the power of RFwM 
to the signet ring has to be rejected as well. In view of the morphological 
complementarity of wax blocks and signet rings, there seems to be solid grounds to 
reject the attribution of the signature shape F to the ring. On the other hand, however, 
there seems to be some good reason to attribute the same shape F to both the ring and 
the wax, as long as one wants to say that the wax block receives the signature shape 
from the ring. After all, the ring’s shape has been carefully crafted for the purpose of 
impressing F on wax, and this ability constitutes its essential function as a sealing 
device. In this view, F must belong to the ring in some way, even though it does not 
identify nor qualifies it as an F-shaped thing. One might be therefore tempted to solve 
the problem by adding a qualification: while the wax block possesses F-with-matter, 
the ring possesses F-without-matter. Along these lines, the ring’s possession of the 
signature F-without-matter will obviously entail that the ring received it when its 
surface had been shaped in such-and-such a way. The conclusion would then be that 
according to the object reading of the signature simile, the signet ring does in fact have 
the power of RFwM, against RFwM-Sufficiency. 
The above reasoning, which ends up attributing the power of RFwM to the ring, cannot 
be accepted. First of all, to become fully acceptable, the idea that the signet ring 
possesses the matterless signature F requires an important qualification. The signature 
shape F-without-matter does not actually exist as an abstract object in the ring. In the 
                                                             
113 It is only by an indirect route that we can arrive to the adverbially expressed idea that F 
belongs to its subject without qualifying or identifying it as F, i.e. by first endorsing the 
thesis that (while F-with-matter perform such metaphysical roles as identifying or 
qualifying a whole subject) F-without-matter belongs to subjects without qualifying or 
identifying the subject as F.  
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ring, the signature only exists as a potential F-without-matter: a ‘cognisable’ aspect, 
rather than a cognised aspect and an abstraction. The signature shape F only exists as 
actual F-without-matter (a ‘cognised’ aspect, an abstraction) in a cognising subject (e.g., 
the person recognising the signature by looking at the actually F-shaped wax block). In 
a way, then, it is correct to state that the signature shape F-without-matter is carried by 
the signet ring, but only if one supplements the important qualification that the latter is 
not able to receive the actually abstracted matterless form. What the ring could receive, 
if recast as an F-shaped ring, is instead F-with-matter; and what it has been carrying, 
after it had been modelled as a G-shaped ring, is a merely abstractable F-shape.114 The 
ring did not, and cannot, receive any actually abstracted, matterless F. 
It would certainly be correct to note that the possession of F-without-matter as an 
‘abstractable’ aspect is common to the ring and the impressed wax block (or any other 
F-qualified subject whatsoever), but this does not make Aristotle’s decision to focus on 
the ring’s signature arbitrary. In fact, there is a good reason why the ring’s signature-
without-matter is more suitable than the wax block’s for Aristotle’s purpose. The signet 
ring shows with immediate evidence that something can carry an F-without-matter 
without being F-qualified, and thence reveals Aristotle’s idea that forms-without-
matter (as opposed to forms-in-the-matter) do not qualify or identify the subjects they 
belong to. It is for the sake of recalling with no ambiguity the metaphysical sterility of 
matterless forms that Aristotle decides to focus on the abstractable F-shape that belong 
to a G-shaped subject, despite being likely aware that the F-qualified (sealed) block of 
wax does also ‘carry’ F-without-matter in the same way as the signet ring: in fact, any F-
subject qualified (or identified) by F-with-matter does also carry – potentially and as a 
merely abstractable aspect– a corresponding F-without-matter. Aristotle’s decision to 
                                                             
114 For the sake of avoiding unnecessary complications, I eschewed a point that can make 
the difference between abstractable and abstracted F implicit in the simile immediately 
manifest. The point is that it seems strictly incorrect to say that the wax’s shape-with-
matter and the ring’s complementary negative shape-without-matter are wholly identical. If 
we indicate the whole shape of the wax block as A, and the whole negative of the ring’s 
shape as B, it seems more correct to say that the signature shape F is a part or section that A 
and B have in common. The signature F, then, is an abstraction: it is only in our mind that 
anything like a ‘negative-shape-part overlapping with a morphologically complementary 
positive-shape-part’ actually exists with its own, well defined boundaries. Accordingly, as 
far as the wax block and the signet ring are concerned, F only exists as an ‘abstractable’ 
aspect (a potential F-without-matter).  
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illustrate his point about perception by comparing the matterless forms to the ring’s 
signature is therefore appropriate, and the simile’s phrasing fitting.115 
3.2 Perceptible forms-without-matter in the sense 
The section of the passage about the sense that follows the signature simile (424a21-
24), is dense and obscure. In order to expose the interpretive problems raised by the 
passage, it is useful to parse it in the following way: 
(1) likewise 
(2) each sense116 is affected by what has colour, or flavour, or sound,  
(3) but not qua X ‘is said to be each of those’ (ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται),  
(4) but qua X ‘is such as that’ (τοιονδί)  
(5) and according to the logos (κατὰ τὸν λόγον). 
The lack of an explicit grammatical subject in (3)-(5) contributes to the passage’s 
ambiguity, and in view of the opposition of (2) to (3) and of (3) to (4) it is not 
immediately clear how inclusive is the ‘likewise’ in (1) (i.e., which of the clause (2)-(5) 
are to be included in the similarity).  
With regard to the identification of the grammatical subject in (3)-(5), one is forced, for 
reasons concerning grammatical gender and number, to supply a second ‘each’ working 
as either the grammatical subject or predicate in (3), and read the sentence, construed 
as a dependent accusative and infinitive clause, as ‘not in so far as one says that each is 
each of these’. 117 The referents of ‘each’ and ‘each of these’ must be accordingly chosen 
between those made available by the context, i.e. the source objects or the perceptible 
qualities. A first reading favours the traditional ‘selectivist’ interpretation, according to 
                                                             
115 It is possible, and in fact likely, that several other aspects of the wax-ring system 
contribute to make it an attractive example. A first one is that by choosing as example a 
shape which is the mere negative of a positively instantiated one, he seems indeed to come 
metaphorically close to the idea of a ‘matterless’ form as much as one could by using a 
physical example. For F is instantiated in the signet ring as a sort of (metaphorically 
speaking) ‘empty’ shape, in the same way as the foot print left by an animal on mud is an 
‘empty’ and ‘matterless’ instantiation of the animal’s foot’s shape (another ‘matterless’ 
shape is exemplified in the case of a stone mould to be used in the production of an F-
shaped bronze statue). A second attractive aspects of the sealing system is that the same 
instantiation of the signature in the source secures the formal identity of the content for all 
the different receivers that may interact with it. 
116 The meaning of the expression ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου is instead uncontroversial: all 
translators seem to agree that ἑκάστου indicates each type of sensible (Hicks (105) ‘sense 
as relative to each sensible’ Ross (264) ‘the sense for each sensible quality’; the point seems 
the same in less literal translation by Hett [137: ‘in every case’] and Hamlyn [43: ‘in each 
case’]). 
117Hicks (416).  
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which (3) talks about whole subjects themselves (the possessors of perceptible 
qualities), supposedly opposed in (4) to subjects qua qualified by perceptible 
properties.118 
Arguments from transductionist commentators convincingly dismissed this reading, 
lending support to the idea that (3) is denying a literal affection by saying that the 
sense is not affected in so far as ‘each of those perceptible qualities’ is itself. In 
agreement with some transductionists, I believe that what ‘not in so far as each is each 
of these’ in fact means is ‘not in so far as the received F is the F that belongs to F-
qualified material composites’.119 It is then true that in light of (3) RFwM cannot 
amount to being subject to a literal physical assimilation, as transductionists insist: 
sight receives red by being affected by a red tomato, but not in so far as the red 
received by the sense is said to be the red that qualifies the tomato as red. A suggestion 
in this direction comes from the parallelism between the ‘not qua each is said each of 
those’ in (3) and the previous ‘not qua bronze’ in 424a 21. Aristotle said there that the 
signature shape in a brazen ring is evidently ‘matterless’, since it is carried by it ‘not 
qua’ a signature made of bronze: the signature shape is an F-without-matter in a non-F-
shaped subject.  
My agreement with transductionist reading comes to an end as long as we move from 
(3) to (4) and (5), though. To be sure, the opposition between ‘qua τοιονδί’ (4) and ‘qua 
each of those’ (3) obviously requires that the sense’s being ‘such as’ the received object 
does not amount to its being red-qualified like the tomato: were τοιονδί indicating that 
the sense is qualified in the same way as the source object, (4) would be in 
contradiction with the point just made in (3).120 However, the problem of RFwM-
Sufficiency, together with the meaning of the clause ‘without matter’ that emerged in 
the survey of its occurrences, make it impossible to endorse the further transductionist 
                                                             
118 According to Hicks (416-417), the term τοιονδί (commonly opposed to τόδε τι to 
express the distinction between the categories of substance and quality) serves here as a 
general term for "coloured, flavoured, sonorous" , and the point made in 424a21-24 is that 
‘the object acts upon sense not in so far as it is a concrete object, but in so far as it is 
coloured or flavoured or sonorous'. Similarly, Hamlyn (113) comments that 'when we see a 
man, the sense of sight is affected by him in so far as he is, say, white, and not because he is 
a rational, non-feathered biped'. 
119 Ward (220-221), Silverman (289, note 9). A slightly different construction is proposed 
by Caston (2005:306, n.120). 
120 Nor can (4) mean that the sense-faculty is affected qua ‘such as F’ in so far as the sense-
faculty is itself matterless in the required sense, since this would entail the undesirable idea 
that the sense faculty, i.e. the perceptive soul, is a causally powerless and metaphysically 
sterile abstract entity. 
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idea that the denial of literal affections in (3) is followed by (4) and (5) by a description 
of physical processes of ‘transduction’ or ‘codification’.121 
In my view, (4) and (5) describe in positive terms what the ‘matterless’ F is in 
comparison to F-with-matter: despite being causally powerless and metaphysically 
sterile, the received matterless F is ‘such as that’ (τοιονδί) F belonging to F-qualified 
material composite subjects, as it is respondent to the essence (κατὰ τὸν λόγον) of F, 
i.e. to what F in fact is. In other words, forms-without-matter are reality-respondent 
with regard to corresponding forms-with-matter. The received red is not the type of 
entity that belongs to the red tomato (the causally efficacious aspect qualifying it as 
red), but an abstraction that is ‘such as that’, in the sense of being respondent to a 
certain aspect of the real world (the aspect of reality that makes the tomato red and 
capable to interact with the sense organ). This arguably means also that the place 
belonging to F in the structure of reality is aptly reproduced as well, as we perceive it as 
co-specific (though still different) from certain other aspects (colours and visible 
aspects), and as specifically different from other aspects with which it still share the 
generic feature of being perceptible (e.g., shapes, sounds and smells).  
The initial ‘likewise’ in (1), then, includes all the clauses from (2) to (5), which describe 
once again what a matterless form is. The sense is being similarly affected by F in F-
subjects, not qua each received F is a F in an F-subject (a form-with-matter), but qua 
each received F is a matterless form which is such as the F in an F-subject, i.e. qua it is 
an abstraction which is respondent to the essence of F. 122 
                                                             
121 Ward’s somewhat different proposal (220-221, cf. Silverman, 289, n.9), according to 
which the sense is affected by each subject not as having a determinable quality (e.g., a 
determinable colour like ‘red’) but as having a particular non further determinable one 
(e.g., this particular shade of red), is rightly rejected by Caston (Spirit.. 306, n. 120), who 
notes that this opposition hardly has any relevance here. 
122 It is important to get the ‘likewise’ right. Two readings can certainly be excluded. The 
first one is that by ‘likewise’ Aristotle means that the sense is ‘likewise affected by a 
matterless form’. The reason why this reading must be excluded is that it implicitly 
attributes to matterless forms the power to affect inanimate objects like wax blocks and 
signet rings, which is impossible as far as forms-without-matter are causally powerless. The 
second reading to be rejected is that ‘likewise’ indicates that the sense is ‘likewise affected 
as it receives forms in a matterless way’. First of all, according to the object reading of the 
simile I proposed, there is nothing like a ‘matterless way of receiving forms’ (the clause 
‘without matter’ rather describes the abstract forms as opposed to forms that qualify or 
identify composite subjects). Furthermore, if such a ‘matterless way of receiving’ were in 
fact to be introduced here, the ‘likewise’ would end up being highly problematic: since the 
power to RFwM is going to be declared a sufficient condition to be a sense-organ, it would 
be absurd to state that there is a ‘matterless way of receiving’ which is ‘likewise’ taking 
place in senses and inanimate subjects like wax blocks and signet rings. 
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4. Conclusions 
At the beginning of DA II 12, Aristotle claims that senses are able to receive forms-
without-matter. Such forms are metaphysically sterile and causally powerless 
abstractions that correspond to real aspects of the world. As opposed to forms 
(realised) in matter or (fused) with matter, matterless forms do not perform the 
metaphysical job of qualifying or identifying the subject they belong to. The point is 
illustrated by the signature simile: senses receive items that are as ‘abstract’ as the 
signet ring’s signature (which is carried by a bronze subject, but is not a piece of 
bronze) received by a wax block. The signature simile does not equate the wax block 
and the sense with regard to the reception of forms without matter. The matterless 
form F is actually received only in senses, while signet rings (or wax blocks, or any 
other F-subject quan F-subject) are only able to carry F-without-matter as an 
‘abstractable’ aspect. 
This reading of RFwM has a certain degree of agreement with the spiritualist and the 
transductionist interpretations, in so far as it endorses the idea that when a subject 
receives F without matter, the affection on the receiver does not amount to becoming 
an F-qualified or F-identified subject. More specifically, spiritualist interpreters are also 
right as they insist that the receiver does not become F-qualified because its matter 
does not work as the suitable (‘to-be-qualified’) material substrate for the received 
form, as it happens in physical affections and changes.  
Two differences distinguish my reading of DA II 12 from that supported by modern 
spiritualists, though. First of all, it is in my view wrong to confuse RFwM with the 
supposedly ‘phenomenal’ changes taking place in media of perception.123 RFwM is 
instead sufficient to be a sense-organ in the most proper way: no wax blocks or media 
of perception can receive perceptible forms-without-matter. The second distinguishing 
feature of my reading is its being fundamentally spiritualist without denying the 
existence of a physiology of perception. In my view, it is wrong to draw from the 
description of perceiving as RFwM any implication about physiology (on this point I 
therefore disagree also with transductionists and literalists). Far from being reducible 
to a negative point about the lack of physical assimilation (or to a description of 
physical transductions or assimilations), the concept of RFwM must be read in light of 
the (textually grounded) fact that Aristotle’s ‘forms-without-matter’ are abstractions 
                                                             
123 In my view, the very same idea of ‘phenomenal’ changes taking place in the media of 
perception should also be rejected (cf. above, Appendix to chapter 2). 
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corresponding to real aspects in the world. By employing this description, then, 
Aristotle only captures the mental dimension of perception: he does not in fact intend 
to say anything about physiological processes, and thence he is neither excluding nor 
describing them.124 If we are looking for a physical description of perception, we have 
to look elsewhere, namely at the immediately preceding lines at the end of DA II.11, 
where perception is described as a homeostatic counterbalancing ‘mediature’ (as 
explained in chapters 1-2). 
By his idea of receiving forms-without-matter, Aristotle captures the difference and 
opposition between the domain of the physical and the domain of the mental without 
using any such labels, nor any other modern candidate for the role of mark of the 
mental like consciousness or intentionality. Thanks to his peculiar hylomorphist 
metaphysics, Aristotle’s description of the mental dimension of perception takes place 
by the same vocabulary and conceptual tool kit which serves the purpose of describing 
and analyzing the domain of the physical. This is baffling and puzzling from our point of 
view, and makes one wonder whether such an account is fact a first step towards a 
feasible and original account of the mental. At any rate, then, a good surprise indeed. 
                                                             
124 On this point, I therefore agree with Scaltsas’ claim that what Aristotle is concerned with 
is perception as a mental (not physical, nor reducible to a physical ) event, without 
excluding the possibility of an underlying physiology related to it. Several differences 
remain, though: I endorse RFwM-Sufficiency and accordingly disagree with both Scaltsas’ 
reading of RFwM as indicating selectivity of the information, and his belief that the initial 
simile grants to wax blocks the power of RFwM. Quite obviously, in light of what I claimed 
in chapters 1-2 about perception being a μεσότης, my reading of the reprise of this thesis in 
the explanation of the why plants do not perceive is also different from Scaltsas’.  
 
Chapter 4 - Perceiving that we see and hear, and the 
debate about perceptual consciousness in Aristotle 
In III 2 Aristotle introduces the activity of ‘perceiving that we see’, asking what 
αἴσθησις (sense, or sensation) is responsible for it. 
According to the traditional reading, the passage is an investigation about the sense 
capacity responsible for the second-order reflective awareness of our own seeing, 
constituted by two arguments against the hypothesis attributing the activity at issue 
to a sense different from sight (‘different sense hypothesis’ from now on): a first one 
based on the Underlying Colour Inclusion (UCI, for short) requirement posed at 
425b13-14; and a second one showing that the ‘different sense hypothesis’ 
unacceptably implies an infinite regress (b15-17). Aristotle’s final answer has thence 
been thought to be that sight perceives that we see, and the rest of the passage 
(425b17-25) accordingly read as a defense of this position against a possible problem 
concerning the coloration of sight .  
Modern commentators reacted to the traditional interpretation, and showed that 
what one can hope it to deliver is, quite disappointingly, nothing more than two badly 
conceived arguments for a conclusion that apparently contradicts what Aristotle says 
in another work (Somn. 455a17-20), where it is explicitly denied that that we see that 
we see by sight), followed by an obscure problem about the coloration of the organ of 
sight.125  
Revisions proposed by modern commentators pointing out the problems in the 
traditional interpretation pointed in two directions. According to a first, Aristotle is 
not in fact arguing in favour of the ‘same sense hypothesis’ at all, but neutrally 
entertaining problematic implications of both the latter and the competing ‘different 
sense’ hypothesis (Osborne 1983). In a second interpretation, the ‘same sense 
hypothesis’ is instead still considered to be the view finally endorsed by Aristotle, but 
the interpretation of the argument he offers is importantly modified, to the effect of 
making the argument cogent and interesting. The latter approach was inaugurated by 
Kosman (1975), who proposed a fixing of the regress argument through a change of 
                                                             
125 Cf. Kosman 1975:499-505. 
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perspective with regard to what ‘perceiving that we see’ means. In his view, the clause 
does not indicate self-consciousness or reflective awareness of our own seeing or 
hearing, but rather the non-reflective consciousness implicitly characterizing seeing 
(and any other perceiving) qua mental. Such recognition was thus connected with the 
problematic necessity to provide a complete account of what perception is, capable to 
supplement the reception of forms without matter – which is supposed to be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for perception – with a further aspect.126 
A more radical revision of the passage that revives Kosman’s fundamental ideas has 
thenceforth been proposed by Caston (2002), who rightly remarked that the 
conservation of the traditional capacity reading cannot even provide a sound 
‘duplication argument’ in 425b13-15 (the passage setting the UCI requirement and the 
second dilemma).127 He thence argues that the question Aristotle treats concerns the 
structure of the perceptual activity that secures seeing (and hearing, and other types 
of perceiving) with its characteristic ‘intrinsic consciousness’ by means of a higher-
order intentional act that, while being a different type of activity in comparison with 
the first-order act, does not count as a second token separate from it.128 Against this 
revisionary attempt, Johansen (2005) has recently renovated the debate by proposing 
a punctually argued defence of the traditional ‘inner sense’ reading.  
The effect of the recent attention the passage has received is that no shared consensus 
exists anymore with regard to what Aristotle is saying in the passage. The questions 
on which scholars disagree are reducible to the following three: 
 what type of awareness is Aristotle describing with the expression ‘perceiving 
(i.e. being perceptually aware) that we see’? 
                                                             
126 Scholars proposing the ‘intrinsic perceptual consciousness’ interpretation claim that 
the latter aspect is theorized by Aristotle to demarcate perception from the mere being 
physically affected by perceptible objects, and thence solve the problem left open, in their 
view, at the end of DA II 12 (cf. Kosman [1975:507-511] and Caston [2002:755-757]; the 
connection is rejected by Johansen [2005:256-257]). Aristotle is accordingly supposed to 
theorize ‘intrinsic, non-reflective perceptual consciousness’ as a further aspect 
distinguishing perception form the non-perceptual physical processes of the same type 
(like a transduction or a literal assimilation) taking place in inanimate bodies (notably, for 
instance, the media of perception). 
Note that in my view such a distinguishing feature would not be needed: Aristotle already 
provided a ‘mental’ description of perception by describing it as RFwM in DA II 12, and a 
non-ambiguous theorization of a type of physical mechanism that is peculiar to perception 
in DA II 11 (cf. Chapters 1-2 of the present work). 
127 Caston 2002: 764-768. Johansen’s defense of the traditional capacity interpretation is 
immune to the criticism, as he attributes to the passage a neutral stance with regard to the 
dilemma (cf. Johansen 2005:243-244)  
128 Caston 2002: 768-773. 
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 is Aristotle arguing about senses (capacities) or sensations (activities)? 
 is Aristotle arguing for a certain conclusion, or neutrally considering hypotheses 
and problems? 
The reading I am going to propose is somewhat rescuing the essence of the traditional 
interpretation, but to an extent much more limited than Johansen’s. In my view, as in 
Johansen’s, Aristotle is indeed investigating what capacity is responsible for the 
second-order perceptual awareness that we are seeing; however, I shall argue that in 
order to make sense of the regress argument it is necessary to employ the ‘activity 
reading’ of αἴσθησις in the hypothesis introducing the argument at 425b15-16. 
Against Kosman’s and Caston’s hypothesis, however, I shall claim that the regress 
does not require to attribute any notion of ‘intrinsic’ perceptual awareness to 
Aristotle, and that it remains ultimately uncertain what type of awareness he had in 
mind. The conclusion Aristotle is aiming at is rather that an activity different from 
seeing, and thence a power different from sight qua sight (the power of seeing, i.e. 
perceiving a visible F by means of causally interacting with an F-subject) is required to 
explain how we perceive that we see. In the course of his treatment, he does in fact 
show that – in spite of what a misunderstanding of the UCI requirement may lead one 
to believe– it is impossible to see that is being seen is being seen. In light of the 
context, and in full agreement with Aristotle’s De Somno, the capacity by which we 
perceive that we see cannot be anything but the power of perceiving per accidens 
(perceiving a perceptible F without causally interacting with an F-subject), belonging 
in the same way to each single sense, and thus ‘common’ to all of them.  
1. The question of neutrality 
The beginning of Aristotle’s treatment appears unproblematic in both the activity and 
capacity reading. His claim that some αἴσθησις (a word ambigously capable to refer to 
either a sense or a sensation) is responsible for the activity at issue stems from the 
assumption that we in fact perceive that we see and hear: the information is conveyed 
by perceptual activity129. The following initial dilemma, then, seems to require nothing 
                                                             
129 This need not to be to the exclusion of other cognitive faculties. Aristotle is not saying 
that this content is accessible by perception only. The possibility that Socrates can think 
(or image or desire) that he sees and hear is not precluded. 
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but logic: it is either by opsis (vision, or sigth) that we see, or by another αἴσθησις 
(again, sense or sensation).130  
The structure of Aristotle’s reasoning, however, is unclear. As soon as the UCI 
requirement is introduced (425b13-14), and the dilemma accordingly updated (b14-
15), it becomes difficult to understand – regardless of whether the argument is about 
senses or sensations –whether Aristotle is already arguing against one of the horns of 
the dilemma, or merely restating the theoretical options in a neutral way. The 
difficulty to be faced here is, in other words, that it is not at all clear whether the 
updated version of the ‘different sense hypothesis’, according to which there will be 
‘two (aesthêseis) of the same object’, is in fact implicitly rejected, or rather neutrally 
entertained as a theoretical possibility on a par with the other horn.  
According to the traditional reading, Aristotle would be arguing against the possibility 
that a sense different from sight perceives that one sees, by saying that since the 
‘underlying colour’ (τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος, 425b14) must be included in the 
activity of the sense perceiving that we see, the hypothesis of a sense different from 
sight would violate the theory of ‘proprietary’ (or ‘proper’, idia) perceptible objects 
proposed in DA II 6. For according to the latter thesis, each of the five senses has 
exclusive access to a certain class of perceptible objects (e.g. colours are proprietary 
to sight, sounds to hearing, etc.).131 
Modern analyses questioning the traditional reading called into question the above 
reconstruction of the first part of the passage, casting doubts on the efficacy of the 
argument it sketches. In this direction, Caston (2002: 766) noted that nothing 
prevents the ‘two (aesthêseis) of the same object’ hypothesis from referring to two 
senses that are only numerically different, and thence to a second sense of sight. In this 
hypothesis, no contrast with the doctrine of proprietary objects needs to follow and 
the argument is ineffective. Granted, a model based on the idea of an ‘inner eye’ seeing 
                                                             
130 A doubt I shall not try to solve is whether the initial ‘we perceive that we see and hear’ 
means ‘as we see, we perceive that we see; as we hear, we perceive that we hear’ or ‘as we 
are seeing and hearing, we perceive that we are both hearing and seeing together’ (cf. Ross 
1961:274-5 ‘we are seeing (or hearing)’; Polanski, 2007:381: “ His noting that we perceive 
both that we see and we hear suggests (a) that not only is there such awareness of 
perceiving but that there is possibly perceiving of all perceiving, and (b) that there may be 
a unified awareness of all perceiving insofar as we are perceiving our perceiving”) . While 
the difference itself is important, I do not think it is relevant for the point Aristotle is 
making here.  
131 Kosman (1975:500). Osborne (1983:402) casts doubt on the interpretation by noting 
that 'nothing is said about "proper" objects, and in the previous chapter we had just been 
considering objects perceived by more than one sense'. 
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the outer eye would be awkward, and what Aristotle himself is going to say in what 
follows shows that this is far from being his final answer to the question. However, 
such model is a theoretical possibility at this stage, and this suffices to show that the 
traditional interpretation is wrong. 
To further disprove the traditional reading of the UCI dilemma, I wish to call attention 
to the fact that even a reference to a different type of sense, i.e. a sense different from 
sight, cannot in fact be excluded. One should note that Aristotle just established (in III 
1, 425a30-b4) that the possible five ‘particular’ senses are accompanied by the ability 
to perceive proprietary objects of a certain sense ‘by accident’ through a different 
sense (and in the case of perceiving a flavour by sight). Such a possibility makes the 
hypothesis that the latter operation turns out to belong to a kind of sense different 
from sight valid, in spite of the UCI requirement.  
The traditional reading is in fact wrong, then, in invoking the doctrine of proprietary 
objects to read the UCI dilemma as an implicit argument against the ‘different sense’ 
hypothesis. The doctrine of proprietary objects only imposes that each of the five 
senses has the proprietary power of per se perceiving a certain class of objects, and 
this is compatible with the equally explicit claim that each sense can access, by 
accidental perception, the other senses’ proprietary objects. As a consequence, no 
argument against the ‘different sense hypothesis’ can be unquestionably attributed to 
Aristotle so far, in spite of the required inclusion of the ‘underlying colour’ belonging 
to the detected act of seeing. Without further qualification of how the ‘underlying 
colour’ has to be perceived (i.e. per accidens or per se), both the ‘second sense of sight’ 
(numerically different sense hypothesis) and ‘second sense different from sight’ (type-
different sense hypothesis) are at this point valid theoretical possibilities.132 
                                                             
132 I therefore agree with Osborne (1983:401) as she notes that '[b]y this stage in the 
argument (425 b 15) the original pair of alternatives still remains open', but not when she 
says that '[i]t seems more likely that he thinks both seem problematic' (ibid., 402; in her 
view, if we take into account the whole chapter Aristotle’s final reply is that the sense by 
which we perceive that we perceive must in fact be different from sight, cf. ibid., 406-407). 
Johansen (2005:243-244) reaches a similar conclusion by arguing that the ‘different 
sense’ hypothesis is afflicted by the tension it generates with the doctrine of proprietary 
objects, while the ‘same sense’ hypothesis by the fact that Aristotle claims in II 5 that we 
do not perceive our own organs despite of the fact that they contain fire and the other 
elements (not to mention the 'worry aired in Plato's Charmides 165cff, namely, that if 
knowledge is of something, it ought to be of something other than itself'). The type of 
neutrality I am going to attribute here to Aristotle is quite different from Johansen’s. In my 
view, Aristotle is not in fact proposing any argument based on the contradiction of the 
doctrine of proprietary objects. Furthermore, as I am going to argue in Chapter 5 of the 
present work, I find the problem of self-perceiving sense organs in II 5 different from the 
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2. Capacities or activities? 
The suitable interpretations of the first part of DA III 2, including the UCI requirement 
and the second dilemma (425b13-15), are apparently two: in a first, the ‘neutrality 
reading’ is coupled with the ‘capacity reading’; in a second, the ‘activity reading’ is 
held together with a ‘non-neutrality reading’. If what I argued above is correct, once 
the capacity reading is adopted, it is advisable, if not compulsory, to read the first part 
of the argument as a neutral exposition of theoretical possibilities. On the other hand, 
the activity reading of αἴσθησις is better suited to the scope of claiming that Aristotle 
is in fact providing a first argument against the ‘another αἴσθησις’ horn. As Caston 
(2002:770-772) suggests, the point would then be that (regardless of what power is 
involved) there is no double vision (nor, I would say more generally, any ‘double 
perception’), of the original colour, a fact ultimately grounded on phenomenology. In 
short:  
– if Aristotle is dealing with the question ‘by what sense do we perceive that we see?’ 
(capacity reading), then he cannot yet be arguing against either of the horns of the UCI 
dilemma, which would consist in the alternative between (i) the hypothesis that sight 
is able to perceive not only visible objects, but also ‘that we are seeing them’; and (ii) 
the hypothesis that we perceive that we see by another sense, which is able to 
perceive that we are seeing while including the visible objects we are seeing.  
– On the other hand, if Aristotle is dealing with the question ‘by what sensation do we 
perceive that we see?’, he would be already implicity endorsing (i) the hypothesis that 
a single act of vision perceives not only the visible object, but also ‘that we are seeing 
it’, while rejecting (ii) the hypothesis that another sensation is taking place, which 
perceives both ‘that we are seeing’ and the object being seen (for no double vision 
occurs).  
The question we left aside at the beginning must now be faced: are there independent 
grounds to decide between the (neutrality involving) ‘capacity reading’ and the (non-
neutral) ‘activity reading’? Some (admittedly non-decisive) reasons favouring the first 
can be obtained by looking at the larger context in which the discussion occurs. As 
Caston (2002:763) himself admits, in DA III 1-2 Aristotle is generally interested in 
perceptual powers. He began the discussion with ‘physical’ argument concluding that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
question of perceiving our senses as they receive matterless forms, which is at issue here. 
Very roughly, this is the same difference that would distinguish first order perception of a 
part of our body from second-order perception of the qualia-characterized contents of our 
mind..  
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the maximum number of peripheral senses is five (424b20-425a13), and then 
discussed the perception of common perceptibles by means of the five senses 
(425a14-29). As already mentioned, he thence considers the power of perceiving one 
sense’s proprietary objects by means of another sense, which postulates a power of 
perceiving by accident belonging to the senses working ‘as one’ (425a20-b4). At the 
end of III 2, he will consider the case of discriminating the difference between types of 
perceptible objects (e.g., that sweet is different from white), and argue again for the 
unity of the senses (426b9-427a14). Generally speaking, then, Aristotle seems 
interested here in showing that the model of five jointly working senses is capable of 
explaining the complex perceptual activities we are able to perform, and in fact 
postulated by them. This suggests that in the part of III 2 under consideration he is 
considering the phenomenon of ‘perceiving that we see’ from the same standpoint. In 
other words, Aristotle is likely asking what is the sense responsible for the activity of 
perceiving that we see and hear, and his agenda is arguably that such an activity can 
be fully explained by employing the model he is proposing (five different senses, plus 
a power to perceive ‘by accident’). In view of the context, then, it seems more 
reasonable to support the (neutrality involving) capacity reading.133 
Further indications in favour of the capacity reading come from considerations about 
the terminology Aristotle is employing. In fact, as Johansen (2005:242-3) has argued, 
‘we should take "the capacity of sight" to be the default meaning of opsis in the DA’. He 
notes that none of the occurrence for the sense of opsis as ‘seeing’ quoted in Bekker’s 
Index are from DA, and that passages like DA II 1 412b27- 413a2, III 2 426a12-15 and 
III 3 428a6-7 (cf. also Metaph. IX 9 1050a24-25) clearly imply the sense of opsis 
referring to the capacity of sight. 134 
The arguments in support of the capacity reading based on context and terminology 
are admittedly not decisive, though, and its tenability should also take into account its 
(and the rival activity reading’s) ability to make sense of the rest of the passage, 
including the regress argument and the aporia about coloration of sight. That the 
capacity reading does in fact fit the bill with the crucial help of the activity reading at 
                                                             
133 I therefore largely agree with the reconstruction of the context offered by Johansen 
(2005:235-238).  
134 Johansen also rejects Caston's (2002:768) criticism of the capacity reading of the 
expression 'it of itself' at 425b15, based on the assumption that a change of referent in 
such a short phrase is unacceptable (the capacity reading must read the phrase as 
meaning that the capacity is of its own activity). As he remarks, 'Caston' s point relies on 
an artificially narrow idea of how to read reflexive expressions such as "seeing oneself"'. 
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425b16, is what I shall argue for in the following. Before moving on, however, I shall 
dwell upon the UCI requirement and its grounds, as this will prove necessary to trace 
back the argumentative path Aristotle is going to follow in the rest of the passage. 
3. Making Sense of the UCI Requirement 
3.1 The underlying object to be included is the subjectively experienced 
phenomenal quality 
The type of ‘neutrality’ I coupled with the capacity reading has a positive advantage 
concerning the UCI requirement. The view I argued for promotes the idea that no 
argument based on the contradiction of the doctrine of proprietary objects has to be 
attributed here to Aristotle. In this way, it manages to avoid the implausibility of 
introducing the UCI requirement that affects the argument theorized by the 
traditional interpretation: were it in fact impossible that two senses different in kind 
have the same object, there would be no reason at all to endorse the UCI requirement 
in the first place.135 A question remains, however, with regard to what are in fact the 
grounds for the introduction of the UCI requirement.136  
Commentators rightly underline that the UCI requirement implies that it is not 
sufficient to get information about sight being at work, to the effect of discouraging 
any attempt to reduce ‘perception that we see’ to the proprioceptive feeling that sight 
is at work. For the latter proprioceptive feeling alone would clearly not need to 
include the information about what is being perceived (i.e. the underlying colour), 
against Aristotle’s requirement.137 In other words, once the UCI requirement is 
embraced ‘perceiving that we see’ cannot indicate that one is detecting that sight is at 
work seeing, but rather that what is being seen is being seen. Such remarks cannot be 
sufficient, though: even if the exclusion of mere proprioceptive feelings were in fact 
the goal Aristotle wants to achieve by embracing the UCI requirement, it would still be 
far from clear why one is supposed to accept such constraint.138 
                                                             
135 Cf. Caston (2002:765-6). 
136 The question left commentators like Hicks (1907:435), Hamlyn (1968:121-122) and 
Kosman (1975:500-501) perplexed. 
137 Caston (2002:771) notes against Osborne (1983) that the UCI requirement excludes 
the perceiving that we see is simply ‘a matter of being informed that we are seeing, rather 
than merely dreaming; or discerning that we are seeing rather than, say, hearing’. 
138 According to Johansen (2005:243), the reason for the position of the UCI requirement 
lies in the fact that 'one cannot perceive the perception of that sensible form without also 
perceiving the sensible form as it is taken on by the sense faculty'. If this is the reason, 
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A question that is useful asking in the investigation concerning the grounds of the UCI 
requirement is ‘what is the underlying colour Aristotle is talking about’? A need for 
disambiguation in the description of the relevant sense of ‘perceiving that we see’ can 
in fact be raised, which will prove useful in the determination of the nature of such 
activities and the grounds of the UCI requirement. The mentioned difference between 
mere ‘proprioceptive’ perceiving that we see, and the perceiving that we see abiding 
by the UCI requirement can be schematized in the following way: 
 perception-that-we-see* = proprioception that the activity of seeing is taking 
place (the perceived content is ‘Seeing’ or ‘Sight at work’139) 
 perception-that-we-see = perception that the colour being seen is being seen 
(the perceived content is ‘SeenRed’). 
The ambiguity characterizing the phrasing describing the second, relevant sense of 
‘perceiving that we see’ concerns the expression ‘the colour being seen’ (the 
‘underlying colour’ Aristotle is talking about). The clause may be referring to either 
the source object’s property (the red tomato we see), or to what the perceiver is 
subjectively being presented with, as a result of the interaction with the source 
object’s property (depending on the theory of perception one embraces, this could be 
the sense-data, or qualia, or modes of presentation, that result from the interaction 
with the red tomato). 
The above question about the nature of the ‘underlying colour’ is crucial, in so far as a 
reasonable justification of the UCI requirement can only be obtained, in my view, by 
stressing that the only proper perception that we see is the direct perception of 
particular acts of vision themselves,140 accompanied by the visual qualities (qualia) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
however, one can still ask why we cannot simply perceive that we see, as opposed to 
perceiving that we see that particular thing. In note, Johansen explains that 'properly 
speaking seeing is never just seeing for Aristotle; it is, at least, seeing red or yellow or 
some colour, since seeing is a matter of some such sensible form being received by the 
sense faculty'. This explanation raises the further question of why Aristotle does in fact 
think that seeing is always of some object, but even if the question is left aside and the 
point accepted, it does not follow from it that one cannot detect that the activity of seeing 
is taking place without perceiving its object. 
139 The second is to be preferred, since Aristotle tends to distinguish the being at work of 
sight (which occurs also in darkness) from the actual seeing, that consists in the 
interaction between sight being at work and actually visible objects (cf. later in III 2, 
425b17-22). 
140 Caston (2002:766-768) rightly emphasizes that it would be absurd to claim that what 
is being perceived is the capacity of seeing itself (what he calls ‘extreme capacity reading’). 
As he himself recognizes (ibid.), though, the defender of the capacity reading need not 
accept that perceiving the capacity amounts to perceiving that a certain subject is able to 
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characterizing them. According to this proposal, the question about the ambiguity of 
‘the colour being seen’ must be solved invoking the necessity of including the 
‘subjective’ and ‘mental’ qualities accompanying the detected act of vision (the sense-
data, or ‘qualia’, or modes of presentation), rather than the perceptible object that the 
detected act of vision is interacting with (the red tomato). Aristotle is thence requiring 
that we perceive the particular act of vision with the corresponding ‘mental’ 
colouration characterizing it at each given time. Perceiving that we see means being 
aware that what is being seen is being seen, by means of an act of perception that has 
as its object the particular act of vision, i.e., the subjectively experienced act of vision, 
that is – so to speak – coloured in ‘mental’ or ‘phenomenal’ paint.  
3.2 Justification of the proposal 
To justify this proposal and the soundness of the version of the UCI requirement I 
attribute to Aristotle, I shall rely on the intuitive difference between properly 
perceiving that we see and believing that we see by means of perceptible indicators 
along the lines of what I call the ‘inferential model’. The ‘inferential model’ is based on 
a mechanism of getting information by perceptually conveyed testimony, indirect 
reports or signals. This is the way in which, for instance, I come to perceive that 
Socrates sees when I see that all the questionnaires I gave to people knowing Socrates 
have the ‘yes’ box ticked under the question asking whether Socrates sees. In both 
cases, I can say that I come to believe that Socrates sees on the basis of perceptible 
testimony, and in this sense I may say that I ‘perceive’ that Socrates sees. In such 
cases, the verb ‘to perceive’ is evidently employed in a loose way, i.e. as short for ‘to 
come to believe by perceptible indicators’.  
The mechanism of perceptible testimony characterising the ‘inferential model’ may be 
applied to the case of one’s own perception of seeing. In this case, there is to be sure a 
notable aspect to be taken into account, namely the fact that both the perceptible 
indicator and the agency perceiving it belong to the same subject, i.e. myself. This is 
not what really matters in the inferential model, though. What is essential in the 
model is rather that the part responsible for seeing, i.e. sight, gives out a perceptible 
signal that is perceived by what perceives that sight is seeing. An example of this 
would be a hypothetical case in which an internal sound is produced in my body every 
time my sight sees, to the effect that I perceive (by hearing the emitted sound) that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
perceive, and rather argue that what is perceived is that the subject is seeing (what he 
calls the moderate capacity view).  
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sight is at work.141 For a less phenomenologically awkward application of the same 
model, we just have to think of an inner perceptible signal of a different kind, like a 
proprioceptive feeling due to extraocular muscles spindle stretch. What actually 
distinguishes the ‘inferential model’ is exactly the fact that in all such cases what we 
perceive is strictly speaking a perceptible signal to be interpreted as evidence that we 
are seeing, to the effect that ‘perceving that we see’ would mean ‘coming to believe 
that we see, by perceiving a perceptible sign indicating that this is the case’.  
If the characterization of the ‘inferential model’ I offer is accepted, it is arguable that 
the structure that defines the model may still be in place even when the perceptible 
sign by which the original perceptual activity is detected is changing in accordance to 
the content of the inferentially detected perceptual activity, to the effect of allowing 
one to indirectly interact with the original source object being perceived. It is worth 
dwelling upon this possible scenarios, since in such cases one might be deceived into 
thinking that the subject is in fact satisfying ‘the underlying colour’ requirement. My 
claim is that in these cases the requirement would not in fact be respected, if not in a 
merely appartent way, which is not the one Aristotle has in mind as he poses it. 
 A first interesting variation of the ‘inferential model’ may be exemplified by the ‘blind 
man & guide dog’ case. By following the dog’s movements, the guided man is indirectly 
interacting with visible aspects of the world being seen by (the dog’s) sight. Despite 
the (indirect) interaction with visible objects, the blind man has no ‘perception of the 
(dog’s) seeing’, if by this we mean ‘perception of the (dog’s) vision inclusive of the 
objects being seen by it’. The man is ‘perceiving the dog’s seeing’ only if by ‘perceiving’ 
we mean ‘coming to believe that the dog sees by means of perceptible indicators’. 
What is interesting in the ‘blind man & guide dog’ case is that perceiving that one sees 
by indirect interaction with the external visible object being seen is not yet sufficient 
to exclude the ‘inferential model’.  
 A second interesting variation is represented by cases in which one sees that one sees 
while also seeing the external visible object, without this being sufficient to exclude 
‘perception of seeing’ according to the inferential model. The situation can be 
illustrated by the ‘second row watcher’ case, in which a person watching a horror 
movie perceives that people in the first row are seeing the projection, by means of 
seeing them cringing in their seat. Again, even though the second row watcher is 
                                                             
141 Cf. the hypothesis entertained (and rejected) by Kosman (1975:203-504) in his 
reasoning on the meaning of perceiving that we see and hear. 
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directly seeing the same visible object (the horror movie on the screen) being seen by 
the (first row watcher’s) act of vision she is detecting, she is not ‘perceving the (first 
row watcher’s) act of vision’, and she is only perceiving that the other watchers are 
seeing if what we mean by ‘perceiving’ is ‘coming to believe by means of perceptible 
indicators’. 
The cases that fit the ‘inferential model’ described above are as far from ‘perceiving 
that one sees’ as ‘seeing a red tomato’ is from ‘believing that a perceptible tomato we 
cannot see is there’ on the grounds of someone else’s ‘perceptibly vehicled testimony’: 
I can believe a red tomato is behind a screen because I hear your voice as you tell me 
so, but this is not what perceiving a red tomato is. Similarly, I can believe that I see by 
interpreting a perceptible signal, but this is not what perceiving that I see is. The 
object analogous to the accessible red tomato in the case of properly perceiving that 
we see is, in my view, the particular act of vision we are engaging in as the perception 
that we see is taking place.  
The ‘blind man & guide dog’ and ‘second row watcher’ cases show that interacting or 
even seeing the external objects are not sufficient to ‘perceive’ that one sees, if by 
‘perceive’ we mean something more robust that ‘coming to believe by perceptible 
indicators’. This suggest that the only way in which the blind man and the second row 
watcher might actually perceive that the relevant act of seeing they are inferentially 
detecting would be by a second-order perceptual act that is inclusive of the original 
‘mental’ qualities (qualia, modes of presentation, sense-data) belonging to the act of 
vision being detected. Those features can be applied by analogy to a single subject’s 
activity thus gaining the possibility to convert ‘perceiving my own seeing’ into 
‘perceiving that I see’. The conclusion is that one cannot be said to properly perceive 
one’s own seeing, unless the original qualia characterizing the detected act of seeing 
are accessed by a second order act of perception (where ‘properly perceive’ means 
that the substitution of ‘perceive’ with ‘come to believe by means of perceptible 
indicators’ is not allowed). The requirement Aristotle poses, according to which the 
sense responsible of perceiving that we see must include the ‘underlying colour’ being 
seen, is therefore justified.  
Caston’s remark that the reasons behind the UCI requirement have to do with the 
precise determination of the type of mental activity at issue is therefore, in my view, a 
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first agreeable move in the right direction.142 This very same assumption, however, 
allows two different reconstructions. According to a first, the UCI requirement serves 
the purpose of restricting the argument to a certain type of ‘perceiving that we see’. In 
a second reconstruction, the point of the UCI requirement is rather to specify a 
condition that is generally necessary in order to have ‘perceiving that we see’. In my 
view, Aristotle’s point is the latter, not the former.143 What Aristotle is implicitly 
assuming is that in order to perceive that we see we must perceive that what is being 
seen is being seen; the mere ‘perception of seeing’ would be compatible with coming 
to believe that we perceive by means of perceptible indicators. In such cases we would 
in fact be perceiving some indicators, but not ‘perceiving that we see’ in the relevant 
sense, i.e. perceiving that what is being seen is being seen.144 
Despite being proposed aboust colours and sight, the UCI requirement is obviously 
valid for all senses: what perceives that we are per se perceiving F, must perceive both 
F and the sense perceiving F. This explains why in the following lines Aristotle is never 
                                                             
142 He argues (2002:771) that the UCI requirement is ‘gratuitous’ unless taken as 
indication of the sense of ‘perceiving that we see’ Aristotle is interested in. In his view this 
sense is ‘perceiving that we are undergoing a visual experience with a particular content’. 
The sense of ‘perceiving that we see’ at issue would then be ‘a perception both of our 
seeing and of the object seen’. 
143 Caston seems to have in mind the first type of point instead. To be sure, the ‘perceiving 
that we see’ Aristotle has in mind must be, in Caston’s view, the intrinsic awareness 
constituting the ‘mental mark’ of any perceptual activity (2002:755-759, 769, 773-775); 
and yet, for Caston [t]here are perhaps circumstances, in which it is true to say that ‘I 
perceive that I see’ without my having perceived what I am seeing’ (771). This concession 
appears problematic: if Aristotle were arguing about the intrinsic awareness structurally 
characterising any perceptual activity, one would expect him to be unwilling to restrict his 
argument to a certain kind of perceptual activity. In fact, he should rather be wary of 
unduly exclusion of any perceptual activity whatsoever from his treatment. I suspect that 
Caston may be thinking that Aristotle is at this stage proposing a first, less general 
reasoning, to be followed by the second, more general regress argument.  
144 Osborne justifies the UCI requirement by noting (1983:403-404, 406) that colour must 
be included since what is detected is seeing, a specific type of activation of sight (as 
Aristotle says, sight can be exercised without the corresponding activity being sight), 
which on the basis of the second part of III 2 (425b26-426a26) is identical with the 
actuality of colour and thence ‘transparent’. Without the exclusion of the irrelevant loose 
sense of 'perceiving that we see' (an exclusion that already requires, if I am right, the 
inclusion of the underlying colour), however, the justification proposed by Osborne is 
defused, since nothing would otherwise prevent one from perceiving that a specific 
activation of sight, like seeing, is taking place by a perceptible indicator specifically 
corresponding to it (for a wholly different line of criticism concerning the ‘transparency’ 
of perception, cf. Caston, 2002:782-785). For the same reason, the inclusion of the 
underlying objects is not required to perceive that the activation at play is seeing rather 
than, say, tasting. It is therefore implausible that this is what perceiving that we see 
means, as Osborne (1983: 406-407) proposes. 
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questioning the Underlying Colour Requirement he is committing to here.145 In fact, it 
is plausible that similar considerations, which may be familiar to Aristotle’s audience 
because of the discussion in Plato’s Charmides, apply also to the detection of non-
perceptual types of mental activities: the underlying object must always be included 
in the higher-order perceptual (or in some cases, intellectual) activity that performs 
the detection.146 
4. Making Sense of the regress according to the traditional ‘reflective 
awareness’ model 
4.1 Is the awareness to be explained first-order ‘intrinsic consciousness’ or 
second-order reflective consciousness? 
As anticipated, intepreters like Kosman and Caston argued that the activity being 
investigated in Aristotle’s treatment of ‘perceiving that we see (and hear, etc.)’ is the 
being aware that intrinsically belongs to every act of perceiving qua mental. The latter 
‘intrinsic consciousness’ reading was motivated by the necessity to solve a difficulty 
concerning the regress argument at 425b15-17. If intrinsic consciousness is what 
Aristotle is indicating by ‘perceiving (being aware) that we perceive’, it is a truism to 
say that every time we see (or hear, etc.) we experience the awareness (perception) of 
seeing, since awareness will belong to seeing (and any other perceiving) by logical 
necessity. In this view, the regress will in fact follow if one postulates that it must be 
by another sense or act of perceiving that sensations are made conscious. On the 
contrary, and despite the recent defense by Johansen, the regress argument remains 
more difficult, if at all cogent, under the traditional assumption that ‘perceiving that 
                                                             
145 The UCI requirement is also valid, in my view, for both the horns of the initial, ‘purely 
logical’ dilemma, i.e. whether or not the part or subject seeing is in fact the same as the 
subject or part perceiving its being seeing. As Caston (735, n. 35) reports, the restriction to 
the 'another αἴσθησις' horn is instead supported by Alexander (Quaest. 3.7,91-2), 
Themistius (In De an. 83.13); Ross (1961: 275 ad loc.), and supplied in translation by 
Wallace, Rodier, Hamlyn, Tricot, Barbotin.  
146 As Caston (2002:775, note 50) shows, this does not mean that the higher-order, 
underlying object inclusive activity must be of the same type as the detected first-order 
one (so that we would have the absurdity of ‘desiring to desire’ and ‘doubting of 
doubting’). In fact, in the rest of DA III 2 Aristotle will defuse any argument aiming at 
imposing a similar correspondence between the type of ‘underlying’ object and the type of 
detecting faculty, thus gaining the possibility to argue that even though detection of desire 
must include the desired object, which is a ‘proprietary’ object of desire (in the same way 
as red is proprietary to sight qua sight), this does not imply that the desirable object must 
be included by means of being once again subject to the same type of power (desire), since 
we have a special perceptual power perceiving F ‘by accident’. 
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we see’ indicates the reflective awareness of our own perceptual (visual) activity. As 
Kosman has showed, there is no reason why one should not be happy and stop after 
the postulation of an αἴσθησις (be it a sensation or a sense capacity) that perceives the 
first act of vision. The reasoning proposed by the traditional interpretation would 
require a further αἴσθησις for the perception of perceiving that we see, and so on for 
each higher order perception; but nothing forces one to go on adding further higher-
order aisthêseis for the sake of perceiving that we see.147 
Despite the undeniable merit of being able to make sense of the regress, I find the 
invocation of a notion of ‘intrinsic consciousness’ unconvincing. Leaving aside 
philosophical controversies surrounding the very idea of ‘intrinsic consciousness’ and 
its explanation in terms of higher order intentional acts (not to speak of the risk of 
anachronism), I find such proposal unsupported by the wording Aristotle employs 
here. The important drawback of the ‘intrinsic consciousness’ reading is that if the 
expression ‘perceiving that we see’ suggests anything, this is not the awareness 
‘intrinsically belonging to’ seeing (and thence, in this sense, ‘of’ seeing), but rather the 
second-order perception by which we are aware that seeing is taking place.148 
                                                             
147 Kosman 2005:280-281. Johansen's attempt to meet Kosman's criticism is 
unconvincing. In Johansen’s view (2005:244-5), a parallel with the third man argument 
can be drawn, and the regress concerning sense faculties is triggered by the combination 
of two principles: (i) in order for a faculty to be perceived, a different faculty must be 
postulated; (ii) every faculty of perception is itself perceptible. In my view, the 
reconstruction fails to entail the regress, since the explanatory asymmetry characterizing 
the third man argument is crucially missing in the argument about senses designed by 
Johansen. The explanatory asymmetry in the argument about Forms consists in the fact 
that the ‘bottom level’ represented by the individual subjects is always and only working 
as the explanandum, never as the explanans: a Form F may explain why a particular F is F, 
but certainly not the other way around. On the opposite, in the case of senses there is no 
such hierarchy, and it is possible to break the regress by theorizing, for instance, that 
while sight's activity is perceived by X (a sense different from sight, which at this point in 
the argument may be another one of the five senses), X's activity is in turn perceived by 
sight. Pace Johansen, no infinite proliferation of faculties necessarily follows. 
148 As Osborne (1983:405) rightly remarks. Kosman’s reading tries to justify the 
equivalence by invoking the thesis that the act of the sensible and the act of the sense 
perceiving it are identical (exposed in III 2, 425b26-426a26), so that ‘perceiving red’ is –in 
his view– equal to both ‘perceiving red’s actuality as it affects sight’ and ‘perceiving sight’s 
seeing red’. The argument is rightly rejected by Caston, 2002:782-785. Caston’s own 
interpretation may appear to offer a solution, since in his view (2002:752) Aristotle’s 
position ‘cuts down the middle’ of the dichotomy generated by the current debate 
‘between those who take consciousness to be an intrinsic feature of mental states and 
those who think it consists in a higher-order thought or perception’ . In this way, Aristotle 
may be thought to be justified in embracing both the ‘perception of perception’ talk and 
the assumption that each perceiving postulates a higher-order perception. For the being 
conscious that is intrinsic to each perceiving would in this view require such a higher-
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Furthermore, against a common assumption shared by proponents of this 
interpretation, I believe there is in fact no theoretical need for it in Aristotle’s account 
of perception.149 
If the attribution to Aristotle of the notion of intrinsic (non-reflective) perceptual 
consciousness is rejected, however, it becomes urgent to provide a convincing 
alternative explanation of the regress. In what follows, I propose an attempt at such an 
explanation. 
4.2 The Regress Argument without Intrinsic Consciousness 
The intepretation of the regress argument I am going to propose will be based on an 
attempt at re-assessing, in the frame of an overall ‘capacity reading’, the ‘another 
αἴσθησις’ hypothesis introducing it at 425b16-17. As we know, at this point in the text 
Aristotle has just posed the UCI Requirement, and consequently revised the original 
dilemma. He now proceeds to argue that under the mentioned hypothesis a regress 
will follow.  
Commentators generally agree that the ‘another αἴσθησις’ hypothesis in b16-17 is just 
making explicit that what Aristotle is going to argue against is one of the horns of the 
dilemma, namely the idea that the αἴσθησις (once again ‘the sense’ for supporters of 
the capacity reading, ‘the sensation’ for proponents of the activity reading) by which 
we perceive that we see must be different from that by which we see. The Greek ἑτέρα 
εἴη ἡ τῆς ὄψεως αἴσθησις is accordingly read as ‘if the sense/sensation having 
sight/vision as its object is a different one’.150 In this view, Aristotle’s argument is 
deemed to aim for the conclusion that not only seeing, but also perceiving that we see, 
must be attributed to the same αἴσθησις (sight, in the capacity reading; vision in the 
activity reading), since the attribution to a different one generates the regress . As 
anticipated, along the lines of this reconstruction the only plausible reading seems to 
be the one attributing to Aristotle a notion of ‘intrinsic non-reflective consciousness’, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
order perception. The awkwardness of the expression remains, however: Aristotle’s 
starting point is that we have second-order perception (perceiving that we perceive), and 
not that first-order perception is aware because we have second-order perception. He 
says ‘since we are aware that we perceive…’, and reading this as ‘since we have awareness 
as we are seeing…’ keeps requiring too much of a stretch. 
149 Cf. note 126 above. 
150 Cf. translations by Hicks (‘if the sense perceiving sight were really a distinct sense’), 
Hett: (‘if there is a separate sense perceiving sight’), Hamlyn (‘if the sense concerned with 
sight were indeed different from sight’). The ROT has it as ‘if the sense which perceives 
sight were different from sight’. 
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since the more natural reading of ‘perceiving that we see’ as reflective awareness of 
our own seeing appears unable to make Aristotle’s argument sound. 
The difficulty involved in reading the expression ‘perceiving that we see’ in the most 
natural and simple way – i.e. as indicating (non-intrinsic) ‘second-order’ awareness –
makes it worth exploring a different interpretation of the initial hypothesis, according 
to which the words εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἡ τῆς ὄψεως αἴσθησις do in fact mean ‘if there were 
another sense/sensation of sight’. In this reading, the genitive ‘of sight’ (τῆς ὄψεως) is 
not objective (as in ‘the perception of the apple’), but specificatory (as in ‘the habit of 
smoking’): the sense/sensation is ‘of sight/vision’ not in so far as it has sight/vision as 
its object, but rather as it is an instance of the visual type of sense/sensation. 
Accordingly, Aristotle’s regress argument is not deployed against the hypothesis that 
‘we perceive that we see’ by sense/sensation different from sight/vision, but rather 
against the hypothesis that we do it by a further visual act, i.e. a second act of seeing. 
Outlandish as it may seem, the hypothesis of ‘another sensation of sight’ (which will 
eventually prove wrong) can at this stage appear justified by the supposition that 
since the original qualia to be included are visual, i.e. proprietary to sight qua sight, 
the perceptual activity including them can only be a second act of vision. Once the 
hypothesis is posed, the regress does indeed follow, regardless of whether one 
assumes the ‘one sense of itself’ or the ‘two senses of the same object’ model. Under 
the assumption that we in fact ‘perceive that we see’ by seeing that what we are seeing 
is being seen, the preceding dilemma will impose the choice between the two 
following horns:  
– Horn 1: ‘two senses having the same object & another αἴσθησις of sight’ 
 a second instantiation of sight (Sight2) perceives that what the first sight is 
seeing is being seen, by means of a second act of vision (Vision2) that is due to the 
causal interaction between itself and the first simple sight (Sight1) engaging in 
the first act of vision (Vision1). A representation of the model can be obtained 
imagining a perfectly transparent sensor that sees ‘red’, and a second sensor 
behind it perceiving the first sensor (if the first sensor is affected by a red tomato, 
the second sensor is affected by the tomato-affected first sensor). Note that on 
this model, the phenomenal qualities of the first act of vision are preserved. 
– Horn 2: ‘one sense of itself & another αἴσθησις of sight’  
one and the same power (Sight) perceives, by means of a second act of vision 
(Vision2), that what it is itself seeing (by means of a first act of vision, i.e. Vision1) 
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is being seen. A representation of the model can be obtained imagining a 
reflective sensor that, thanks to a system of mirrors, is affected at the same time 
by a red tomato (Vision1) and by its own being affected by it (Vision2, due to a 
double reflection) 
What is implying a regress is, in both the hypotheses above, the fact that the 
hypothesized second act of vision would be identical to the first whose perception is 
supposed to postulate it. The gist of the regress argument is that if the postulated 
second act is simply an act of vision preserving the content and phenomenal qualities 
of the first one, such further act of vision cannot be anything but a simple 
reproduction of the first (like a second photograph printed from the same impressed 
film). As a consequence, if one hypothesizes that in order to perceive that we see the 
first (visual qualia inclusive) act of vision is simply perceived by a second act of vision, 
an infinite regress will follow.151 Being a copy of the first act of vision, the second, 
simple act of vision has nothing more to contribute in comparison to the original one; 
and if, in order to explain how we perceive that we see, the previous act of vision 
needed to be seen by a further one, the same will apply to the second, and so on ad 
infinitum. In my view, then, no postulation of a controversial notion of ‘intrinsic non-
reflective perceptual awareness’ is needed to make sense of the regress argument, and 
the reason why Aristotle draws the consequence of a regress from the assumption of 
‘another act of vision’ is quite simple and straightforward.  
This reconstruction makes sense of Aristotle’s regress argument without having to 
attribute to him the idea that there is a physically or logically necessary co-occurrence 
of ‘seeing’ and ‘perceiving that we see’.152 This leaves untouched the further, 
                                                             
151 More precisely, the ‘one power of itself’ horn will generate a regress of tokens, the ‘two 
powers of the same object’ horn a regress of both tokens and powers.  
152 That there always is that co-occurrence is claimed by Caston (2002:757-759, 774-775), 
on the grounds of a certain reading of several passages (Phys. VII 2, 244b12-245a2; Sens. 
2, 437a26-29; cf. Mem. 2, 452b26-8 and Sens. 7, 448a26-30; EN IX 9, 1170a29-b1; Metaph. 
XII 0, 1074b33-36). As Johansen (2005:263-269) shows, however, a different reading of 
those passages is possible, according to which the co-occurrence is not necessary. It is 
worth noting, in particular, that – as Johansen (2005:266, n.64) remarks – in Sens. 
437a26-29 Aristotle’s argument makes perfect sense if the Greek μὴ ἔστι λανθάνειν <μὴ> 
αἰσθανόμενον καὶ ὁρῶντα ὁρω μενο ν τι , is rendered as ‘it is not possible to be unaware of 
what is seen when one is seeing’, thus neutralising Caston's point (which is based on the 
reading ‘it is not possible to be unaware of perceiving and seeing something seen'). 
Johansen further remarks that even if Aristotle stated that second order ‘perceiving that 
we see F’ and first order ‘seeing F’ are always co-occurring, such co-occurrence may still 
be due to physical (causal) rather than logical necessity. In this way, second-order 
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independent question whether the co-occurrence of ‘seeing Red’ and ‘perceiving 
seenRed’ (which is in my view possible, but not necessary for the entailment of the 
regress in DA III 2) amounts to a single token or to two separate ones.153  
Once the explanation of perceiving that we see by a simple second act of seeing is 
proved to be untenable, it becomes clear that what is needed is a different type of 
perceptual activity and a corresponding power that – having still to abide by the UCI 
requirement – includes also (as opposed to just) the information and phenomenal 
qualities belonging to the first, simple of act of seeing. This type of activity is the only 
alternative to the regress. As Aristotle says: 
either there will be a regress or a certain one will be of itself (425b16, my 
translation and emphasis) 
In my view, the ‘certain’ (τις) here must be emphasized as an indication that the 
power at play here cannot be simple sight (i.e., sight qua capable of seeing), since the 
activity that is required cannot be limited to a simple act of seeing.154 In order to avoid 
the regress, it is necessary that the operation of perceiving that we see is not theorised 
as a simple act of vision that is merely replicating the original one and its phenomenal 
qualities. On the contrary, it is crucial that there is ‘something special’ that makes the 
required perceptual activity different from mere seeing. An additional element of 
information must in fact be provided by the activity at issue, to the effect that its 
content can be described as ‘seenRed’ rather than simply as ‘Red’.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
perception cannot be said to be 'part of the nature or essence of first-order perception' 
(ibid.:268). 
153 Caston (2002:777-778) argues that Aristotle’s passage reveals the logical 
inseparability between two components in each and every token of perception. In Caston’s 
account, in each token of perception a sense is directly perceiving something else and, at 
the same time, indirectly perceiving itself. Against a common assumption in contemporary 
thought, however, the unity of the token requires that the individuation of mental acts 
cannot be exhausted by content (Caston 2002:781-782). Otherwise, the obvious difference 
in the type of content between seeing and perceiving that we see (respectively having 
‘Red’ and ‘seenRed’ as their content) would imply the impossibility for them to form a single 
token. Johansen (2005:259-260) does on the opposite insist on the difference in content 
and truth condition between the two activities to reject the idea that they form a single 
token, objecting that Caston ‘provides no justification of his rebuttal’ (ibid., p.260, note 
50). 
154 This means that the ‘one sense of itself’ in b15 (αὐτὴ αὑτῆς, opposed to δύο τοῦ αὐτοῦ) is 
not referring to the exactly the same hypothesis as the ‘some certain sense of itself’, 
offered as an alternative to the regress in b16 (αὐτή τις … αὑτῆς, opposed to εἰς ἄπειρον). 
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5. Making Sense of the aporia about colouration of sight 
The necessity to avoid the regress requires that perception that we see is assigned to a 
capacity that is not limited to the reproduction of the detected perceptual activity’s 
‘underlying object’. There are several ways in which one can meet this condition, but 
at this stage it is unclear whether in doing so one must worry about saving the 
assumption – implicitly grounding the postulation of ‘another act of sight’ at 425b15-
16 – that the inclusion of the visual (phenomenal) qualities of the detected act of 
seeing requires one to attribute to the ‘special’ self-detecting power the capacity to 
see. If this is the case, the only way to avoid the regress would be by theorizing a 
specially ‘enhanced’ ability to see, thence abiding by one of the following two options: 
either (i) we perceive that we see as sight, specially (and perhaps ad hoc) endowed 
with self-detecting abilities, perceive ‘seenRed’ by a single act of ‘enhanced’ vision 
(‘same sense’ horn, hypothesizing an act of ‘super’ vision rather than a simple 
‘seeing’); or (ii) perceiving that we see takes place by another, self-detecting sense, 
which will have to be endowed with the ability to see the colour underlying the 
detected act of vision same sense hypothesis (different sense horn, hypothesizing a 
second act of ‘super’ vision after the first ‘simple’ or ‘standard’ act of seeing).155 
It is exactly the concern about the theoretical possibility of seeing that we see, still 
open for someone willing to theorize an enhanced power of sight and act of vision, 
that motivates Aristotle to consider the problem concerning the colouration of what 
sees. He says: 
There is a problem: for if perceiving by sight is seeing, and one sees a color or 
what has it, then if a certain sense sees what is seeing, what is seeing must be 
coloured in the first place (425b17-20, ROT modified, my emphasis) 
According to the view Aristotle is evaluating, the ‘special’ sense invoked to elude the 
regress is seeing the detected act of vision. In this model, perception of seeing must 
work by the same mechanism of causal interaction with visible objects belonging to 
normal vision (in the ‘enhanced sight’ model, this must happen while providing an 
additional piece of information). The mechanism at issue, which equally characterizes 
all cases of per se perceiving, requires that in order to perceive F a special sense must 
                                                             
155 When Aristotle observes that, for the sake of simplicity and economy, the best 
explanation would attribute this power to ‘the first’ sense (ὥστ’ ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο 
ποιητέον, 425b17), he is therefore meaning the ‘first’ in the series: the first of postulated 
senses, if another sense is needed, or (the by now ‘enhanced’) sight itself, if no other sense 
is needed. 
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be causally interacting with an F-subject: we perceive red by causal interaction with a 
red subject, e.g. a red tomato.156  
Aristotle proceeds by critically remarking that the mechanism at work in seeing is not 
adequate to account for all instances of perceptual activity, even if we limit ourselves 
to sight:  
Well, to be sure ‘to perceive by sight’ has more than one meaning; for even 
when we are not seeing, it is by sight that we discriminate darkness from light, 
though not in the same way as we distinguish one colour from another 
(425b20-22, ROT modified)157 
Aristotle is here stressing that there are cases in which perception of a certain content 
cannot be due to the mechanism of ‘perceiving F by causal interaction with F-subjects’, 
which is at work in seeing (and hearing, etc.). In experiences like perceiving darkness 
or silence, there obviously are no causally powerful F-subjects corresponding to the F 
content being perceived. As we perceive darkness, our sight is not causally interacting 
with anything visible, and rather perceiving a certain content because of the lack of it. 
The fact that Aristotle says that as we perceive darkness by sight we are not seeing is, 
therefore, a confirmation that his point consists in calling attention to the presence of 
a different type of perceptual activity, which arguably postulates a different type of 
perceptual power. 
Having secured on independent grounds the existence of the activity of perceiving F 
without interacting with an F-subject, Aristotle can now directly attack the 
assumption that grounded the regress-implying hypothesis of ‘another sensation of 
sight’, namely the idea that since the underlying colour must be perceived as we 
perceive that we see, then we can only perceive that we see by seeing the supposedly 
visible colour included in the detected act of vision. He observes that  
in addition, it is in a certain way that what sees is coloured; for in each case the 
sense-organ is receptive of the perceptible item without the matter (425b22-24, 
my translation) 
The above remark concerning the colour that ‘tinges’ the capacity of sight that is at 
work in seeing enforces the necessity of a special type of perceptual power, different 
                                                             
156 More precisely, for Aristotle one must interact with an actually perceptible F-subject. 
This requires, for instance, that an indeterminate and actually transparent body (such as 
air or water in presence of fire) affected by the visible source object ‘mediates’ the 
interaction between the latter and the sense organ of sight. This further complication will 
be ignored here, as it does not affect any aspect of my reconstruction. 
157 As Osborne (1983:402, note 7) notes, the word τοίνυν introducing the remark at 
425b20 (rendered as ‘well, to be sure’ in the above translation) does not indicate a 
conclusion, but rather a rejoinder. 
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from the one involved in seeing.158 Aristotle is willing to admit here that the reception 
of forms without matter coincides with some sort of colouration of what sees. 
However, as established in the analysis of DA II 12 (424a17-28), forms without matter 
are causally powerless abstract items, and the described operation of perceiving 
‘SeenRed’ cannot accordingly amount to seeing, nor take place by causal interaction 
with something that is visibly red, i.e. as red as a tomato, or even as the transparent 
medium affected by it. 159  
The reference to the reception of matterless forms confirms the interpretation of the 
UCI requirement offered early, in so far as the special colouration Aristotle is hinting 
at here seems to coincide with what we would describe today as the phenomenal 
quality of vision (the subjectively experienced qualia).160 Aristotle is here stressing 
                                                             
158 As Johansen (2005:245-248) notes, it is unlikely that τὸ ὁρῶν ('what sees') indicates 
here the activity of seeing, as Caston's reading requires. In terms of meaning, it makes 
sense to say that sight has colour as it is seeing, but not that the act of seeing itself has 
colour, as Johansen's comparison with a fence being painted shows (2005:246: 'the fence 
becomes colored in the act or activity of being painted, but it is not the act of being painted 
that has the color'). Further, the use of the neuter participle with definite article instead of 
the infinite with definite article is unusual in classical Greek literature (Johansen, 247 
notes that 'Caston quotes no examples from Aristotle and I am aware of none') and 'even 
in the unlikely eventuality that Aristotle was using the idiom, it would still be unsuited to 
supporting an activity reading rather than a capacity reading', since ‘it would still retain, 
according to Denniston, a reference to the part or the whole of the person in its activity of 
seeing, that is to say the faculty or the person seeing' (Johansen, 2005:247-248). 
159 I am therefore in disagreement with Kosman (1975:512). Assuming that perceiving 
that we see indicates the (non-reflective) intrinsic consciousness belonging to first-order 
perceiving, he explains that since 'awareness is by sight, it will be seeing, and since what 
we see is colored, its object will be colored. (...) then (...) that which sees at the eyeball or 
retina (...) will have to be colored. Aristotle (...) offers two possible responses. (1) (...) not 
all perception by sight is seeing. (...) (2) (...) that which sees is in a sense colored, since the 
sense organ takes on the sensible form without the matter'. Similarly Osborne (1983:402) 
comments that here Aristotle ‘questions whether there is any difficulty in supposing that it 
is a case of seeing, and hence of seeing colour, in that it has been argued that that which is 
seeing is, in a way, coloured and hence could itself be seen’. In the same direction, 
Johansen (2005:251) notes that '[w]hat is required is a notion of being colored that would 
allow a) for the sense organ itself to be perceptible by being so colored and b) for the color 
to remain in the sense organ after the departure of the external sense object', arguing that 
both the literalist and spiritualist readings are up to the task. In his view (2005:267) the 
colouration ‘suggests that there is color available for second-order vision whenever we 
are engaged in first-order vision. So whenever I see a colored object before me, that color 
will itself be impressed on my sense-organ and therefore my sense organ can itself be 
seen, as colored’.  
160 I therefore largely agree with Caston's (2002:788-791) observations about the 
phenomenal quality of experience we can attribute to Aristotle on the ground of the 
passage. Being perceived, but not seen, the 'coloured' act of vision must be perceptible in a 
different way than a visible object (thence, unlike a sense-datum theorist, Aristotle is not 
theorizing that 'our experience contains objects that possess perceptible qualities quite 
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that sight engaged in seeing Red is not visible as a red tomato. In fact, the ‘Red’ item 
received by sight through causal interaction with the tomato’s visible Red is not an 
equally causally powerful replica of the latter. The sense of sight, our ‘mind’ as it were, 
is ‘coloured’ only in a certain way. We would say ‘epiphenomenally’ and ‘subjectively’; 
Aristotle says ‘in so far as what it is received are forms without the matter’. 
Since perceiving that ‘Red’ is being seen without causally interacting with a red subject 
is not only possible, but in fact necessary, the activity of ‘perceiving that we see’, 
understood in light of the UCI requirement, postulates a type of power that access an 
F-content without causally interacting with an F-subject. The inclusion of the causally 
powerless qualia characterizing the detected act of seeing, then, requires that seeing 
and sight are different in kind from the perceptual activity and power responsible for 
perceiving that we see. More precisely, both the activities ad powers involved in 
cognizing ‘Red’ and ‘seenRed’ are perceptual, in so far as in both cases we have a 
reception of perceptible forms without the matter; but in one case F is received by 
causal interaction with an F-subject, while in the other F is received without causally 
interacting with an F-subject. One is therefore compelled to reject, rather than to 
endorse, the assumption on which the antecedent of the regress was based (i.e. that 
we perceive that we see by a further act of seeing). Any argument insisting that sight 
and second-order seeing are necessary to perceive that we see, on the assumption 
that the visual qualia characterizing the detected act of vision can only be perceived 
by seeing, would therefore be seriously mistaken. 
The remark about perceiving darkness by sight, together with the invocation of the 
thesis that items received by senses are matterless (and thence causally powerless) 
forms, effectively rejects all the versions of idea that perceiving that we see consists in 
seeing that we see, including its (so far) surviving regress-avoiding versions, based on 
the postulation of an ‘enhanced’ act of vision. Not only a simple vision has to be 
excluded (the cost would be a regress), then, but also any kind of vision of the first, 
original-qualia-inclusive act of vision. Aristotle’s final aporia about the colouration of 
what sees shows that the required activity cannot consist in a ‘seeing plus’, so to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
literally'). Caston appropriately notes (2002:791) that 'Aristotle can thus agree with the 
intentionalist that nothing other than perceptible objects need literally have the 
perceptible qualities in question. But he can also agree with the proponent of qualia that 
the phenomenal character of our experiences outruns their representational content. His 
view thus cuts down the middle of another alleged dichotomy'. 
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speak, but must rather be due to a type of perception that cannot at all be a ‘seeing’ of 
any sort. 
6. The power and mechanism by which we perceive that we see and hear 
6.1 The power of perceiving per accidens belonging to all senses, rather than 
sight qua sight, is responsible for perceiving that we see. 
Once the reasoning of DA III 2 is understood as arguing for the impossibility of seeing 
that we see, the power to perceive by accidens Aristotle discussed in DA III 1 (and 
already mentioned in DA II 6) appears as the most suitable candidate for the the role 
of perceiving that we see. Aristotle describes as ‘accidental perception’  
the perception of Cleon’s son, where we perceive him not as Cleon’s son but as 
white, and the white thing happens to be Cleon’s son (425a25-27, ROT) 
and it is arguable that the latter operation is performed by the same mechanism I 
proposed for ‘perceiving that we see’: the perceived content F (‘Cleon’s son’) is 
accessed without causal interaction with the F aspect of an F-subject, since what we 
are causally interacting with is another aspect (i.e., whiteness).  
Some lines below in (III 1, 425a30-425b3), Aristotle mentions the fact that sight can 
perceive per accidens a taste (and in general that ‘the senses perceive each other’s 
special objects accidentally’), leading one to believe, for instance, that the yellow thing 
we see, being bile, is bitter. The mechanism Aristotle is hinting at is the same by which 
we perceive the bitterness of an unripe banana by seeing its green colour. In such 
cases, a content F (in our example, ‘bitter’) is once again accessed without any causal 
interaction with the F of an F-subject (the bitterness of the green thing we see). 
Generally speaking, then, Aristotle seems to have in mind the following distinction: 
– perceiving F per se = F is perceived by means and because of direct causal 
interaction with some F-subject 
– perceiving F per accidens = F is perceived, but not by means and because of 
direct causal interaction with some F-subject’s F161 
                                                             
161 The classification is valid regardless of a possible distinction between contents that are 
accidentally perceived on a particular occasion and with regard to a certain sense, and 
contents that are instead always perceived per accidens. In the first group we would have 
those objects that are not accidentally perceptible absolutely speaking, since they can also 
be perceived per se in other occasions by some other sense. Examples would include the 
bitter flavour perceived by sight, or the master perceived by his dog, as the latter hears the 
sound of the keys in the door as its master is opening it. In the second group we would 
Chapter 4 — 
 115 
In consideration of the fact that – as we know from the aporia about colouration of 
sight– when we perceive ‘seenRed’ we are entertaining a content F that is not in fact 
perceived by causal interaction with an F-subject, the perceptual power responsible 
for the perception that we see, then, is the ability to perceive per accidens introduced 
earlier to explain how a sense can perceive another sense’s proprietary object or 
aspects like ‘being Cleon’s son’.  
The power of perceiving per accidens is crucially important in the economy of 
Aristotle’s theory of perception as a whole. Aristotle’s argument (exposed in DA III 2, 
426b8-427a14) that on the one hand, a single thing cannot moved at the same time by 
contrary movements, while on the other it must be a single thing that says whether ‘F 
and G’ forms a unity or not (there would be no such judgment if two separate subjects 
perceive ‘F’ [alone] and ‘G’ [alone] respectively), does in fact appear manageable only 
if one abandons the scheme of per se perception (which would require perceiving F 
and G simultaneously and by a single sensor by an impossible simultaneous causal 
interaction between them), to embrace the one characterizing perception per 
accidens. Therefore, it is arguable that it is thanks to this power that we access the 
cross-modal activity necessary to perceive external perceptible objects in their 
complexity, i.e. as single wholes endowed with properties that are hearable, tangible, 
visible, etc. 
It must be noted, however, that while cross-modal perception requires perception per 
accidens as a precondition the converse does not hold. When Aristotle insists that 
perception per accidens only takes place as the senses work ‘as one’, what he is talking 
about is the capacity each sense has to (accidentally) perceive another sense’s 
proprietary objects (DA III 1, 425a30-425b3).162 And there seems to be no reason to 
think that any similar ‘unification’ of cross-modal contents is necessary to perceive 
that we see or hear.163 
                                                                                                                                                                          
instead find those objects that cannot be perceived in any case by the mechanism of per se 
perception, like the relation ‘being son of’ or more generally ‘being relative of’. 
162 It is far from clear what type of physical or metaphysical unity between the senses 
Aristotle is having in mind here, and how it is achieved. I shall not even try to sketch an 
interpretation of this difficult aspect of his theory here.  
163 I therefore agree with Johansen (2005:260) as he observes that perceiving that we see 
and hear ‘will generally qualify as a form of accidental perception’, but the reasons he 
gives distinguish his view from mine. In his view, the perception is accidental because it 
involves ‘attributing this color to one' s own sense of sight’, or locating it in one’s own 
sense faculty (on account of the fact that accidental perception is involved in saying where 
the coloured thing is, cf. II 6, 418a16). Perceiving that we see is then analogous, for 
Johansen, to discriminating sweet from white (which postulates a unification that cannot 
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While sight itself, as opposed to the five senses’ cooperative unity, is endowed with 
the power to perceive that we see, it would be mistaken to state that such power 
belongs to ‘sight qua sight’. The reason can be appreciated by reflecting on the 
difference between the latter and the activity of perceiving ‘common’ perceptible 
aspects. In perceiving a ‘common’ perceptible aspect like the shape of a tomato, two 
senses (e.g., sight and touch) perceive the same content by two different powers, each 
exclusively belonging to each of the two different senses.164 On the contrary, in the 
case of perceiving ‘seenRed’ by sight and ‘heardMiddle C’ by hearing, the two senses 
perceive two different contents by the same power (i.e., the power to perceive per 
accidens), which belong to both of them in the same way. Each sense has the very 
same, generic power to (accidentally) perceive its own activity, and it would therefore 
be wrong to say that we perceive that we see by sight qua sight. 
The denial that we see that we see found in Aristotle’s De Somno is hardly surprising in 
view of the interpretation of DA III 2 I offered. Aristotle says that 
 every sense has something special and also something common; special, as, e.g., 
seeing is to the sense of sight, hearing to the auditory sense, and so on with the 
other senses severally; while all are accompanied by a common power, in virtue 
whereof a person perceives that he sees or hears (for by sight one certainly 
does not see that he sees; and still discriminate it); also, it is not by taste, or 
sight, or both together that one can discern that sweet things are different from 
white things, but by a part common to all the organs of sense; for there is one 
sensory function, and the controlling sensory organ is one, though differing as a 
faculty of perception in relation to each genus, e.g., sound or colour) (Somn. 
455a13-22, ROT modified, my emphasis)165 
The first claim shows the existence of the power of perceiving that we see or hear, 
belonging to each and every sense, but different from the power that is specifically 
                                                                                                                                                                          
be carried out by sight and taste themselves, although clearly requiring both), since it 
requires the unification of ‘that we see’ and ‘Red’ (ibid., 270-273).  
164 The case of perceiving common perceptible aspects does not require a unified 
embracement of contents simultaneously accessed by multiple sensory parts. As Aristotle 
says, perception of common perceptibles is a case of per se perception that follows from 
perceiving changes in proprietary objects (DA III 1, 425a14-20, 27-29, b5-6). As a 
consequence, a single sensory part in rapid movement is arguably enough to scan the 
entire perceptual field it has access to, and register a pattern of different proprietary 
objects (image a single retinal cell scanning the visual field, thus perceiving limits and 
shapes of differently coloured areas by registering the changes in the colours composing 
the scene). 
165 It is worth giving the Greek for lines 455a17-20, where I modified the Revised Oxford 
Translation: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ, καὶ κρίνει δὴ καὶ δύναται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερα 
τὰ γλυκέα τῶν λευκῶν οὔτε γεύσει οὔτε ὄψει οὔτε ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλά τινι κοινῷ μορίῳ τῶν 
αἰσθητηρίων ἁπάντων. 
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exclusive to each and thence ‘common’ to all.166 The further remark about cross-modal 
perception involved in discerning white things from sweet things does instead reveal 
that all the senses are in fact modalities of a unitary system.167  
6.2 Lack of causal interaction with perceived F does not entail de-physiologized 
spiritualism  
It is important to note the interpretation I offer does not imply that we perceive that 
we see without any causal interaction whatsoever, and thence by some sort of ‘magic’ 
which would abide by the de-physiologized account proposed by modern Spiritualists. 
In fact, the interpretation I propose only excludes that we perceive that we see by 
means of the same mechanism which characterizes all kinds of per se perception 
(including both proprietary objects like sounds and colours and common objects like 
shapes), i.e. by means of a causal interaction between the sense organ perceiving F 
and the causally powerful F of an F-subject actually affecting it. It is intuitively clear 
that the lack of this particular type of causal mechanism does not entail the lack of any 
causal mechanism and underlying physical process. As we ‘accidentally’ perceive 
unripe bananas as bitter by seeing their green colour (or the knife as hard and sharp 
by observing the visual qualities of its material and shape), we are perceiving some F 
but no causally powerful F in an F-subject is affecting our sense organs; but nothing 
                                                             
166 I thence agree with Caston’s a distinction of powers and activities involved in 
perceiving that we see. As he says (2002:779) ‘it no more follows that we perceive that we 
see by sight than it follows that we see that we see. Aristotle always asserts that we 
perceive that we see, never that we see that we see. In so far as this sort of awareness is 
common to all perception, Aristotle is right to ascribe it to the perceptual capacity as a 
whole in On Sleep and Waking (2, 455a15-22 )—it is not something vision possesses in so 
far as it is specifically the activity of sight. The perceptual system sees in virtue of its visual 
part. But it perceives that it sees in virtue of the nature of perception more generally (cf. 
On Perception and Perceptibles 7, 449a10-11,a18-22)'. Having in mind the ἐν παρέργῳ 
awareness of Metaph. XII 9, 1075a36 (a secondary and indirect awareness, for Caston), he 
also notes (2002:787) that '[t]he awareness that accompanies all perception is not the 
primary function of a second sense, according to Aristotle, but a secondary function of the 
primary ones’. 
167 I therefore slightly depart from Johansen’s (2005:270-273) explanation of the 
compatibility between DA and Somn., which seems rather based on the assumption 
(which I deny, cf. note 163 above) that ‘seenRed’ requires a unification of contents similar 
to that involved in discriminating ‘White’ from ‘Sweet’. In Johansen’s view, both operations 
equally require common sense, which he describes not a sixth sense but as the unity of the 
five senses (cf. ibid., p. 272: ‘he is not excluding that sight is involved in perceiving that we 
see; he is just saying that insofar as sight is involved it is not involved as a special sense, 
but rather by virtue of its integration with the other senses’). 
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implies or suggests that there are no causal interaction and physical processes going 
on in our perceptual apparatus. 
There is little doubt that Aristotle’s intuitions concerning the presence of physical 
processes underlying accidental perception are compatible with ours, but different 
cases should be distinguished, depending on whether the perception of F without 
causal interaction with F-subjects involves other cognitive powers, such as memory.  
The involvement of past experience and memory secures the existence of 
physiological processes in virtue of the Aristotle’s employment of images (φαντασίαι) 
in the explanation of such cognitive activities, since images are themselves 
‘movements’ resulting from the exercise of perceptual powers, resembling sensations 
and remaining in the sensory apparatus (DA III 3,428b27-429a8, cf. III 7, 431a15-19).  
Some circumstances in which accidental perception appears to involve no other 
faculty (like memory of past experience) requires a different mechanism, but they will 
equally be far from being ‘de-physiologized’. Aristotle’s preoccupation with the 
physiological aspects of phenomena that do not require neither the presence of an 
actual perceptible object nor images replacing them is evident in De Insomniis 2, 
where he considers after-images and perceptual illusions following the fixation of an 
intensely bright object. The explanation he offers is based on the assumption that 
internal affections can persist in sense organs after the departure of the external 
perceptible objects (459a24-b7). The mention of the impairing effect of excessively 
intense stimulation at the end of the passage (459 b20-23) suggests the persisting 
affections are those due to the agency of external perceptibles (as opposed to the 
counter-balancing ones reacting to them). Due to the perseverance of alterations, the 
sudden passage to a new stimulation is not accompanied by an equally quick ceasing 
of the old stimulation, especially when the persistence of the past stimulation is 
favoured by its being more powerful than the present one:  
when we shift the scene of our perceptive activity, the previous affection 
remains; for instance, when we have turned our gaze from sunlight into 
darkness. For the result of this is that one sees nothing, owing to the motion 
excited by the light still subsisting in our eyes. Also, when we have looked for a 
long while at one colour, e.g. at white or green, that to which we next transfer 
our gaze appears to be of the same colour. Again if, after having looked at the 
sun or some other brilliant object, we close the eyes, then, if we watch carefully, 
it appears in a right line with the direction of vision (whatever this may be), at 
first its own colour; then it changes to crimson, next to purple, until it becomes 
black and disappears. And also when persons turn away from looking at objects 
in motion, e.g. rivers, and especially those which flow very rapidly, things really 
at rest are then seen as moving (459b 8-20, ROT modified) 
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A different type of perceptual experience can be distinguished, which is wholly 
independent from external objects. In Sens. 2 (437a27-b10), Aristotle recognizes that 
in special circumstances even the physical features of the body are sufficient to 
produce an internal affection that makes the sense-organ perceptible to itself. This 
further corroborates the general point that an internal perceptible affection can exist 
in the absence of an actual external source-object corresponding to it, thus securing 
the possibility to perceive ‘by accident’ (i.e., to perceive F without interacting with a 
perceptible F-object), without entailing a magic ‘de-physiologized’ type of perception. 
 
Finally, what goes on in an organism capable of hearing that is awake in a perfectly 
silent room would likely be, for Aristotle, analogous to what goes on in an electrical 
recording system that is turned on and running. In such cases, he would likely concede 
that the mere ‘preservation’ of the receptive condition characterizing the system in 
the state of being ‘awake and ready’ already implies some physiological process. After 
all, according to the theory he exposes in De Somno, the contrary state of sleep and the 
subsequent awakening are caused by internal physical interactions that accompany 
nutrition and digestion. Conversely, the mere maintenance of the waking state of 
sense organs must equally require certain physical dispositions and interactions in 
the body, even in the absence of external stimulation characterizing the experience of 
silence or darkness. 
The perception of F with no causal interaction with F-subjects does not need to invoke 
‘magic’, nor is it a reason to re-introduce the modern de-physiologized versions of 
Spiritualism. In the interpretation I offered, it is the active dimension of perception on 
the physical level, namely the internal processes of homeostatic counterbalancing, 
that secure the possibility to perceive F. It is thanks to such processes that it is 
possible to perceive darkness by sight. Furthermore, as Aristotle states at the end of 
the aporia about the colouration of sight that concludes the passage on perceiving that 
we perceive in III 2  
That is why sensings and imaginings (αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι) are there in the 
sense-organs even when sensible objects are gone (425b24-25, my transl.) 
The point is again to invoke commonly experienced phenomena showing that 
perception of F is possible even in the absence of stimulation by an actually 
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perceptible F in an F-subject, as the perception of seenRed requires.168 In fact, the 
power to perceive per accidens, which is necessary to postulate to account for our 
perceiving that we see (and hear, etc.), is also what makes it possible for us to 
experience after-images, illusions and hallucination, as well as mental images.169 
Conclusions 
Aristotle’s investigation about the sense by which ‘we perceive that we see’ 
reasonably abides by the general requirement that qualia characterizing the first 
order act of perception must be included by the second order one, since this secures 
that we are in fact perceiving that we see (rather than coming to believe that we see by 
means of perceived indicators). The necessary inclusion of qualia peculiar to the first 
order perception, however, does not entail that the second order perception must be 
of the same type, so that, for instance, we would see that we see. First of all, if 
perception that red is being seen required a further simple act of seeing, the latter 
would be a mere replica of the first, and equally postulate a further act of seeing, and 
so on ad infinitum. Furthermore, the activity of perceiving that red is being seen 
cannot abide by the same mechanism by which sight sees visible objects, nor stem 
from the power of seeing that characterizes sight qua sight. Seeing that red is being 
                                                             
168 In my view, then, Aristotle is providing a robust argument rather that the merely 
tentative answers that Caston suggests (he comments [2002:790] that '[t]he claim that we 
have certain perceptual capacities that are not of perceptible qualities like azure is a 
welcome broadening of his account. But it is hardly enough to do the job'; further, he 
offers no substantial clarification about the argumentative role of the remarks about 
forms without the matter and persisting sensations and images, that he considers 'no 
more than gesture at an answer' [ibid.]). I therefore disagree with Osborne's reading as 
well, in so far as she believes (1983:402) that '[t]he paragraph as a whole surely remains 
inconclusive', and that 'Aristotle observes that it is because the sense-organ receives the 
form without the matter that there are perceptions and phantasiai in the sense-organs 
when the sense-objects are no longer present’, thus posing a ‘footnote’ that ‘seems to have 
little relevance to the matter in hand except that it raises the question of our awareness of 
our seeing when what we see is only a phantasia in the organ'. 
169 In the following section of DA III 2 (425b26- 424a26), Aristotle clarifies that every time 
a perceptible item interacts with a subject able to perceive it, their actualities are 
numerically one but still distinct with regard to their being. At 425a1-6, he seems to 
suggest that such a distinction leaves room for the possibility that the actuality of a sense 
can occur in the absence of a corresponding actuality of a perceptible object actually 
affecting it. He says: 
If it is true that the movement, i.e. the acting, and the being acted upon, is to be found 
in that which is acted upon, both the sound and the hearing so far as it is actual must 
be found in that which has the faculty of hearing; for it is in the passive factor that 
the actuality of the active or motive factor is realized; that is why it is not necessary 
that what causes movement moves (διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι). (ROT, 
modified, my emphasis). 
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seen is in fact impossible, since the act of seeing being detected, and the visual 
qualities characterizing them are not at all visible. Sight engaging in the activity of 
seeing a colour can be said to be ‘coloured’ only in so far as it has received an abstract 
content characterized by a mental ‘epiphenomenal’ quality. 
What Aristotle seems to have in mind as he speaks of ‘perceiving that we see’ is some 
sort of second-order perception of one’s perceptual activity that may or may not take 
place in a perceiving subject. The higher-order activity of ‘perceiving that we see or 
hear’ may still be supplying the lower-order one with ‘consciousness’, but it may be 
difficult to locate the type of consciousness Aristotle has in mind on the theoretial map 
drawn by contemporary distinctions on the subject. Nothing of what Aristotle says, 
not even the regress argument in DA III 2, inequivocably states or requires logical 
inseparability between ‘seeing’ and ‘perceiving that we see’; and if the two are in fact 
logically separable, the ‘consciousness’ at issue will not be something intrinsically 
belonging to every act of perception qua perception.170 Furthermore, Aristotle’s 
argument presupposes that the (second-order) perception of seeing finds (first-order) 
seeing already ‘poised’ (i.e., available and ready to be accessed) and endowed with a 
phenomenal ‘colouration’, and both aspects seem secured by the fact that seeing is a 
reception of matterless forms. As a consequence, if ‘perceiving that we see’ does in fact 
confer some type of ‘consciousness’ to first-order seeing, the latter will be neither 
‘phenomenal consciousness’, nor ‘access consciousness’, respectively characterizing 
the ‘colouration’ and the ‘being poised’ I just recalled. The only sense in which the 
higher order ‘perception of seeing’ might be said to make the first order seeing 
‘conscious’, then, is similar to that applying to a novice driver’s ‘attended’ vision of the 
unknown road he is travelling on, which thanks to the attention being paid is distinct 
from the ‘seeing’ characterizing an absent-minded expert driver coming home by a 
route she has been acquainted with for decades. It seems the interpretive choice about 
Aristotle’s ‘perceiving that we see’ remains open between the latter (i.e., the second-
order perception making first order attended perception ‘conscious’) and the 
hypothesis that perceiving that we see only indicates reflective self-consciousness 
                                                             
170 I am therefore sympathetic with Johansen's remark (2005:274) that Aristotle is not 
'offering either in DA III.2 or in De Somno 2 a general account of perceptual consciousness, 
if that is meant to explain also what makes first-order perception consciousness of objects 
in the world', but I disagree with his statement that Aristotle gives ‘an account of what, 
thanks to Ned Block, has become known as “access consciousness,” that is, the mechanism 
by which the contents of our mental state are available, or “poised,” for rational control, 
verbal report, and reasoning’ (ibid., 273-274). 
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(perceiving one’s own activity). To my understanding, nothing Aristotle says seem to 
justify a preference between the two. 
The reason why the activity of ‘perceiving that we see (or hear, etc.)’ attracted 
Aristotle’s activity seems rather to lay in its revealing that a perceptual power 
different from that involved in per se perception must be postulated. Since any 
perceptual content F supplied by per se perceiving is a causally powerless abstract 
item in the perceiver’s mind, the further perceptual activity that has it as its object 
cannot be based on the causal interaction with an F-subject. A perceptual power 
enabling us to perceive F without causally interacting with an F-subject must be 
postulated. In agreement with De Somno, the context of De Anima III 1-2 indicates that 
each of the senses possesses not only a per se power of perceiving proprietary and 
common perceptible items, but also the power to perceive per accidens. Such power 
belongs to each of the five senses in the same way, and it is therefore right to say that 
‘we perceive that we see’ by such a common power, rather than by sight qua sight (for 
we do not in fact see that we see).  
Aristotle’s reflection on the power responsible for ‘perceiving that we see’ has 
therefore the crucial importance of attesting the necessary introduction of the 
common power to perceive per accidens, which allows each sense to perform further 
perceptual operations on the contents provided by per se perception. Several 
operations cannot in fact be carried out by the mechanism of per se perceiving. 
Perceiving darkness and perceptually experiencing absent objects are an example, 
and resolution of the problems posed by the ‘grouping’ and ‘ungrouping’ 
discriminations of perceptible objects, which are clearly crucial to account for the 
richness and complexity of perceptual experience, are likely to involve the same 
mechanism. 
 
Chapter 5 - DA II 5: Self-Perceiving Sense-Organs 
and the Transitions to the Exercise of Perception 
 
In DA II 5, Aristotle begins the exposition of his own views about perception. He starts 
with the assumption that perception is an affection and a change, which recalls a 
thesis from earlier thinkers read in the light of his own natural philosophy. After 
presenting a problem concerning sense-organs’ self-activation and self-perception, he 
proceeds by promises a refinement of the analysis about potentiality and actuality 
with regard to perception. The treatment is conducted by examining the case of 
knowledge first, and then by applying the results of this examination to perception. In 
the course of his analysis, Aristotle establishes several fine-grained distinctions about 
changes and activities, and the chapter is often quoted in its capacity as a repository of 
distinctions about the subject. 
According to a classic reconstruction proposed by Ackrill (1965 [1997]: 161-162), DA 
II 5 distinguishes 'first-order’ and ‘second-order’ abilities (the latter being abilities to 
acquire the former), respectively exemplified in their actualization by learning and 
thinking (or perceiving). In this view, Aristotle’s point is that the acquisition of a first-
order ability amounts to a change, since the subject’s nature is developed by a process 
of acquisition that 'is a journey towards an end or a goal'. The actuality of a first-order 
ability would instead be the simple exercise of the subject’s nature. In other words, 
Aristotle would here be stressing that getting an ability is a κίνησις, while using it is 
not κίνησις, but an ἐνέργεια, without establishing whether the activity exercised is 
itself an ἐνέργεια or a κίνησις.171 In fact, one of the examples adopted in the chapter is 
that of a builder who begins building, and in this case the activity itself is clearly a 
κίνησις, even though the transition the builder undergoes as he exercises his skill is 
not a κίνησις. 
It is uncertain, however, if what DA II 5 ends up endorsing is in fact a peculiar version 
of the distinction between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια. As Barnes (1979:38) pointed out, the 
                                                             
171 This is not to say that such a scheme is not problematic when compared to the notion 
of κίνησις and ἐνέργεια elaborated elsewhere. In fact, the point of Ackrill’s analysis is to 
emphasize the peculiarity of DA II 5’s approach.  
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chapter seems rather aiming at the introduction of a notion of ‘special’ alteration, 
whose meaning remains obscure. In the same vein, Burnyeat (1992:19) noted that as 
a consequence of DA II 5 perception is not an ordinary change of the type described in 
the natural works. By attending to the details of the chapter through a long and 
astonishingly sophisticated analysis (Burnyeat 2002), he finds in it a distinction of two 
types of changes that prepares the grounds for the ‘spiritualist’ theory of perception 
he attributes to Aristotle in II 7-12. In Burnyeat’s view, Aristotle would discard in this 
chapter the notion of unqualified ἐνέργεια, to work out a distinction between ordinary 
(i.e. ‘destructive’ and featuring an opposition among termini) alteration and ‘non-
ordinary’ (preservative and developmental) alteration.  
In the general division between ‘spiritualist’ and ‘literalist’ interpretation, however, 
the distinctions set forth in DA II 5 have never proved to be decisive.172 In reaction to 
Burnyeat’s reconstruction, an alternative and equally thorough analysis of the chapter 
has been elaborated by Heinaman (2005), according to which no ‘non-ordinary’ 
alteration is being introduced here by Aristotle. In Heinaman’s view, the chapter is 
rather offering a series of distinctions about two kinds of transitions to the actuality of 
knowledge, followed by a different (and overlapping) one differentiating positive and 
negative affections.  
In this chapter, I propose my view concerning the debated issue of what De Anima II 5 
is really meant to establish, and how. I shall argue that the initial aporia about self-
perception and self-activation of the sense-organs cannot dismissed as easily as it is 
normally believed, and that what unifies the chapter as an organized series of 
distinctions is in fact the necessity to fully solve such aporia. In my view, the gist of the 
chapter is that there are two possible ways in which the power of perceiving can be 
activated, and thus two ways in which perception is exercised. In a first normal and 
‘direct’ activation, sense-organs do not become perceptible and thence cannot 
perceive themselves. However, a second type of activation is possible by an ‘indirect 
route’, which entails an actual affection and alteration making sense-organs 
                                                             
172 According to Everson (1997:89-96) the ‘special alteration’ distinguished in II 5 applies 
only to the shift from first to second actualities, and this is not decisive to prove whether 
or not there are further literal affection (what is decisive is for him only the very last 
statement in 418a5-6); on the other side, the ‘spiritualist’ Johansen (1998:269-271) 
speaks of a distinction between ‘quasi-alteration’ and ‘alteration’, but recognizes that the 
first takes place on the agent’s side in all ordinary changes. According to Johansen, a 
‘quasi-alteration’ does in fact take place on both the patient’s and the agent’s side, but he 
does not argue for this on the grounds of DA II 5, but by a specific analysis of the physical 
condition of perception. 
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perceptible to themselves. The existence of this two possible ‘routes’ to the exercise of 
perception explains why sense-organs do not normally perceive themselves, while 
leaving open the possibility that this can actually happen in particular circumstances. 
1. The Aporia about Self-Activation and Self-Perception of the Senses 
Aristotle begins the chapter with a very general statement that includes perception 
among affections and changes, justified by its being theorized as an alteration (a 
change in the category of quality, for Aristotle).173 He thence recalls the thesis held by 
some thinkers according to which affections take place only between similar things ( 
‘like is affected only by like’), and his own critical reception of it. In fact, for Aristotle 
himself affections take place between things that are actually similar on a generic 
level; however, a difference in actuality and a capacity of being similar are also 
required on the specific level (GC I 7, 323b29-324a9).  
Aristotle notes (417a2-3) that the idea of perception as change in quality and an 
affection entails a problem: if perceiving is an affection, and thus a ‘becoming like’ 
from the past ‘being actually unlike and potentially like’, sense-organs should become 
actually perceptible.174 If this is right, then why do we not perceive them every time 
we perceive? This is only part of the problem, though. Aristotle immediately adds a 
second one (417a3-5), asking why sense-organs do not start the perceptual process 
by themselves. The supposed rationale for the latter problem lays in the fact that 
sense-organs have their own perceptible aspects because of their physical 
constitution: as Aristotle says, they contain elements (fire, earth, etc.) that are – in 
                                                             
173 He says that perception συμβαίνει ἐν being affected (πάσχειν) and changed (κινεῖσθαι), 
echoing a thesis already presented DA I 5, 410a 25-26 (τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι καὶ 
κινεῖσθαι τιθέασιν), which (together with II 4, 415b24) is the target of the first backward 
reference (καθάπερ εἴρηται, 416b34, cf. Hicks [1907:350], Ross [1961:235], and Burnyeat 
[2002:33]). Burnyeat (2002: 35-40) stresses that it is only by assuming Aristotle’s own 
ideas (as presented in treatises like GC I 4 and Physics III 1, [esp. 200b 32-201a 3] and V 1-
2 and Cat. 14) that perception, as theorized by earlier thinkers, cannot be other than an 
affection and a qualitative change, i.e. an alteration. Aristotle does indeed associates the 
reported belief that we perceive like by like with the idea of perception as a qualitative 
change (I 2, 404b 17-18; 405b 15; I 5, 409b 26-8), perhaps because the involved ‘likeness’ 
tends to mean for Aristotle ‘sameness in quality’ (Cat. 8, 11a 15-19; cf. Met. V 9, 1018a 15-
18; 15, 1021a 11-12). 
174 Since we are told that the αἰσθήσεις contain elements, the meaning we have to choose 
among the possible ones is clearly ‘sensory organs’. Cf. Hicks (1907:351, quoting PA IV 10, 
686a8, Sens.3 440a19) and Ross (1961:235, adding Insomn. 459b8), who reports that this 
interpretation is embraced by Themistius (1899:54.23) and Philoponus (1867:291.3), and 
that Simplicius, who rejects it, attributes it to Alexander (it in fact appears in his Quaest., 
82.35-36). 
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themselves or in their properties– what perception is about.175 This second problem 
envisions an even more challenging situation, in which sense-organs are also able to 
trigger perceptual processes in a fully autonomous way, thus being able to perceive 
themselves by themselves, as a sort of diminished physical incarnation of the divine 
first mover.  
Aristotle has an easy time solving the second part of the aporia: 
To be sure, it is clear that what is capable to perceive is not in actuality, but only 
in potentiality. This is the reason why it does not perceive in the same way as 
what is ignitable does not ignite itself by itself without what is able to ignite; for 
it would ignite itself, and would not need what is in actuality fire (417a6-9) 
Invocation of the potentiality of the sense is sufficient to solve the latter part of the 
aporia, in so far as it explains why we do not perceive in the absence of external 
stimulation. The being in potentiality of the capacity implies that an agent in actuality 
is needed to trigger the activity of perception, and this is certainly part of what 
Aristotle has in mind in the comparison between the ignition of what is combustible 
and the act of perception. 
The explanatory efficacy of the remark about the potentiality of what perceives, 
however, is limited to the problem of self-activation. In fact, the remark is impotent 
against a version of the self-perception problem divorced by the endorsement of self-
activation, as in the hypothesis that we do perceive our sense organs when they are 
affected by external, actually perceptible objects. As Aristotle himself suggests, the 
potentiality of the sense can only explain why an organ is not perceiving ‘in the same 
way as what is ignitable does not ignite itself by itself without what is able to ignite’. 
As a consequence, the initial condition triggering the process must certainly be in 
place. However, one can still argue that once the activation has taken place sense-
organs should be able to perceive themselves, pretty much in the same way as a fire 
keeps burning what is ignitable by itself after having been fired up. In my view, then, it 
                                                             
175 Aristotle is here leaving open the question whether what perception is about are the 
elements themselves, or just their (essential – or non-essential) attributes. I see no reason 
why the neutrality he shows here should perplex us, but commentators try to 
accommodate it with the following chapter’s (DA II 6) discussion, where Aristotle speaks 
of qualities without mentioning elements. Some scholars think the alternative posed here 
is between perception elements’ essential (καθ'αὑτά) and accidental properties (cf. Hicks, 
351, who quotes Philoponus [295, 3-8], Simplicius [118, 23] and Sophonias [63,33-35]); 
others (Burnyeat, 2002:40) take both the disjuncts as an expression of earlier thinkers’ 
doctrines he is criticizing. At any rate, in my view Aristotle immediately solves this part of 
the problem and focus on the harder one posed in the first part. This makes the question 
of the compatibility with II 6 less than pressing.  
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would be wrong to claim that these lines are sufficient to wholly solve the aporia about 
the perception of the sense-organs, and Aristotle’s illustration of the fire burning its 
combustible shows he is fully aware of this.  
That there is no reason why Aristotle should discard a priori the possibility that sense-
organs are affecting and perceiving themselves is clear in light of his own ideas about 
self-change and self-motion, expounded in Physics VIII. 176 All is needed for self-
change is a distinction between what changes (or moves, or affects) and what is 
changes (or moved, or affected) internal to the self-changer.177 The distinction does 
not necessarily have to be restricted to physical parts: in DA III 10 (433b13-21) 
Aristotle distinguishes the desired object and the desiring power as moving, and the 
physical organs involved in the transmission of motion as moved. Concerning a 
sensory organ like the eye, however, he can actually deal with self-change by invoking 
a physical partition, as he distinguishes at least three physical parts of the eye: the 
κόρη (the pupil or the jelly posterior chamber of the eye), ‘the white’ (our sclera) and 
‘the dark’ (our iris). Among these, only the κόρη is properly capable to perceive178.  
Aristotle’s does in fact acknowledge that in at least some cases sense-organs perceive 
themselves. He noticeably describes a similar experience in Sens., 437a 22 ff. , where 
he admits that in certain circumstances an eye sees itself. He states that this happens 
when we are in darkness (Sens., 437a 24-26) and is due to the smoothness of the black 
                                                             
176 In Burnyeat’s view (2002: 39 n.31; cf. the approving remark by Caston 2005:287, note 
90), it is a corollary of GC I 7 that ‘an organic unity cannot be affected by itself (Met. IX 1, 
1046a 28; cf. Ph. VIII 4, 255a 12-15)’, and this entails a difficulty about the sense-organs in 
the ‘like by like’ thesis: if like were affected by like, sense organs would be self-activating 
and continually perceive themselves without any need for external stimulation. The 
parallel Burnyeat makes between the general difficulty of GC I 7 and the specific one of DA 
II 5, however, seems to underestimate some important differences. To be sure, in GC I 7 
(323b 18-29), Aristotle points out that if like were affected by like, then every thing would 
continually affect itself, and therefore nothing would be indestructible and unchangeable. 
The absurd consequence in GC, however, is only that there would be nothing that is 
unchangeable since all the things would always be changing themselves. This is quite 
different from the arguably tenable implication that a particular ‘changeable’ thing, be it 
the sense or the sensory organ, would sometimes be able to change itself by itself, 
provided that the appropriate relation among its parts occurs, and in accordance to 
Aristotle’s views about self-motion in Phys. VIII. 
177 Cf. Phys. VIII 4, 254b 14-33 and 5, 258a22-27. As a consequence, elements, that are 
homogeneous and continuous, cannot be self-movers (Phys. VIII 4, 255a 5-10). For a 
classic treatment of the tensions between the claim that animal are self-movers (cf. DA III 
9-11) and the denial that they are, absolutely speaking, self-movers (cf. Phys. VIII 2, 
253a11-21; 6, 259b1-16) see Furley (1978). 
178 Cf. HA, 491b 21 ff. ; PA, 653b 25; Sens., 438b 15 ff. On the identification of the κόρη with 
the internal eye-jelly cf. Sorabji (1992:209-210) and Lloyd (1978: 218, 220-221). 
Chapter 5 — 
 128 
and the middle part of the eye.179 This property allows things to shine in darkness 
(Sens., 437a 31-b 1), and when the shining takes place while the eye is moving quickly, 
the eye becomes ‘as two’ (Sens., 437b 1-3), to the effect that a difference between what 
sees and what is seen becomes apparent (Sens., 437b 3-4). Against the claim that this 
experience supports the idea of a fiery composition of the eye, Aristotle eventually 
stresses that this phenomenon is analogous to looking at our eyes reflected in a 
mirroring surface (Sens., 437b 9-10). 
The limitation of sense-organs’ self-perception to exceptional circumstances appears 
problematic, however, for at this stage in DA one may in fact argue that sense-organs 
should always become actually perceptible, and thence perceive themselves, after the 
interaction with actually perceptible objects by which they normally perceive. The 
‘generic’ similarity and ‘specific’ dissimilarity necessary for causal interaction are in 
place not only in the case of sense organs and perceptible objects, but also inside the 
sense organs themselves. Sense-organs are, in Aristotle’s view, made of the same 
material as the external media corresponding to them, and accordingly they should in 
fact undergo affections that make them perceptible as a result of their interaction with 
them. Take the case of sight for instance: both the external media and sense organs 
are made of indeterminate transparent bodies like air of water, which in presence of 
fire is suitable to be affected by colours to the effect of becoming visible. In the 
interaction between the medium and the organ, then, it is reasonable (but in fact 
wrong, in light of the counterbalancing physiology I reconstructed in chapters 1-2 of 
the present work) to expect that the organ becomes as visible as the external media. 
The problem may then be raised for Aristotle himself: why do we not perceive our 
own eyes, if they are made of the same elements as the external media that are 
actually visible, and affected by them in a way that is suitable to make themselves 
perceptible?180 
                                                             
179 Aristotle says ‘the black and the middle (μέσον)’. Lloyd (1978:231, note 13) notices 
that since by ‘middle’ Aristotle usually describes the κόρη, and by ‘the black’ the iris, the 
καί cannot be explanatory. While I certainly agree with Lloyd about Aristotle’s technical 
use of the clause, I believe it is still possible that ‘the middle’ is here used as an (admittedly 
confusing) non-technical description of the iris as what is in the middle between the white 
and the κόρη.  
180 There is an evident discrepancy between ‘transparent’ perception of external objects 
(as opposed to the perception of our own organs) we commonly experience, and the 
‘becoming perceptible’ of sense-organs one can arguably expect (in consideration of their 
composition and the interaction between them and actually perceptible objects and 
media), and it is only in virtue of this discrepancy that sense-organ’s self-perception 
becomes problematic. In other words, the claim that sense-organs perceive themselves 
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The persistence of the aporia about self-perceiving sense-organs appears confirmed 
by the following passage (417a9-14), which (according to one of the possible readings 
of the uncertain Greek text) reads 
But since we speak of ‘perceiving’ in two ways - for we say that the one 
potentially seeing and hearing ‘sees’ or ‘hears’, both if it is by chance sleeping, 
and if he is already exercising the activity – then one should speak in two ways 
also of the ‘sense’ – the one as <seeing and hearing> in potentiality, the other as 
<seeing and hearing> in actuality – and in the same way also of the ‘perceptible’ 
– the one being in potentiality and the one in actuality181 
The point seems to be that in correspondence to actual perceiving and potential or 
‘dormant’ perceiving we should not only speak of the actuality and potentiality of the 
sense, but also of the actuality and potentiality of the perceptible. This suggests that a 
distinction between the actual and potential perceptibility of sense-organs becomes 
possible, thus allowing one to argue that sense-organs are potentially (but not yet 
actually) perceptible to themselves in the absence of incoming stimulation by external 
objects, while actually perceptible to themselves after their interaction with (and 
being affected by) external objects. 
My conclusion is that there are logical and textual grounds to believe that Aristotle 
must be taking the aporia more seriously than it is commonly observed.182 Otherwise, 
he would be committing the ridiculous inaccuracy of raising a difficulty he himself 
leaves unsolved. The appeal to the potential state of the capacity to perceive is only 
                                                                                                                                                                          
only becomes absurd if we take into account our common experience about what senses 
and sensory organs can and cannot do. What has to be explained, then, is the reason why, 
as we all know, sense-organs are not normally perceiving themselves as they perceive.  
181 The reading αἰσθητόν was proposed by Torstrik on the basis of Alexander (Quaest. 
83,6, cf. Hicks' apparatus, 70-71 and p. 352 ad loc.), and accepted by Ross (235), who notes 
that τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι (attested also by Themistius, Simplicius and Philoponus) is clearly 
wrong. In fact, the MSS’s reading (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τό τε δυνάμει ὂν καὶ τὸ 
ἐνεργείᾳ) is clearly redundant, and thence considered suspicious by Trendelenburg and 
bracketed by Biehl and Rodier (cf. Hicks, who keeps the MSS reading, but qualifies the 
clause as a ‘strange piece of carelessness’).  
182 The passage is treated as Aristotle’s proposed solution to the whole aporia by Hicks 
(1907: 350-351), Ross (1961: 233), Johansen (1998: 71) and Hamlyn (1968: 99-100), who 
complains about its obscurity. Everson (1997: 90) seems to think that the aporia does not 
deserve much more than a passing mention (‘after a brief discussion of the problem of 
why we do not perceive the senses themselves'). Burnyeat (2002: 39-40) sees the whole 
aporia as a criticism of thinkers who endorsed the theory that we perceive like by like (he 
notes that the theory that we perceive like by like is associated with the claim that soul is 
composed by elements in I 2, 404b 8ff. and I 5, 409b 23ff., esp.410b 22). In my view, the 
criticism (which would be superfluous, in view of the earlier one offered in I 5, 410a 23-
26, quoted by Burnyeat himself) leaves untouched the first part of the problem, that must 
still be valid even if the outcome of the interaction between sense-organs and perceptible 
objects were – as Burnyeat proposes – a ‘quasi-alteration’. 
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sufficient to solve the second part of the difficulty, but it certainly not enough with 
regard to the more general question of why sense-organs do not perceive themselves. 
2. Knowledge-related transitions: a model for the refined doctrine of potentiality and 
actuality  
With a resolutely consequential fresh start (aptly announced by πρῶτον μὲν οὖν at 
417a14) Aristotle declares his intention to ignore in the forthcoming reflection his 
own distinction between imperfect ἐνέργεια (i.e. κίνησις) and unqualified ἐνέργεια.183 
The claim that even (καὶ, read as concessive) κινήσεις are ἐνέργειαι, familiar for 
readers of Phys. III 1-3, invokes the right to make this preliminary simplification.184 
While we do not yet know whether we are going to meet κινήσεις or unqualified 
ἐνέργειαι or both, then, we can safely assume that we will deal with such events 
regardless of their distinction.185 
First of all, then, let us speak as being changed, being affected and actual 
exercising186 are the same thing: for change is a kind of activity, albeit imperfect, 
as it as been said in other <writings> (417a14-17) 
The first thing Aristotle does after assuming this point of view is recalling the relevant 
doctrines about the ἐνέργεια of the patient. He reminds us of the necessity of an agent 
that is already in actuality, and of the way the agent and the patient are on one hand 
similar and on the other dissimilar (417a17-20). He then proceeds by declaring the 
necessity of further distinctions about potentiality and actuality (417a21-22). As he 
explains (γάρ, a 22), we are currently speaking (λέγομεν) about them ἁπλῶς, i.e. ‘in a 
simple, undifferentiated way’.187 The point Aristotle makes here, read bearing in mind 
                                                             
183 If we were to assume, along the lines of the standard interpretation, that Aristotle 
already solved the aporia, he would initiate here the treatment of a new topic in a pretty 
abrupt and perplexing way. Hicks (1907: 352) reads the passage, together with the 
following 417a17-20, as a 'preliminary note on action and passivity', but it is still unclear 
what is in his view the relevance of such a note. Burnyeat (2002: 41, n.34) believes that 
‘the argument takes a new turn’, whose goal is to provide refined notion of alteration, 
radically different from the ordinary physical one. 
184 As scholars normally notes commenting on the first cross-reference (καθάπερ ἐν 
ἑτέροις εἴρηται, a17), Aristotle defines κίνησις as the ἐνέργεια of the potentiality qua 
potentiality in Phys. III (1, 201a27-29), where he also deals with the idea of κίνησις as an 
imperfect ἐνέργεια (2, 201b 26-202a 3, cf. DA III 7, 431a6-7).  
185 To this end, it is not necessary to think that the notion of perfect ἐνέργεια is here 
absorbed and nullified by the notion of κίνησις. On this aspect, I therefore agree with by 
Heinaman’s (2007 : 184, n. 69) critical remarks against Burnyeat (2002:47). 
186 Burnyeat (2002:46, n.48) wisely recommends to avoid 'activity' as a translation for 
ἐνεργεῖν, since perception is passive (it is a case of πάσχειν), quoting Met. IX 8, 1050a 22-
3. 
187 On the interpretation of the expression ‘we are speaking ἁπλῶς’, cf. the useful remarks 
in Hicks (1907: 354) and Burnyeat (2002:47- 48). 
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the still pending aporia about sense organs, already suggests the direction of his 
enquiry in DA II 5: the being in potentiality related to sense-organs and their being 
perceptible is a notion in need of further specifications. 
Aristotle now explains (cf. the introductory γάρ at 417a22) the declared necessity to 
abandon the initial ‘simple way of speaking’ by examining different stages of 
potentiality and actuality in the case of knowledge (417a 22-28). He begins by 
demarcating two ways in which we attribute the qualification ‘knower’ (ἐπιστῆμόν). 
In a first way, we say that a certain person is a ‘knower’ because ‘human being’ (ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος, a 23-24) belongs to the class of subjects that are such qua ‘endowed with 
knowledge’ (the καί in a24 being explanatory). In a different way, we say that a person 
is ‘already’ (ἤδη, a 25) a knower qua possessing a certain expertise, for instance the 
ability to read and write (τὴν γραμματικήν). The distinction is then rehearsed in terms 
of two respective modes (τρόποι, cf. a26) of ‘being capable’ (δυνατός): a first due to 
the genus the subject belongs to and ‘the matter’ (ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη);188 
and a second due to the fact that the person can ‘contemplate’ whenever she wishes, if 
not impeded. The theme of contemplating returns immediately in the final description 
of a third case, in which a subject is ‘already’ (another ἤδη, a27) engaged in 
contemplation (θεωρῶν, a 28). The latter is for Aristotle the principal and most proper 
sense (κυρίως, a28) in which one can be a ‘knower’. 
 Up to this point, then, Aristotle offers a distinction between two potentialities related 
to knowledge and its actual exercise, i.e. contemplating.189 In the following analysis, I 
                                                             
188 As Burnyeat (2002: 49, n.59) points out, the adoption of γένος for a specifically 
differentiated species makes it impossible to invoke the analogy between matter and 
genus we find in the Metaphysics (V 28,1024a 36-b 9; VII 12, 1038a 6-8; X 8, 1058a 1, 23-
4). He therefore suggests either to read the word ὕλη as a synonym of 'potentiality', or to 
consider one of the hypotheses elaborated by ancient commentators like Philoponus and 
Themisitius, usefully reported by Hicks (355). Themistius 55, 21 H. (1899: 101, 14 Sp.) 
thinks that the reference to ὕλη is due to the fact that the nature of man is receptive of 
knowledge (some support for this reading may come from II 2, 414a9-11); Philoponus 
(1897: 299,27) seems instead to believe that 'because of the genus, that is the matter' 
must mean 'because of the ὑποκείμενον'. Simplicius (1882: 121, 17) explains that since the 
natural human disposition to knowledge needs to be perfected by learning, the genus (that 
is human nature) is such as (τοιοῦτον) matter. Along the same lines, Hicks thinks that ὕλη 
probably sums up ‘the latent capabilities of the individual’, and is therefore not indicating 
something really different from to γένος. 
189 Commentators usually draw comparisons between this passage and analogue ones in 
Phys. VIII 4, 255a30b2 (where two potentialities related to knowledge and perception are 
distinguished, and subsequently applied to the natural motions of the elements) and DA II 
1, 412a 20 ff, in which Aristotle only speaks of one knowledge-related potentiality. As 
Burnyeat (2002: 48-49) notes, Phys. VIII 4 is the only other place in which the 'tripartite 
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shall adopt the abbreviation k0 and k1 to refer to the senses of ‘knower’ defined by to 
the two τρόποι of ‘being capable of knowledge’ distinguished here, while by k2 I shall 
indicate the one actually exercising knowledge. 
The identification of the actuality that k0’s and k1’s potentialities are related to is 
crucial to determine what Aristotle is after in DA II 5. Despite some differences in their 
readings, commentators generally agree that what Aristotle is interested in is the fact 
that k1 is at the same time ‘in potentiality’ with regard to k2, and ‘in actuality’ with 
regard to k0, while k0 has a knowledge-related potentiality qua capable of reaching the 
state of k1.190 It is not obvious, however, that this (undoubtedly true) fact is what 
Aristotle is really interested in here. In fact, in the contrast between k0 and k1 no 
explicit mention is made to the actuality they are relative to. Aristotle does not in fact 
say that k1’s actuality is what k0’s potentiality is related to: the clause ‘capable of 
becoming a knower in k1’s sense’ is nowhere in the text. What we have is rather an 
explanation of why we think of them as ‘capable’. Thus, k1 is ‘capable’ because she can 
exercise at her will a hexis she fully possess, while k0 is such because of a natural 
‘innate’ disposition qua member of the human kind. As I am going to explain, there 
should be little doubt that k0’s ‘capability’ is no more relative to k1 than it is to k2. In 
other words, the expressly mentioned ‘capable of contemplating’ (δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν) 
can be predicated of k0 as legitimately as the capability to reach k1.191 
                                                                                                                                                                          
scheme' (in his terminology) is found (with the exception of a brief allusion, in Sens. 4, 
441b21-23). The distinction of three stages is instead remarkably absent from both the 
metaphysical lexicon of Metaph. V and the distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις in 
Metaph. IX 6, 1048b 18-36. 
190 Hicks (1907: 354) claims that II 5’s (as opposed to II 1’s) distinction introduces k1, thus 
stressing that knowledge is a hexis, i.e., in his view, an 'act if contrasted with potence, but 
potence if contrasted with act’, and accordingly speaks of 'three stages being really four'. A 
similar reading is proposed by Ross (1961: 223-24). On the opposite, Hamlyn (1968: 101, 
82) refers to DA II 1 (416a6 ff.) as the place where the notion of knowledge as hexis is 
elaborated, while arguing that DA II 5 adds k0 in order to differentiate it as a ‘mere 
potentiality’ whose actuality is a κίνησις, in opposition to k1 (whose actuality is the 
exercise of the hexis). Some of Burnyeat’s (2002:50-51) assumptions are in line with 
Hamlyn’s. He also believes that k1 and k2 were already distinguished in II 1, and that what 
is added in II 5 is k0, which he considers an example of the ordinary potentiality related to 
κίνησις. On the other hand, Burnyeat peculiarly argues that the aspect defining k1 is not its 
being both an actuality and a potentiality, but rather the fact that while resulting from a 
‘ordinary’ change (the one from k0), it gives raise to a non-ordinary change (the one to k2). 
191 Despite his own interpretation, and despite stressing Aristotle's reluctance to speak 
about actualities in the passage, Burnyeat himself recognizes (2002: 50) that 'both types 
of potentiality contrast with the actuality of someone exercising their knowledge of 
letters'. 
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The attribution of the capacity of exercising a certain branch of knowledge (k2) to a 
human being that does not yet possess that branch of knowledge (that is, to k0 as 
opposed to k1) is all but perplexing in Aristotle’s terms, and reasonably so. According 
to him, a subject progresses towards the stable acquisition of a hexis by repeated 
(assisted or unassisted) exercise of it. As a consequence, the capacity for a human 
being of exercising knowledge (k2) without being an actually accomplished knower – 
i.e., exercising knowledge qua k0 rather than qua k1 – must be logically presupposed. 
Aristotle addresses the issue twice in Metaph. Θ 8 (1050a12-21, 1050b10-15), and 
while he considers possible perplexities about the ability of exercising knowledge 
without possessing it, he clearly does not deny that learning students can exercise 
knowledge, and rather admits that they have ‘something’ of the knowledge they are 
practicing. Bearing this in mind, I propose the following schematization of Aristotle’s 
view: 
k0 =def subject capable of reaching k1 = subject capable* of k2; 
k1 =def subject capable** of k2  
The words by which Aristotle introduces the distinguishing features of k1 and k0 in 
417a26, then, seem carefully chosen: ‘each of them is capable in a mode that is not 
identical’ (ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατός ἐστιν). This is 
unquestionably different from saying that ‘they are in potentiality in relation to two 
different actualities’. In spite of the apparent obviousness of the standard reading, 
then, the point Aristotle is making is not that k0 is capable of becoming k1, but rather 
that k0 is able to exercise knowledge (becoming k2) in a way that is different from k1’s. 
There is accordingly one actuality both the potentialities are relative to (namely the 
actual exercise of knowledge Aristotle calls ‘contemplating’, θεωρεῖν) and two 
different ways of being capable of it.  
This point is particularly important once we put it in the context of the chapter as a 
whole. Aristotle just declared his intention to achieve some further distinctions about 
potentiality and actuality. The reason behind his proposal was the impossibility to 
solve the aporia of self-perceiving sense-organs by a ‘simple way’ of speaking about 
potentiality and actuality. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the distinction of 
two potentialities (k0’s and k1’s) that lead, in two different ways, to the exercise of the 
same actuality (k2’s θεωρεῖν), is going to be crucial in Aristotle’s full-blown answer to 
the aporia about self-perceiving sense-organs. 
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2.1 Two transitions towards contemplation. 
In 417a28-b2, Aristotle recognizes that ‘both’ the previously mentioned knowers (k0 
and k1) are such ‘in potentiality’, and then claims that 
 (i) one is based on  
(a) ‘having been altered through learning’ (διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς) 
and  
(b) ‘having shifted from an opposite disposition’ (ἐξ ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν 
ἕξεως),  
 (ii) the other is characterized by the shift from ‘having, but not exercising’ (ὁ δ' 
ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ) to ‘exercising’ (εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν) the specific 
knowledge at issue (e.g., τὴν γραμματικήν). 
In my view, what Aristotle means as he says that k0 and k1 are ‘in potentiality’ a 
knower is that both of them are such with regard to k2. This is strongly suggested by 
the context, since he just stressed that k2, exemplified by the actual exercise of 
‘knowing this A’, is in fact the primary sense in which one is said to be a ‘knower’ 
(417a28-29: ὁ δ' ἤδη θεωρῶν, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν καὶ κυρίως, ἐπιστάμενος τόδε τὸ Α).192 
The point enlightened by the following descriptions, then, is that while k0 is potentially 
k2 only (a) ‘having moved many times from an opposite state (hexis)’ and (b) ‘having 
been altered through learning’, k1 can go straight to k2 in a different way, i.e. by 
shifting from the actual possession of the relevant hexis to its exercise.  
It is worth noting that the common assumption I rejected, according to which the 
transition the passage compares are k0k1 and k1k2 (rather than, as I argued, 
k0k2 and k1k2), faces the difficulty of explaining why k0 –previously described as 
‘knower’ because of the innate potentiality due the mere belonging to human kind– 
                                                             
192 Commentators usually read κυρίως supplying the predicate ‘knower’, so that Aristotle 
distinguishes here a third situation in which the term is employed (cf. translations by 
Smith, Hicks, Hett). This seems indeed implied by the fact that the subject is ‘knowing this 
A’: since the person at issue is knowing, then is a knower; and since he is in actuality 
(ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν), he is a knower in the principal sense. This last inference is due to the fact 
that actuality is ‘definitionally and teleologically prior to the correlative potentiality’, as 
Burnyeat (2002: 50, n.60) suggests quoting DA II 4 (415a 17-20) and Metaph. IX 8 (1049b 
10-17; 1050a 7-12).  
Ross (1961: 233) and Hamlyn (1968: 23) prefer to read κυρίως together with ἐπιστάμενος 
τόδε τὸ Α, so that the meaning would be that the subject at issue ‘is actually and in the 
proper sense understanding this letter A'. In this reading, however, κυρίως would be 
referring to an aspect that has not appeared so far, since each of the first two subjects was 
described either as ‘capable’ or as a ‘knower’, not as ‘knowing’. Moreover, no other case of 
‘knowing’ is distinguished in the chapter, and the supposed remark about being κυρίως 
‘knowing’ would therefore be otiose and out of context. 
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would be said to be potentially k1 after having been altered (ἀλλοιωθείς, in a30) by 
learning. This implication of the standard reading is absurd, since any human being 
qua human being is k1 in potentiality from the very beginning, i.e., ‘innately’ and 
without ‘having been altered’ by learning. Different solutions to the difficulty has been 
proposed, but all of them seem to require some stretched interpretation – if not 
indeed an alteration – of the original text.193 In my reading, the past participle 
ἀλλοιωθείς does instead make perfect sense without any exegetical intrusion, and the 
passage can be translated as follows: 
However, it is the one already contemplating that, being in actuality, is also a 
‘knower’ in the principal sense, knowing this particular A; both the first two are 
in fact a ‘knower’ in potentiality, then. However, one <is potentially a knower in 
the principal sense> after he has been altered through learning, and having 
shifted several times from an opposite state; the other, <having shifted> to the 
exercise from the possession of the letters without exercise, <is potentially a 
knower in the principal sense> in a different mode.  
As it is clear, the implicit clause in the passage is the one declared at the beginning: 
both k0 and k1 are a ‘knower’ in potentiality in relation to k2, which is the principal 
sense of the term. The only other clause one need to supplement is a ‘change’ verb 
connecting the stages the latter transition (k1k2) begins from (ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν 
γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ) and ends in (εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν).194  
                                                             
193 As Burnyeat (2002: 83-87) reports, commentators deal with the difficulty by supplying, 
in the translation if not in the text, a reference to being or becoming a knower in actuality. 
In this way, the passage is supposed to claim that a k0 is a knower in actuality after 
becoming k1, thanks to the alteration undergone by learning, while k1 is a knower in 
actuality after becoming k2, which only requires activation of expertise and knowledge 
that are already fully possessed (cf. Alexander [Quaest. III 3, 83.27-30], Philoponus [1897: 
300.8-30], and all modern translators; Torstrik and Ross, with some differences, added it 
to the Greek). Burnyeat himself proposes a less intruding reading in response to this 
difficulty, rightly complaining that the commonly supplemented ‘is a knower in actuality’ 
is nowhere in the text. In his view, the passage moves from the remark that k0 and k1 are 
potentially a knower, to the distinction of k0 as ‘potentially’ (thus supplying just 'is in 
potentiality' for ὁ μὲν in a 31) one who has been altered through learning and has 
repeatedly changed from an opposite state (i.e., k0 is potentially k1), and k1 as ‘potentially 
someone who has changed’ (thus supplying ‘in potentiality μεταβαλὼν' for ὁ δ' in a 32) in 
another way, viz. from having knowledge of letters without exercising it to the actual 
exercise. While certainly more persuasive than the traditional insertion of a reference to 
‘becoming k1’, Burnyeat’s proposal still suffers from the assumption that the transition 
from ko to k1 must be relevant here, and is forced to artificially separate κατὰ δύναμιν 
from ἐπιστήμον to provide an adequate suppletive clause. 
194 On this point, I agree with Hicks and Burnyeat that the participle μεταβαλών (‘having 
shifted’ or ‘having moved’) must be borrowed from the preceding description. I also agree 
with Burnyeat (2002: 53, n.68) that the MSS reading τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν γραμματικήν at 
the end of the passage is implausible. The mention of αἴσθησιν (possibly a gloss inspired 
by 417b18-19) together with γραμματικήν would imply that perception is a case of 
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An aspect that needs to be clarified is the relation between the two processes 
mentioned in the first description under (a) and (b), i.e., the shift from the opposite 
hexis, and the ‘being altered by learning’. Commentators believe that the two are in 
fact referring to the same thing (in their view, the transition from k0 to k1) so that the 
καί connecting the two clauses is explanatory.195 If I am right in believing that 
Aristotle is explaining how k0 and k1 are potentially k2, rather than how k0 moves to k1, 
the supposed equivalence between the ‘shift from the opposite hexis’ and the ‘being 
altered by learning’ is implausible. First of all, in my view the subject ‘altered by 
learning’ (k0) has not yet reached the ‘opposite hexis’ (k1), and has rather altered his 
initial full ignorance of letters by becoming, so to speak, a ‘taught ignorant’ (to be 
distinguished by a full possessor of γραμματική: imagine the difference between a 
learning kid and an mature school master). We can accordingly speak of the passage 
from ‘intact’ ignorance (k0) to ‘altered’ ignorance (k0*), but it would be awkward to 
claim that the two hexeis constituting the termini of the transition are ‘opposed’ to 
each other. Furthermore, the equivalence between ‘having been altered’ and ‘having 
shifted from a contrary state’ is ruled out by the specification that the shift happened 
more than once (πολλάκις). The alteration from k0 to k0* by which a ‘pure’ ignorant 
changes into a ‘taught’ one is not something that need to happen more than once. It is 
vice versa likely to assume that in order for such ‘alteration’ of the state of ignorance 
to have occurred, the shift to k2 – e.g., a repeated activity of recognizing letters – has 
been performed more than once. At any rate, there certainly are preliminary changes 
‘from the opposite hexis’ that human beings must go through since their birth in order 
to reach the state of ‘taught’ ignorance, such as becoming a competent speaker of a 
language, acquiring experience, performing induction and memorizing sets of beliefs 
(A.Po. I 1, 71a1-b8, II 19, 99b15-100b5; Phys. I 1, 184a10-b14; Metaph I 1, 980a27-
981b10; 9, 992b24-993a2). For this reason, I believe that the ‘having been altered’ 
clause is referring to the fact that k0’s initial ignorance underwent an alteration as k0 
became a ‘taught’ (or even ‘self-taught’) ignorant (k0*), whilst the repeated shift from 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ἐπιστήμη, that is absurd (on this point, cf. Hicks’ commentary, despite his choice to keep 
the MSS reading). The usual emendation is ἀριθμητικὴν (found in Themistius’ paraphrase 
[1899: 55.28] and accepted by Torstrik and Ross). Burnyeat reports also Theiler’s 
ἀρίθμησιν, and suggest as an alternative the deletion of τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ. Considering that 
so far Aristotle mentioned only γραμματική and ‘knowing this A’, I prefer this last option. 
At any rate, the choice of one or the other emendations is irrelevant for the general 
understanding of the passage. 
195 Cf. Burnyeat (2002:53). 
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the contrary hexis refers to the fullest way of being a knower (k2), that in k0’s case is 
reached from the contrary state of (‘altered’ or, originally, intact) ignorance.196  
What we have, then, is the remark about two ways of exercising the same activity (k2): 
one mediated by an alteration and thus ‘indirect’, in which k0 becomes potentially k2 
passing through k0*; and one that is ‘direct’ or ‘immediate’ in so far as the subject (k1) 
simply ‘switches on’ and exercises and already possessed hexis. The two transitions to 
k2 can therefore be schematized in the following way: 
Indirect : k0 – (alteration) k0* –(shift from opp. 
hexis) 
k2 
Direct:  k1 — (shift from same hexis) k2 
 
The idea that the shift from the same hexis (as in k1k2) is not an alteration is not in 
itself unacceptable and in fact right in light of what Aristotle is going to say. It is 
doubtful, however, that the rationale for the distinction of the two transitions is the 
presence or lack of an opposition between their initial and final termini, supposedly 
grounding a differentiation between ‘ordinary’ and ‘non-ordinary’ changes.197 At any 
rate, this is not what Aristotle seems to be interested in here, and if there is a 
                                                             
196 This interpretation suggests to look back again at the preceding (417a27) explanation 
of k0’s ability by appealing to his γένος and ὕλη. If we read καὶ ὕλη in the light of the 
‘having been altered’, it is indeed possible to assume that Aristotle was hinting at bodily 
modifications due to previous training. The mention of matter should therefore be 
interpreted as a further reason adding up to being a member of the human kind, different 
from it and hinting at the bodily matter composing the subject. Hicks (1907: 355) has the 
merit of considering the possibility to read καὶ ὕλη in this way, even though he does it only 
to note that this is very improbable (cf. also Ross, 1961: 233, 236). 
197 Heinaman convincingly argues that the transition k1k2 can be equally described as a 
passage from contraries (ignorant3knower3) and as an activation of a potentiality (k2 in 
potentiality  k2 in actuality). Accordingly, he claims that (pace Burnyeat) it is wrong to 
assume that a distinction of k0k1 from k1k2 can be based on the fact that the first 
transition, as opposed to the latter, features and opposition between initial and final 
termini. He recalls (2007: 151-153) various distinctions about stages and meanings of 
‘ignorance’ and ‘knowledge’, pointing out that each type of 'knowledge' has a 
correspondent contrary in a specific type of 'ignorance' (ibid.:151-156; he quotes Top. 
114b 9-11, 147a 17-18 and Metaph. 1052a2-4 [where even a state of 'ignorance' opposed 
to k0 is admitted], and EE 1225a 37-b16 and EN VII 3, 1147b6 [where he identifies a sense 
of ‘ignorance’ defined in opposition to k2]). Heinaman thinks that the transitions (in his 
view, k0  k1 and k1  k2) are distinct in so far as the termini of the second do not fall in 
none of the categories in which changes take place (i.e. substance, quality, quantity and 
place), but rather to the category of ‘suffering’ and ‘being changed’ (πάσχειν, κινεῖσθαι). 
The latter explanation, however, unconvincingly abandons a clear textual indication (that 
is, that in k1  k2 there is no transition from a contrary hexis) to promote an improbable 
idea of ‘transition between opposites belonging to the category of pathos’. 
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somewhat ‘special’ transition he is willing to introduce and emphasize in the passage, 
this is in fact the first, ‘indirect’ one (k0  k0* k2), which is opposed to the one 
reaching contemplation by the ‘normal’ and ‘direct’ route (k1k2).  
The distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ transitions to the same exercised 
activity is certainly subtle, and offers more than an occasion to draw apparently 
paradoxical consequences.198 On the other hand, the difference between a master and 
a beginner with regard to their epistemic abilities is too evident to go unnoticed, even 
if they both exercise an activity that is part of the relevant branch of knowledge, like 
‘recognizing that this sign is an A’.199 Knowledge is for this reason a useful case-study 
for demonstrating that there may be two different modes of being able to exercise one 
and the same activity. Without questioning the idea that an actuality is definitionally 
prior to the relative potentiality, Aristotle thus gains the theoretical possibility of 
distinguishing two different ways of being in potentiality starting from the same 
actuality. 
 The clarity by which such a distinction is displayed in the case of knowledge may help 
us to understand why Aristotle, having in mind the pending aporia about self-
perceiving sense-organs, starts speaking about knowledge. Pace Burnyeat, we are not 
in front of a ‘strained’ and ‘artificial’ application of the language of alteration and 
affection to knowledge, that is meant to introduce us to the realm of a ‘special’ types of 
alteration.200 The rationale behind Aristotle’s strategy is rather that knowledge is a 
perfect introductory example for the claim that two second actualities, apparently 
indistinguishable, may be reached in different ways and require different 
                                                             
198 Cf. again Metaph. Θ 8, 1050b10-15. 
199 This is not to say that the distinction of the two potentialities of reaching k2 is useful as 
a discriminatory test to evaluate if a particular individual ‘knows’ or is a mere ‘taught’ 
ignorant. In fact, in order to spot the difference between two subjects, we would need 
some detailed information about the causal history by which the potentialities are gained, 
and perhaps put their knowledge to the test by dialectic examination. 
200 Burnyeat (2002:58-59) admits that the language of alteration and affection can fit the 
case of knowledge only in a strained and artificial way. In his view, Aristotle may have 
chosen knowledge as the model for the opposition between extraordinary and ordinary 
alteration 'in deference to its Platonic ancestry', while struggling not to give the 
impression that a transition from possession to exercise of a hexis 'is incompatible with 
dependence on a particular external cause'. Such dependence is in turn necessary to 
elaborate a model that secures that perception is 'covered by the pattern of explanation 
expounded in De Generatione et Corruptione I 7 and Physics III 1-3' Having made Aristotle 
suffer this discomfort, Burnyeat sets him free to recognise in 417b 8-9 that the transition 
from k1 to k2 is not in fact an alteration. In his view, since perception has an external 
causal agent, while knowledge is something we can do at will (417b 19-26), k1  k2 is not a 
passive change, 'hence not a change at all as change is understood in Physics III 1-3'. 
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potentialities. This seems a pretty good start towards the enrichment of the notion of 
potentiality, and exactly what Aristotle needs at this point to get rid of the aporia on 
self-perceiving organs.  
2.2 Preservative affections and the k1k2 transition 
Aristotle proceeds by introducing a distinction between two kinds of ‘being affected’ 
(πάσχειν) in 417b 2-5. A first one is a certain ‘destruction’ operated by a contrary 
(φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου); another is rather a ‘preservation’ (σωτηρία) of what is 
in potentiality.  
The following section (417b6-16) appears to state that k1k2 is a clear example of 
‘preserving’ affection. The point seems to be that since k1 is a knower qua possessing 
knowledge, the transition from k1 to k2 entailed by ‘becoming a contemplating subject’ 
(θεωροῦν γίνεται) is ‘a progression towards the same and an actuality’ (417b8: 
ἐπίδοσις καὶ εἰς ἐντελέχειαν).201 As the introductive γάρ (b6) suggests, this statement 
is meant to be a clarification of the previous distinction between two types of 
affections, and this seems to make sense if Aristotle does in fact think of k1k2 as 
belonging to the ‘preserving’ rather than the ‘destroying’ type. In the same vein, 
Aristotle says in the following that ‘this is the reason why’ (διό) the wise is not 
‘altered’ when he exercises wisdom, and the builder is not altered when he builds. The 
reason is the same as the one making k1k2 a preservative affection: since both the 
subjects start from the possession of the relevant disposition (respectively, wisdom 
and the craft of house-building), and so end up in the same state (they still possess, 
respectively, wisdom and the craft of house-building), they are certainly undergoing a 
pathos, but they are not suffering an alteration or a destruction of any sort.202  
                                                             
201 Heinaman (2007: 177, n.59) claims that the expression θεωροῦν γίνεται is strictly 
speaking at odds with Aristotle’s general thesis that there is no coming-to-be or κίνησις of 
an ἐνέργεια (cf. EN X 4, 1174b12-14), and thence (against Burnyeat's assumption of a 
parallel between the passage and 417a31-b2) considers θεωροῦν (as opposed to θεωροῦν 
γίνεται) as the sole referent of ὅπερ (417 b5-7). In this way, Aristotle would be referring 
to the activity of contemplating, and not to the transition to such activity. The hypothesis 
seems not necessary, since (as we know from 417a14-16, and as Heinaman himself 
suggests) Aristotle is not considering here the difference between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια to 
which the thesis of EN X 4 is committed. Further, since Aristotle has not yet established 
that k1k2 is not a destructive alteration, it is excusable to talk of such transition as 
‘becoming a contemplating subject’, even though this is strictly speaking improper.  
202 The examples Aristotle chooses are probably not casual. In both cases, someone could 
exploit the ambiguity of πάθειν to claim that the house builder is affected by a house, that 
is paradoxical in consideration of the fact that it is rather the case that the house is 
‘affected’ (built) by the builder. Aristotle expressly denied that the builder is affected by 
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It is important to note that, despite a prima facie appearance promoted by the 
association of k1k2 with affections of the ‘preserving’ type, it is not obvious that 
k0(k0*)k2 must in turn be associated with affections of the ‘destroying’ type. If the 
destructive character concerns the loss of the initial state (as Burnyeat proposes), 
then k0(k0*)k2 may be said ‘destructive’ (the subject become ‘taught’ from being 
‘absolutely’ ignorant, and then even a ‘knower’ in the fullest sense) as well as 
‘preservative’ (the subject is still ‘ignorant’ even though he is ‘taught’, and still a 
‘taught ignorant’ while contemplating).203 If, on the other hand, the ‘destroying’ 
character of the affection depends on the positive or negative effect on the subject’s 
nature (as Heinaman believes), calling k0(k0*)k2 a ‘destroying’ affection is 
unambiguously wrong, since the progressive approximation of the state of knower is 
certainly beneficial to the subject in Aristotle’s mind.204 In fact, the distinction of 
preservative and destructive affections does not need to be exhaustive, and Aristotle 
is more interested in contrasting the possible transitions to the exercise of knowledge 
– and thence, for the sake of clarifying that distinction, in the examination of the 
processes being involved – than in offering a complete classification of all types of 
affections.  
What appears to be important for Aristotle’s purpose is to show that the description 
proposed for preservative affections (‘a progression towards the same and an 
actuality’) fits the ‘direct’ transition to contemplation (k1k2), but not the indirect 
one (k0[k0*]k2). In this way, it becomes clear that the two do in fact constitute 
different and alternative ways of reaching the same exercised activity. Aristotle is only 
                                                                                                                                                                          
what is being built in II 4, (416a34-b3), offering a parallel with what the relation between 
food and what is nourished in nourishing. Here, Aristotle remarks that what happens – 
presumably, the only effect of wood on the builder – is that the builder switches from 
inactivity to activity (ὁ δὲ τέκτων μεταβάλλει μόνον εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐξ ἀργίας). 
203 In Burnyeat’s view (2002: 53-57), the destruction or preservation concerns a certain 
quality in itself: in this way, an affection that realizes a certain potentiality without 
destroying it (like contemplating, considered as an affection of the potentiality to 
contemplate) is ‘preservative’, while an affection entailing the destruction of the starting 
point (the original potentiality of being in the final stage) is ‘destructive’. He therefore 
associates the two transitions distinguished in the previous passages (in his view, kok1 
and k1k2) with the ‘destructive’ and ‘preservative’ types of affection distinguished here. 
204 Arguing against Burnyeat’s interpretation, Heinaman (2007:171-173) argues that 
affections are ‘preservative’ and ‘destructive’ in relation to the nature of the affected 
subject (the affections due to health or virtue preserves and develops our nature; the one 
due to blindness, ignorance, sickness are instead some sort of destruction). It is worth 
noting that the disagreement between Heinaman and Burnyeat involves a disagreement 
on the question whether Aristotle’s distinction between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια is based on 
the destruction of the initial state, due to the acquisition of a final one that is contrary to it. 
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after a secure confirmation of the difference between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ transitions, 
regardless of how one exactly classifies the transitions and the changes they involve. 
This stance is confirmed by Aristotle’s lack of interest with regard to deciding whether 
the preserving character of k1k2 entails not being an alteration at all, or rather being 
an alteration of a different type: he is not looking for an exhaustive and definitive 
classification of events and processes.205 
2.3 k0k0* is a alteration that is ‘able to deprive’, to be distinguished from the 
perfective alteration k0k1 
Aristotle concludes the section on knowledge with some considerations about 
teaching (417b6-16): first he approves the fact that the derived name for what leads 
to thinking is not ‘teaching’ (διδασκαλία); then, he states that either students being 
taught are not affected at all by their teachers, or there will have to be two kinds of 
alteration. The section is obscure, and several aspects need to be clarified. 
The initial endorsement granted to the fact that ‘what leads’ (τὸ ἄγον) to the exercise 
of an epistemic activity is not given the name of ‘teaching’ appears quite bizarre. 
Aristotle says: 
Accordingly, it is certainly a good thing that what, in a way related to who is 
thinking and understanding, leads <him> from being in potentiality to actuality, 
has a derived name different from ‘teaching’ (417b9-12) 
It is prima facie incredible that anyone could ever call the cause for the transition to 
actual thinking (k2) ‘teaching’, and this makes Aristotle’s praise for not doing it 
suspiciously awkward. For this reason, some editors changed the text transmitted by 
manuscripts, and made Aristotle say that what is appropriately not called after 
‘education’ is rather the very same transition to the exercise (τὸ ἄγειν).206 In fact, 
                                                             
205 While recognizing that the following case of the builder makes it clear that Aristotle 
would certainly go for the first disjunct (that is compatible with the idea of Metaph. Θ 6 
that knowledge is the paradigmatic case of ἐνέργεια as opposed to κίνησις), Burnyeat (56-
59) explains that the possibility that k1k2 is ‘another kind of alteration’ is left open 
because of Aristotle’s intention to extend the distinction to perception. This is in turn due, 
in Burnyeat’s view, to his wish to preserve the objectivity of perceptual content and the 
collocation of perception in the domain of natural philosophy (cf. note 200 above). 
206 Cf. Ross, who follows Torstrik in turning τὸ ἄγον into τὸ ἄγειν. Burnyeat (2002: 59, 
n.83) points out that in both the traditional and modified versions of the text the verb 
ἄγειν equally alludes to ‘a causal agent distinct from τὸ νοοῦν καὶ φρονοῦν and parallel to 
the causal agent in the contrasting description’, namely the teacher Aristotle is going to 
mention at 417b13. However, despite a declared preference for the ‘tortuous’ text of the 
MSS, and despite suggesting that ‘what induces’ could be a sensible or intelligible object 
(he cites Torstrik’s ‘geometrical figure’, 417a29’s ‘A’, Philoponus’ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν καὶ τὸ 
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statements like ‘we are taught because of teaching’ or ‘we know because of 
knowledge’ appear to be perfectly fine for Aristotle. In DA II 2 (414a4-12), he 
proposed a general scheme for all livings beings’ activities, according to which these 
last are affections due to the presence of dispositional states (hexeis) that, thanks to 
the soul, living beings are naturally capable to ‘receive’. In particular, Aristotle states 
that the expression ‘that by which we know’ can indicate both the ‘knowledge’ we 
receive and the soul’s passive ability to ‘receive’ it. If this is taken into account, it is 
evident that it would not be outlandish for him to entertain the hypothesis that 
‘teaching’ is what leads a teaching-assisted ignorant to the exercise of knowledge 
(k0k0*k2). Appreciation of the practice of not invoking teaching (but, presumably, 
‘knowledge’, or ‘understanding’, or the objects being thought) as the subject-related 
causal factor leading to k2 is therefore neither bizarre nor superfluous207. In the frame 
of the interpretation I am offering, a good reason for Aristotle’s approval may be that 
this practice is describing the transition to k2 in an appropriately neutral way, that is 
regardless of whether k2 is reached starting from the actual possession of the hexis 
(k1) or from a state of ‘taught’ or ‘intact’ ignorance (k0* or k0).  
In the following sentence (417b12-16), Aristotle seems willing to clarify the approval 
granted to the practice of not giving ‘teaching’ as the name for what leads a subject to 
actual (i.e., k2’s exercised) epistemic activity. He says: 
However, we must say either that being learning and acquiring knowledge from 
being in potentiality is not affected by a person that is able to teach and is being 
in actuality; or that there are two modes of alteration: the shift to the conditions 
(διαθέσεις) that are able to deprivate, and the shift to the dispositional states 
(ἕξεις) and the nature. 
The text is extremely compressed here, but the salient points seem clear enough. 
Aristotle is investigating how we should speak (φατέον, b14) of a ‘taught’ subject 
(‘one who learns and acquires knowledge’, μανθάνον καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπιστήμην), in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
αἰσθητὸν), he is happy with having Aristotle dully saying that ‘teaching’ is not the right 
word to describe them. 
207 The clause κατὰ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ φρονοῦν suggests that the pertinent causal factor must 
be related to the subject that thinks and understands (I therefore agree with Hicks [1907: 
357] that the κατὰ must be interpreted as ‘in relation to’). In other words, it indicates that 
we are considering factors such as affections (that is, the effect due to some agent leaving 
aside the agent that produced it), states, or dispositions of a subject that make a causal 
contribution to the transition. The focus on the subject is in line with the earlier limitation 
of the enquiry to actualizations that take place in the changed and affected patient 
(417a15-16). The restriction allows Aristotle to leave aside cognized objects , which 
would otherwise have been suitable candidates for the role of ‘what leads’ to the exercise 
of the relevant epistemic activity. 
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light of what he just said (cf. τὸ μὲν at b9 and τὸ δέ here in b12).208 He poses a 
dilemma: since it is right not to say that ‘teaching’ is what leads a subject to k2, then in 
the case of a ‘taught’ ignorant (k0*) moving to k2 while still remaining ignorant, either 
we shall deny that the teacher had any effect on the taught subject, or admit a 
distinction between two types of alteration.209 While some justification for the first 
disjunct can be offered in consideration of the fact that the subject remains ignorant, it 
would be absurd to deny that the change from ‘absolute’ to ‘taught’ ignorance is at 
least in part an effect of teaching. It would indeed be paradoxical for Aristotle to state 
that no effect on students is made by a person able to teach and actually teaching, 
when this presumably describes what he himself was actually doing by giving this 
very same lecture. Furthermore, he already admitted the effect of teaching in 417b30: 
k0 is able to shift to k2 ‘having been altered by learning’.210 
The second disjunct, and the distinction of two types of alteration stemming from it, is 
therefore grounded on the obvious admission that teaching has an effect on people 
being taught, even when it is not effectively reaching the full transformation of 
ignorance into the possession of knowledge (i.e., when the effect being reached is k0* 
rather than k1). This reconstruction perfectly squares with the final classification of 
alterations, according to which taught subjects can be altered either to the effect of 
                                                             
208 The exact qualification of the taught subject’s with regard to potentiality is not at all 
clear, for the clause ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος seems ungrammatical. Torstrik suspected a scribe’s 
repetition from b10, and bracketed the clause. On the opposite, Ross (1961: 237) saves it 
as being repeated ‘naturally enough’, and interprets it (ibid., 234) as absolute: the subject 
is the student that, ‘from being in potentiality’, learns and acquires knowledge. The 
parallelism is accepted also by Burnyeat (2002: 61, n.86), who refers the clause to an 
implicit term like ‘knower’, so that the sense is that the student ‘learns and acquires 
knowledge from being a knower in potentiality’. He adds that the phrase’s oddity is indeed 
due to ‘Aristotle’s determination to treat the two potentialities and the two transitions as 
parallel’. 
209 Both Burnyeat (2002:63-65) and Heinaman (2007:166,n.41) assume that when 
Aristotle says that the taught student is not affected by the teacher he means ‘not affected 
in a destructive way’. The assumption is in my view wrong, however. For it is far from 
obvious that ‘being not affected’ could be reformulated as ‘being altered in a certain way’, 
either presupposing or leaving aside the previous distinction between ‘destructive’ and 
‘preservative’ affections: if we presuppose it, then ‘being not affected’ means that not even 
the latter affection is taking place; if we leave it aside, then it becomes impossible to claim 
that Aristotle means ‘not affected in a destructive way’. 
210 Heinaman (2007: 169-173) notes that since Aristotle adopts learning as both an 
example of the ‘developmental’ shift (here) and as a genuine case of alteration (in 
417a30), Burnyeat’s opposition between ordinary (supposedly destructive) changes and 
non-ordinary (preservative or developmental) changes is unconvincing. Burnyeat (2002 : 
61-62, n.87) does in fact recognize the difficulty, and argues that Aristotle is in fact adding 
a new claim here (he accordingly approves the omission of ὥσπερ εἴρηται in b14 by nearly 
all ancient commentators and several MSS and modern editors). 
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becoming k1, thanks to the achievement of a dispositional state that complements the 
subject’s nature (τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν); or to the effect of undergoing a ‘shift’ 
towards conditions that have the ability to spoil them of their ignorance (τήν τε ἐπὶ 
τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν), thus becoming k0*.211 It is important to note 
that the latter transition is defined by the tendency or ability to deprive (cf. the suffix –
ικόν, that typically indicates ‘being able to’ or ‘inclining towards’) subjects of their 
initial condition, rather than by an actual deprivation of it. Thus, a taught ignorant has 
been subject to a transition ‘towards a condition that is able to deprive’, because the 
alteration by which he becomes a ‘taught’ ignorant (k0*) tends to deprive him of the 
state of ignorance without actually having deprived him yet. Aristotle’s employment of 
two different technical words to describe the states the two alterations lead to 
(diathesis and hexis) is also relevant, for he normally opposes the two by saying that a 
diathesis is a transient and unstable condition (properly speaking, an arrangement 
among parts), while a hexis is a stably achieved dispositional state (once a hexis is 
achieved, some significant event and explanation is required for its loss).212 
What Aristotle is trying to achieve by distinguishing the alteration towards a 
‘privative’ transient state and the one towards a ‘perfective’ hexis is the neutralization 
of a threatening linguistic ambiguity, which could undermine the earlier definition of 
k0(k0*)k2 as a transition to the exercise of knowledge ‘that passes through an 
alteration due to learning’ (417a31). Aristotle must be aware that k1k2 also implies 
(as a past pre-condition) an ‘alteration due to learning’, and can thus be described by 
the phrase originally used to capture the transition he wants to contrast with it, 
namely k0(k0*)k2. A safe description for the latter transition, then, need to qualify 
                                                             
211 Against Burnyeat (2002: 61-63), Heinaman convincingly argues (2007:156-160) that 
the point of the distinction is not the presence or lack of a logical ‘negation’ between the 
termini of the alteration (ibid.:169-170), and that in any case this would not be sufficient 
to ground a distinction between ordinary and non-ordinary changes. I only partially agree 
with Heinaman’s own proposal, though, for he believes that the distinction is alluding to 
the fact that the final conditions are positive or negative for the subject, qua respectively 
perfective or deprivative of a full natural completion (like sickness, blindness and so on). 
In my view, Heinaman is right on the positive type of affection (which is indeed defined by 
its complementing the subject’s nature), but not on the negative one, which is defined by 
the tendency to deprive subjects of their initial condition, rather than by an actual 
worsening of it. In fact, a taught ignorant is presumably better than a full ignorant with 
regard to knowledge (though this may in fact be less obvious than it seems, cf. Plato, 
Sophist 230a-d)– and yet subject to a transition to a condition (k0*) that tends to deprive 
him of the initial state of ignorance.  
212 As Burnyeat (2002:62, n.89) notices, the idea of temporary vs. stable disposition is 
included in the opposition between διαθέσεις and ἕξεις, cf. Cat. 8, 8b26-9a13. 
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the entailed ‘educational alteration’ (i.e., k0k0*) as being privative, to avoid any 
confusion with the transition to k2, that rather entails a perfective educational 
alteration (i.e., k0k1). 
More generally, the result Aristotle is pursuing at the end of his discussion of 
knowledge in DA II 5 is the discovery of a distinction between two ways of being able 
to exercise one and the same activity: 
 an optimal ‘direct’ one, consisting in a transition from the relevant 
dispositional state (hexis) to its exercise, i.e. a preservative affection, enabled 
by previous ‘alterations’ that ended in the stable obtainment of the relevant 
hexis which complements the initial state and the subject’s nature; 
 a sub-optimal ‘indirect’ one, consisting in a transition from a power that falls 
short of the relevant dispositional state, enabled by previous alterations that 
ended in a condition that is able to ‘deprive’ the subject of the initial state 
(rather than complementing it and the subject’s nature). 
 As the examination of the next sections of DA II 5 will show, Aristotle is not interested 
here in the topic of learning and knowledge in themselves, but rather in using them as 
a model for the above distinction, whose application to the case of perception 
provides the means for a complete solution of the question about self-perceiving 
sense organs.  
3. Solving the Aporia: perception in light of the refined doctrine of potentiality and 
actuality 
3.1 The comparison between knowledge and perception.  
In 417b 16- 19, Aristotle finally begins a series of comparisons between knowledge 
and perception. The first remark, according to which the ‘shift’ by which the power to 
perceive is acquired is due to the parent (and actually takes place before birth, cf. GA 
II 3), carries on from the previous section the interest in the causal factors behind the 
potentiality.213 
Aristotle adds that a newborn ‘already possesses perception in the same way as 
knowledge’ (417b18). The knowledge he is referring to must be k1’s, since we clearly 
                                                             
213 It is unlikely that by ‘the first shift’ (πρώτη μεταβολή) Aristotle wants to refer to the 
first type of ‘shift’ just distinguished (the one leading to a ‘privative’ state), since the 
acquisition of the power to perceive is rather a ‘developmental’ transition complementing 
the subject’s nature. Hicks recalls the interpretation of the commentators, that rightly 
distinguish this first transition as the one from pure potentiality to the possession (hexis) 
of the capacity (he cites Alex. Quaest, III 3, 84, 33)]  
Chapter 5 — 
 146 
do not need to acquire the power to perceive by learning. The emphasis must then be 
put on the 'already’ (ἤδη, echoing the one employed in the description of k2 at 
417a25), which indicates that no further development of the capacity is needed (cf. 
417a27-28).214 Aristotle is thus warning us that, in adapting to perception what has 
been established by using knowledge as a model, we should bear in mind that no 
difference exists between the perceptual power belonging to a human being qua 
human being (the analogous of k0), and the hexis fully possessed by an expert knower 
(k1). If we call p0 the natural specific power analogue to k0, and p1 the possession of 
the power to perceive by analogy with k1, we shall have to take p0 = p1. As a 
consequence, all perceivers reach the actual exercise of perception (call it p2) by 
moving from the same, already full-fledged perceptual power (p1=p0).  
It is worth noting that the position of only one (natural and specific) perceptual power 
(p1=p0) does not prevent the possibility to reach the same second activity (p2) in 
different ways. For instance, in order to go from my desk to the library, I need to 
activate my natural ability to intentionally reach a place by moving my limbs in a 
controlled way. Two different activations of the same ability are clearly possible, as I 
could reach the library either walking on my feet or on my hands (granting for the 
sake of argument that I am actually capable of doing it). Aristotle himself considers a 
similar example in a textually defective and obscure section of EE (1246a26-35), as he 
investigates whether virtues can have a correct and an incorrect use. Notably, the 
cases he takes into account in the investigation include knowledge and perception: 
one is the possibility to use knowledge (k2) in a wrong way, as it happens when we 
spell a word incorrectly, either on purpose or by ignorance (thence moving from k1 or 
k0 respectively); the other is the possibility to use the eye to misperceive because of a 
distorting affection. The latter example already suggests the possibility to move to the 
exercise of perception (p2) by a route that, analogously to that followed by an ignorant 
sub-optimally achieving k2, is characterized by going through an alteration of the 
initial state (p1*, analogous to k0*). In my view, then, Aristotle is hinting to nothing less 
than this analogously twofold way of reaching the exercised activity (k2 and p2), when 
he states, in the passage of DA II 5 under examination (417b16-19), that we similarly 
                                                             
214 According to Hicks (1907: 354) in a25 ἤδη means 'without requiring that any further 
condition should be fulfilled' (he cites Pol. 1275b 18). He recalls (ibid.: 357) that 
perception is a δύναμις συγγενής (Metaph. 1047b 31 ff.) that is neither due to habit nor to 
instruction 'whereas artistic skill and moral virtue are only acquired by practice’. Citing 
also Sens. 4, 441b 22: οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι 
. 
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speak of perceiving in actuality and contemplating (τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν δὲ ὁμοίως 
λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν). 
Aristotle continues his comparison between knowledge and perception by stressing 
their difference with regard to the possibility of self-activation (417b 19- 28), thus 
recovering the original investigation about the problem of self-perceiving sense-
organs. While it is true that a subject endowed with the natural power to perceive is 
analogous to the one in full possession of an epistemic hexis (k1), one must also bear in 
mind that the activation of the power to perceive requires the presence of actually 
perceptible objects.215 The passage from the possession to the exercise of knowledge 
(k1k2) can be performed at the subject’s will, since knowledge is about universals 
that are somewhat in the soul.216 On the contrary, since perception is about external 
particular objects, their presence is required in order for the sense-organs to be 
activated and brought to exercise (p1p2). This requirement was already introduced 
in 417a6-9, when Aristotle remarked that what is able to perceive is in potentiality 
and needs to be activated in a way similar to the ignition of a fire, thus explaining why 
sense-organs cannot activate themselves by themselves, and why external object are 
needed to activate perceptual powers. And as already noted, the remark only accounts 
for the fact that sense-organs do not perceive themselves by themselves, while still 
leaving unexplained why they are not perceiving themselves once they are activated 
and affected by external, actually perceptible objects. 
3.2 The two ways of activating the power to Perceive and the Potential 
Perceptibility of Sense Organs 
Aristotle is finally in a position to argue that the first part of the aporia about self-
perceiving sense-organs, which faces the difficulty of explaining why sense-organs do 
not perceive themselves once they are activated and affected by perceptible objects, 
can only be solved after one poses a distinction between two types of perceptual 
‘activation’ and ‘affection’, in analogy with the one examined in relation to knowledge. 
                                                             
215 Cf. Hicks (1907: 359), who quotes A.Po. 87b 29. He even translates (ibid.: 75) ‘for the 
presence of the sensible object is necessary’.  
216 It is worth noting that on the basis of Aristotle’s position concerning the existence of 
absolute self-movers (cf. Phys VIII 4, 255b3-4, 13-31), the mere presence of suitably 
‘active’ objects of knowledge would not determine the capacity to know at will, but rather 
the impossibility not to be always knowing. What determines the capacity to know at will, 
then, must be a certain way of being present and available to the knower that 
characterizes the universals that are the objects of knowledge. On the subject, cf. Shields 
(1994:130-133) and Wedin (1994:85-88, 114-116) . 
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Aristotle suggests this by finally applying to perception the idea of two different ways 
(optimal and direct vs. sub-optimal and indirect) in which a subject can reach the 
exercise the same power. The application takes place by a further comparison, which 
this time entail the activities of perceiving and commanding (στρατηγεῖν):  
being in potentiality is said not to be simple; on the contrary, in the same way as 
‘capable of commanding’ are on the one hand the boy, on the other the one who 
is of the proper age, so it is the case for what is capable of perceiving (417b30-
418a1) 
The way Aristotle employs the case of commanding may strike us as surprising, for he 
decides to hint at a mere difference of age between a boy and a person of the proper 
age, rather than to rehearse the difference between the ‘taught’ ignorant’s and the 
expert’s way to exercise knowledge (which would have been possible as a proper 
τέχνη related to military leadership [i.e. στρατηγική, cf. EN 1094a9, 13] does in fact 
exists). In fact, the focus on age does in fact seem to indicate that, in both the cases of 
commanding and perceiving, two subjects already having the same full-fledged hexis 
(i.e., a k1-type dispositional state) are distinguished because of the presence, in one of 
them, of a further enabling condition. Aristotle’s employment of the example, then, 
suggests an important aspect we should pay attention to in the application of the 
doctrine of the two transitions from the case of knowledge to that of perception.  
What Aristotle indicates in drawing a parallel between commanding and perceiving is 
that the salient aspect distinguishing the two activations of the fully possessed 
potentialities is an ‘alteration’ of the original power, analogous to the one detected 
earlier in the ‘indirect’ transition to contemplation of ‘taught’ ignorants. In the case of 
being capable to command employed by Aristotle, the enabling alteration is 
represented by getting older. That this is in fact what happens in the case of 
commanding can be clarified by adopting the example of a father and a son. Alexander, 
already able to command in the sense of possessing the relevant hexis (k1), lacks only 
the proper age that will make him 'able to command' in the most proper sense, i.e. as 
an officially invested general. The way Alexander is potentially commanding is then 
different from that characterizing his father Philip, who is instead able to command as 
an officially invested general thanks to the ability to command he has in common with 
Alexander, plus the older age that differentiates him from his son. Philip’s potentiality 
towards the activity of commanding is therefore analogue to the possession of the 
relevant hexis plus a certain alteration of it due to age (call it k1*). In a similar way, in 
the case of perception the starting point is a fully possessed dispositional state 
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(p1=p0). It is therefore with regard to the latter, fully possessed perceptual power that 
we shall have to distinguish the two ways of exercising perception, the ‘direct’ one 
(p1p2), and the one that, after a certain alteration, passes through an enabling 
condition that is able to deprive the subject of the initial state (p1p1*p2). 
The distinction of an ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ way of exercising the power of perception, 
characterizing subjects that are respectively in possession of ‘altered’ and ‘non-
altered’ perceptual powers, sheds new light on the conclusion of the passage. Here, 
Aristotle says that 
Since the difference among them is unnamed, but concerning them we 
discerned that they are different and how they are different, ‘being affected’ and 
‘being altered’ must be used as the principal names. But what is capable of 
perceiving is in potentiality similar to that perceptible object <which is> already 
in actuality; accordingly, it is affected when it is not similar to <it>, but once has 
been affected it has become similar and it is of the same quality of that. (418a1-
6) 
Concerning ‘being affected by a perceptible’ we are stuck with a lack of proper names 
for the different two ways in which this is possible. Aristotle accepts this linguistic 
limit as inevitable, noticing that we nonetheless distinguished how and why they are 
different. As we have finally established, the distinction consists in the fact that in the 
‘indirect’ way of exercising perception, the subject passes through an enabling 
‘privative’ alteration.  
The point about becoming similar by being affected may appear a pedant rehearsal of 
the point already made in 417a 20, but it is not, in fact, a mere repetition. The slight 
differences between the earlier and present formulations must not be overlooked. 
What Aristotle said earlier (in 417a20), was that, generally speaking, something is 
affected when is dissimilar and similar after being affected. In that case, he was 
enunciating a general condition for being liable to an affection, and a consequence of 
having been actually affected; but nothing yet implied that an actual assimilative 
affection does in fact take place in perceiving. On the contrary, ordinary assimilative 
affections of this sort have to be excluded, if sense-organs are not perceiving 
themselves every time we perceive.217 In the present passage, Aristotle states again 
that what is capable of perceiving is potentially like the actually perceptible object. 
However, he now says something that acquires a wholly new meaning in the light of 
the two ways in which perception can be exercised: as said earlier, what is capable of 
                                                             
217 This implies that during standard cases of perception sense organs are not literally 
affected, in agreement with the reconstruction I offered in chapters 1-2 of the present 
work.  
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perceiving is affected when dissimilar from the perceptible object (418a3-5: τὸ δ' 
αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθάπερ εἴρηται); 
therefore, it is affected while not being the same, but it becomes of the same quality as 
that once it has been affected (418a5-6: πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ' 
ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο). This is a very compressed way to state that in ‘direct’ 
standard activation of the ability to perceive (i.e., p1p2), senses do not become 
similar to the perceived object to the effect of becoming themselves actually 
perceptible, whereas in some special cases sense-organs may in fact undergo a 
physical alteration that makes them actually perceptible to themselves, according to 
the ‘indirect’ perceptual activation described above (p1p1*p2). In the latter case, 
Aristotle speaks of an organ that has become similar in a past moment and so is the 
same in quality (ἐκεῖνο) as the object affecting it, and thence actually perceptible. This 
formulation is clearly describing the literal alteration taking place in non-standard 
‘indirect’ activation of the power to perceive, which is what makes sense-organs able 
to perceive themselves (the literal affection is what leads to the state I described as 
p1*). This shows that sensory organs can indeed become actually perceptible, and thus 
perceive themselves, without this having to happen in each and every case of ‘normal’ 
perceiving. 
We can therefore try to escape the pessimistic reading shared by Ross (ad loc.) and 
Burnyeat (2002:51-52) about the initial announcement that ‘there will be certainly 
some occasion in the future to make some further clarification about these things’. The 
reference to a further clarification is certainly disappointing if, with Burnyeat, we 
expect this to mean that there will be some more detailed discussion about the 
distinction between ordinary and non-ordinary alterations. If I am right in 
interpreting the passage in the way I explained, Aristotle is rather thinking of the 
occasions in which he will consider non-standard perceptual experiences due to some 
affections on sensory organs that make them perceptible to themselves. The passage 
from De Sensu quoted earlier (437a22-b10) is a paradigmatic example, as it describes 
a peculiar a non-ordinary experience in which the eye sees itself because of a certain 
affection that makes it perceptible to itself. This is similar to what happens in the 
experience of after-images and other illusory perceptual phenomena Aristotle 
discusses in Insomn. 2 (459b1-11). In such cases, there is an actual affection on sense-
organs due to an imprecise counter-balancing of the incoming affection (the intensity 
of the sense-organ’s homeostatic counter-affection either exceeds the incoming 
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affection or falls short of it), and as a consequence the organs undergo an actual 
affection that makes them perceptible to themselves (cf. chapters 1, 2 and 4 of the 
present work for further discussion of the passage). In this way, the transition to the 
exercise of perception takes place by the ‘indirect’ and ‘sub-optimal’ route we are by 
now familiar with, since the original power (p1) is affected and altered, and thus 
reaches a temporary condition that tends to the deprivation of the original power 
(p1*). 
Conclusions 
In the reconstruction of DA II 5 I offered, the chapter is unified as a coherent whole by 
the necessity to solve the initial aporia about self-perception and self-activation of the 
sense organs. Aristotle explains very easily why self-activation is impossible, on the 
grounds of the potential state of what is able to perceive and the necessity of external, 
actually perceptible objects. The question left unanswered is why, once sense-organs 
are affected and thence become ‘like’ such objects, self-perception does not take place. 
This should in fact be expectable, since they are made of the same elements as 
external perceptible objects, and they should become themselves perceptible like 
them after the affection they undergo.  
As far as there is only one possible way in which the potentiality of the perceptual 
faculty is actualized, the sense-organs are affected and the exercise of perception 
reached, it would always be possible to point out that sense-organs should perceive 
external and internal perceptible objects (i.e. themselves qua perceptible) in the same 
way. In order to show why this is not in fact the case, Aristotle needs a more refined 
account of potentialities and actualities related to perception. It is exactly this refined 
account that DA II 5 is meant to provide.  
 Aristotle uses knowledge as a case-study to show that there may be two different 
ways to exercise one and same activity. The activity of ‘knowing this A’ is one and the 
same, but there is an obvious difference between reaching the activity from being a 
possessor of grammar, and shifting to it from being a ‘taught’ ignorant. In the latter 
case, the transition is possible thanks to an alteration that is able to deprive the 
subject of the initial state (while not yet ending in the replacement of ignorance by 
knowledge). In the other case, there is no alteration at all, and the previous affections 
that one may invoke are different from the ‘privative’ one, for they rather led to the 
obtainment of a stable hexis that complements the subject’s nature.  
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Aristotle finally applies the thesis of two transitions to the exercise of the same 
activity to the case of perception. Concerning perception, the state of full possession of 
the potentiality is the starting point for both the ‘direct’ optimal exercise and the 
‘indirect’ sub-optimal one. The latter type of transition takes place because of an 
affection that tends towards destruction of the initial state, while enabling an 
ephemeral disposition that makes sense-organs perceptible to themselves. There is an 
inevitable ambivalence in the terminology of ‘being affected’ here, but the difference is 
clear: to have a normally direct exercise of perception, a sense-organ must be 
dissimilar from the object to be perceived in order to be liable to be affected by it; in 
the case of an ‘indirect’ exercise of perception, the same condition rules, but the sense-
organ must also be actually affected to the effect of becoming qualitatively identical to 
the object, and thus actually perceptible like it. It is therefore true that at the end of II 
5 Aristotle unambiguously describes a literal alteration undergone by a sensory organ. 
However, such a literal assimilation characterizes the non-standard episodes or 
perception Aristotle is interested in here. 
Aristotle’s final answer to the aporia of self-perceiving sense-organs is that we do not 
normally perceive our own sense-organs, since they are not affected to the effect of 
becoming actually perceptible. However, in special circumstances sense-organs can in 
fact be affected to the effect of becoming perceptible to themselves. In such cases, they 
will accordingly perceive themselves, thus reaching the exercise of the power of 
perception by an non-ordinarily ‘indirect’ route, in analogy to what happens to a 
‘taught’ ignorant reaching the exercise of knowledge. 
 
Chapter 6 - Aristotle’s Theory of Perception: Some 
Conclusions 
In her study on Aristotle’s perceptual realism, Sarah Broadie (1993:145) wrote that 
‘in the absence of conclusive textual evidence’, the question whether Aristotle’s 
account of perception includes ‘physiological events in the role of mediators between 
perception itself and the external world (…) may remain unsolved’. The revised 
understanding of the meaning of μεσότης I offered supplies, I believe, something very 
close to a much desirable widening of the texts at our disposal. As I argued, the thesis 
(introduced in DA II 11 and recalled in DA II 12, III 7 and in Meteor. IV 2) describes the 
act of perceiving as a homeostatic ‘mediating balance’ of the incoming affection caused 
by an actually perceptible object on sense-organs. On the other hand, the alternative 
reading that makes it a description of the physical constitution of sense-organs turned 
out to be implausible: none of them is an ‘intermediate’ blend of the extreme 
opposites in the range of its perceptibles (with the exception of only one aspect of the 
organ of touch, its consistency).  
The rediscovery of the homeostatic physiology of perception enlightened several 
aspects of Aristotle’s theory. The thesis squares well with the idea (presented in De 
Insomniis) that sense organs react to the slightest affection they are subject to, and his 
cautious description of perception as an affection and alteration ‘of a certain kind’ are 
now perfectly sound. Similarly, it is clear how Aristotle can state that senses are 
impassive like thought, but in more limited way, and why he says that the exercise of 
perception is a ‘preservative’ type of affection, similar to the one that takes place 
when a knower ‘activates’ its knowledge in contemplation. For the same reason, the 
motivation behind his constant preoccupation with the maintenance of the sense-
organs’ original potentiality – the one which makes them liable to the stimulation 
caused by relevant perceptibles – can now be fully appreciated. Finally, it is evidently 
the homeostatic physiological process that dictates that sense organs which perceive 
F must be simultaneously able become both F and its opposite.  
The reconstruction I proposed has the curious consequence of mediating between 
some of the claims at the basis of Tranductionism and Spiritualism. Spiritualists turn 
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out to be right with regard to the assertion that sense organs are not in fact affected 
by an actual, ordinary change. However, such denial does not entail, nor suggest, the 
presence of ‘quasi-physical’ changes, nor a ‘de-physiologized’ account of perception. 
On the contrary, the reason why sense-organs are not actually changed as we perceive 
is that, thanks to a homeostatic physiological reaction, they counterbalance the 
incoming affection, and thus keep their receptive condition unaffected. For the same 
reason, my reading also entails a certain degree of agreement with transductionist 
interpreters. In order for the homeostatic counterbalancing to be effective, the 
intensity of the incoming affection must be commensurate to that of the perceptual 
reaction. As a consequence, the homeostatic process there will be a quantitative 
structure the incoming affection and the internal counter-affection have in common, 
and the latter will thus be describable as a particular type of ‘transduction’. Against 
transductionist interpreters, however, I do believe that the thesis that senses receive 
forms-without-matter is not portraying the physiological aspect of perceiving, but 
rather complementing it with the description of an aspect we would not hesitate to 
declare ‘mental’. To a certain extent, my view coincides with the traditional 
interpretation reprised by modern spiritualists: the form is received ‘cognitively’ and 
not ‘materially’, i.e. as an abstract aspect in the receiver’s ‘mind’, rather than as an 
aspect that qualifies the receiving subject as a whole. 
On the other hand, an important feature of my reading is irreconcilable with all the 
interpretations offered by modern scholars. As I argued, the ability to receive 
matterless forms is sufficient to be a sense-organ in the most proper way, and the 
signature simile, which only illustrates the ‘waterlessness’ of the received F, does not 
equate a wax block to a sense with regard to their receptive powers. Aristotle’s point 
is just that items received by senses are as ‘abstract’ as the signet ring’s signature 
(which is carried by a bronze subject, but is not a piece of bronze) received by a wax 
block. For this reason, it would be wrong to think that the ‘special’ affections of 
perceptibles on media are receptions of forms without matter (regardless of whether 
one construes them as ‘phenomenal’ and ‘quasi-physical’ alterations, or ‘codifications’, 
or ‘borrowings’ of properties with no intake of bodily parts from the agent).  
The widely accepted opinion that Aristotle faces the problem of distinguishing the 
affection caused by perceptibles on media and sense organs at the end of DA II 12 is 
mistaken. As the lack of a reply in the immediate continuation of the work suggests, 
the question he is asking is purely rhetorical. According to my reading, by the time we 
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reach the end of DA II 12 Aristotle with not one, but two ways to distinguish the 
effects that a perceptible F has on sense-organs and on inanimate objects, which 
respectively amounts to perceiving F and becoming perceptible as F. The first 
difference is physical: perceiving is a ‘special’ alteration and affection in which the 
initial condition is preserved by a μεσότης-like homeostatic process. The second 
invokes the mental aspect of perceiving: the activity of perception is a reception of 
abstract cognized aspects (causally powerless and metaphysically sterile matterless 
forms). Invocation of the activity of ‘perceiving that we see and hear’, then, is not 
required to distinguish the effect of perceptible forms on animate and inanimate 
subjects. In fact, such an attempt would be altogether mistaken, for Aristotle’s 
treatment of such activity in DA III 2 is not alluding to a notion of ‘awareness’ intrinsic 
to each and any act of perceiving. As I argued in ch. 4, the passage is rather attesting 
the necessary introduction of the common power to perceive per accidens, which 
enables each sense to perform further operations on first-order perceptual contents 
supplied by per se perception (such as colours, shapes, sounds, flavours and so on). 
Such operations, which includes the grouping and discrimination of simultaneously 
and cross-modally experienced perceptibles, are crucial to account for the richness 
and complexity of perceptual experience Aristotle generously grant to animals. 
As a result of my reconstruction, it is possible to combine the different aspects 
covered by Aristotle’s treatment in a complete definition, encompassing the four types 
of explanation characterizing his natural philosophy he distinguishes in the second 
book of his Physics. Perception is a homeostatic μεσότης-like process taking place in 
suitable sense-organs, triggered by an affection that actually perceptible objects 
exercise on them through a medium; qualia-inclusive ‘abstract’ items (i.e., causally 
powerless and metaphysically sterile matterless forms) are thus received, and the 
activity is functional to the preservation and well-being of animals (cf. DA III 12, 
434a30-b9). In Aristotle’s account, the source object’s perceptible F-with-the-matter 
is the ‘efficient’ cause of perception, whilst the ‘final’ one is the subject’s own 
preservation and well-being. It seems thus plausible to identify the formal cause in the 
matterless, qualia-possessing received form, and associate the μεσότης-like process 
taking place in the sensory apparatus with the material one. 
Thanks to my investigation, it is finally possible to assess the relationship between the 
reconstructed formal and material aspects of perception, and the position we should 
accordingly assign to Aristotle with regard to the mind body problem. To this end, it is 
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crucial to distinguish the question of the relationship between the formal and material 
descriptions of the event of perceiving (i.e., the perceptual activity and affection), from 
that concerning the power to perceive and the embodying sense-apparatus. 
With regard to the question about events, Aristotle states in DA I 1 (403a16-b25) that 
investigation about an affection like anger must include both the ‘formal’ and 
‘material’ aspects, i.e. its being a ‘desire for retaliation’ as well as a ‘boiling of the blood 
around the heart’. What Aristotle says at 403a16-25 suggests that a relation of 
determination connect the material aspect to the formal one, in so far as it is possible 
to feel a certain passion like fear or anger because of the occurrence of the 
corresponding physiological process.218 
It seems that all the affections of soul involve a body—passion, gentleness, fear, 
pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection 
of the body. In support of this we may point to the fact that, while sometimes on 
the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no excitement or fear 
felt, on others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when 
the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are 
angry. Here is a still clearer case: in the absence of any external cause of terror 
we find ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror. From all this it is 
obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered accounts (403a16-25, ROT).  
In the frame of the interpretation I propose, nothing suggests that perception is an 
exception to this general approach, and its being taken as the most evident type of 
activity ‘common to body and soul’ (Sens. 1, 436b2-436b9) rather appears as evidence 
for its inclusion in this explanatory scheme.219 If this is right, the passage satisfies a 
first condition to claim the supervenience of the formal aspect of perceiving on the 
material one, in so far as it establishes a relation of determination grounding the 
former on the latter. 
My interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of receiving forms without the matter, which 
constitutes the ‘formal’ aspect of perceptual events, can be helpful with regard to a 
further condition for supervenience, namely the existence of a distinction of the 
involved aspects as belonging to two different types. That the formal aspect of 
perceiving belongs to a type that is different from the ‘material’ one is evident, if we 
consider that the received matterless forms are in my view causally powerless, 
                                                             
218 As Caston (1997: 332-334) has argued, the passage shows that the bodily aspect of 
events like anger is sufficient for the determination of the affection as a whole, inclusive of 
is formal aspect. It must be noted that different interpretations of the passage have been 
offered, according to which it actually denies supervenience (Heinaman, 1990:101; 
Burnyeat, 1992:23). Against this reading, cf. again Caston (1997:333, n.54). 
219 Cf. chapter 2 above, p. 47, note 55.  
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whereas the ‘enmattered’ ones involved in the physiological reaction are causally 
efficacious, in so far as they counterbalance the incoming affection.220 Since, as I 
argued, what such reception receives are actual abstractions endowed with a 
phenomenal quality, we are also justified in considering the type under which the 
‘formal’ aspect of perception falls as ‘mental’.221 On the other hand, my reconstruction 
is evidently incompatible with the attribution of ‘downward’ causal powers to the 
‘mental’ aspect of the perceptual event (i.e., the mental activity of perceiving). In other 
words, as far as perceptual activities (as opposed to perceptual powers) are 
concerned, the formal aspect is a powerless epiphenomenal event, rather than an 
emergent efficacious one.222 Any causal efficacy ascribed to the activity of perception 
as a whole (such as the motions of limbs in the organism), then, is strictly speaking 
due to its physiological aspect, and it is only in virtue of the latter that the ‘formal’ or 
‘mental’ one can be coincidentally described as efficacious.223  
As I anticipated, I believe that the question about the relationship between formal and 
material aspects of powers has to be kept distinguished from the one concerning 
events. A first difference between the two is evident, for in the case of the hylomorphic 
link of soul and body (established in DA II 1-2) the ‘formal’ aspect (i.e. the soul) is not 
a powerless epiphenomenon. On the contrary, Aristotle attributes irreducible causal 
                                                             
220 A different view is proposed by Charles (2009:10-17), according to which the two 
aspects are ‘determinants’ in the definition of a single event belonging to one, inextricably 
and non-decomposably psycho-physical type. For a criticism of Charles’ interpretation, cf. 
Caston (2009:30-47). 
221 My view is accordingly convergent with observations made on this regard by Irwin and 
Sorabji. In Irwin’s view, in the case of perception a ‘mental’ subset of soul-related formal 
aspects can be distinguished, which include a reference to the notion of ‘appearing’ to a 
subject (1991:78-81). Sorabji (1992:208) suggests that formal aspects in Aristotle’s 
treatment of perception are those that define its content in relation to other capacities on 
the same domain (he quotes as possible examples ‘belief, reason, appearance, memory, 
experience, and concept formation’), rather than in relation to aspects of a different level 
‘such as physiological states, or behaviour, or the performance of functions’. In this sense, 
formal aspects of perception are in his view corresponding to those we would describe as 
‘intentional’. 
222 I use ‘emergent’, ‘supervenient’ and ‘epiphenomenal’ in the sense specified by Caston 
(1997:310-319), who attributes to Aristotle the claim that perception is supervenient and 
emergent on matter. Emergentist readings of Aristotle’s theory have been advocated also 
by Scaltsas (1996:28-29) and Heinaman (1990: 90-91). 
223 Note that this does not exclude that the ‘formal’ aspect determines the content of other 
‘mental’ faculties: for instance, the reception of matterless F contributes to the 
determination of the (second-order) perception that F is being perceived, or that F and G 
constitute an unity. It is easy, but perhaps mistaken, to consider the contribution to the 
‘top-top’ determination of mental content as a causal effect of matterless form, but such 
causal talk is strictly speaking precluded by their causal impotency. 
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powers to living beings in virtue of their souls. This is evident, for instance, as he 
invokes the soul to explain why organisms like plants resist to the disaggregation due 
to the opposite kinetic tendencies belonging to elements composing them (DA II 4, 
416a6-9, cf. Caston 1997:329).  
Arguably, a second feature distinguishing the hylomorphic connection between soul 
and body from the one between formal and material aspects of the perceptual event is 
the lack of evidence for the institution of a relation of supervenience. Sense-organs are 
on Aristotle’s account made of simple elements, and they display no complexity or 
microstructure (cf. Burnyeat 1995 and Johansen 1998). Yet, they have the power to 
counterbalance incoming affections by a μεσότης-like homeostatic reaction, and the 
power to receive matterless form thanks to a principle that resides in them (cf. DA II 
12, 424a24-b3). These powers have a remarkable degree of independence from 
matter and cannot be determined by it, since inanimate bodies made of the same 
materials exposed to the same stimulation (the causal agency of actually perceptible 
subjects) can at most become perceptible, and they surely cannot perceive. If, as 
Burnyeat injuncts, we aim at respecting the spirit of Aristotle’s text, rather than at 
providing a philosophy of mind inspired by it, we should take this as an indication 
against the supervenience of the power to perceive (and of soul in general) on the 
body. 
The independence of soul from the body need not be absolute, nor does it preclude a 
certain co-variance between them. Some kind of reciprocal dependency connects the 
two, in so far as Aristotle recognizes precise constraints for the implementation of a 
certain form: not any chance matter can be combined with any chance form to 
constitute a hylomorphic unity (cf. DA I 3, 407b20-25). For the same reason, form and 
matter are somewhat co-variant, at least to the extent to which a suitable material 
substrate is a necessary instrumental condition for the realizability of x forms, which 
is in turn necessary for the material substrate to actually constitute a certain 
specimen of x. According to this view, a hypothetical replica of Socrates, identical in all 
respects to the original with regard to elemental composition (proportion and 
arrangement of chemical elements), does not need to possess the same powers, and 
thus cannot engage in the same activities, as the original Socrates. Yet, variation in the 
physical constitution of the original Socrates does affect his psychic powers, in so far 
as it can spoil (or provide) the necessary instrumental conditions for the exercise of 
soul’s powers.  
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If the reconstruction of the relation between soul and body is correct, what the latter 
determines is whether an already possessed vital power is actually ready to be 
exercised or not. For instance, the lack of eyes in the body of an embryo makes the 
exercise of the power of sight impossible. The formation of suitable organs does not 
correspond to the acquisition of the power to see, though, in the same way as their 
decaying in old age does not determine the deterioration of the power itself (408b20-
29). The suitability of the body determines the attenuation or elimination of 
impediments for the readiness of an already possessed power with regard to the 
corresponding exercised activity, and not the possession of the power itself.224  
The ‘downward’ causal powers of the soul Aristotle recognizes, then, do not emerge 
from the material level, but are rather primitive properties of an immaterial agent 
governing and ‘using’ suitable matter at its disposal.225 This view is incompatible with 
supervenience, and suggests Aristote’s commitment to a form of non-emergent 
vitalism that must avoid substance dualism, if coherence with his hylomorphic 
account of the soul has to be saved. With regard to the relationship between 
perceptual (and more generally vital) powers and the material constitution 
implementing them, as opposed to what we observed with regard to formal and 
material aspects of perceptual activities, Aristotle’s position is therefore best 
understood as a form of quasi-dualist vitalism compatible with hylomorphism.226 
What I aimed at establishing is that Aristotle theory of perception takes into account 
both its mental and physiological aspects. He embraces a non-emergentist and quasi-
dualist form of vitalism with regard to the principle endowing suitable bodies with 
                                                             
224 Cf. This would then account for the suitability requirement of DA I 3, as well for the 
other passage quoted by Caston (1997: 334-337) to attribute to Aristotle the 
supervenience of soul on matter (Phys. VII 3, 246a4-8; GA II 1, 735a6-7; LBV 3, 465a27-31, 
Juv. 4, 469b6-20; 6, 470a19-20; 23, 478b31-32). 
225 A similar view is proposed by Miller (1999:203-213). Labeled as ‘epigenetic’ by his 
author, the view is assimilated to some form of vitalism by Caston (1999:221-223). 
Miller’s use of the thesis that perception is a discrimination as a proof for this 
interpretation is unconvincing, and rightly criticised by Caston (ibid., 224). Furthermore, 
Miller does not distinguish, as I do, between the question of bottom up (matter to form) 
determination in the case of events. The evidence he proposes is rather directed at 
showing the ‘epigenesis’ of the activity of perceiving (cf. Miller 1999:208), which does not 
fit with the supervenient epiphenomenalism I attribute to Aristotle on the same issue . 
226 Caston (1999:225-226) appears to believe that a form of vitalism denying 
supervenience would entail substance dualism and be incompatible with hylomorphism. 
That some type of psychological dualism may be compatible with Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism is recognized by Irwin (1991:71-73). Different sorts of non-Cartesian 
dualism have been attributed to Aristotle’s psychology by Robinson (1978:117-120), 
Shields (1988) and Granger (1990:46-49). 
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perceptual powers, while being an epiphenomenalist as far the material (physical) 
and formal (mental) aspects of the act of perceiving are concerned.  
By exploiting his hylemorphic metaphysics, Aristotle remarkably depicts the 
experiential and cognitive aspect of perception, and thus captures the specificity of the 
mental, without introducing notions like consciousness and intentionality, which are 
common currency among modern philosophers of mind. Whether this led him to 
elegantly avoid unsuitably confusing concepts, or to confusedly gesture at a 
distinction that is better approached by modern criteria, remains a question worth of 
accurate reflection.227  
On the other hand, as far as physiology is concerned Aristotle’s position turns out to 
be less than exciting. To be sure, no one would expect to learn something on the 
subject by reading his works, but it may still be disappointing to realize that what he 
saw as he looked at sense-organs was just simple, elemental bodies: the cold watery 
eye jelly, the airy auditive sensors, a warm ‘homeomerous’ fleshy mixture having 
intermediate consistency. This he owes, with all probability, to the empirical evidence 
at his disposal, filtered through the bias of the science of his time (cf. Sens. 2, 437a19-
26 and 438b16-439a5). And yet, we should not overlook nor underestimate his firm 
commitment to an intuition we modern share with him, according to which some 
special physical process must be taking place in our bodies in order for perception to 
take place. If we try to image how frustratingly impotent the ancient four-element 
chemistry could have appeared to his eyes, and how desperately simple the matter of 
vital organs must have looked in comparison to phenomena that have not yet stopped 
to amaze us after more than two thousand years, we may found Aristotle’s postulation 
of a vitalistic immaterial agent not altogether unreasonable.  
The vitalist position I attribute to Aristotle accommodates the challenging 
conservatism of modern spiritualist interpreters, at least with regard to the 
primitiveness of soul powers. On the other hand, Aristotle’s account of the activity of 
perceiving is not the ‘de-physiologized’ one they depict, and under this respect his 
theory is as credible as contemporary epiphenomenalism. What has to be rejected as 
incredible, then, is not Aristotle’s philosophy of mind, but rather the impotent 
chemistry leading him to rebut the supervenience of vital and cognitive powers on 
matter. In the end, we may rest assured that the elements of Aristotle’s thought that 
actually need to be ‘junked’ have already been disposed of, long time ago. 
                                                             
227 An opinionated discussion is offered by Wilkes 1992. 
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